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Abstract 
 
Although private family organisations are prevalent role players in both the South 
African and international economies, limited research has been performed with regard 
to them. In terms of regulatory requirements, South African private organisations are 
neither legally required to comply with corporate governance principles, nor are they 
required to make their financial data available to the general public. Lack of available 
data, and limited available research, have resulted in an absence of clarity with regard 
to whether governance structures in private family organisations add any value to these 
organisations. This study therefore explores, through the use of a multiple-case study, 
how the individual private family organisations have structured their governance 
mechanisms, and the reasons as to why they chose to implement these structures. Both 
case studies revealed that governance structures, in general, add value. The 
implemented governance structures may even have contributed to the increase in 
financial performance over time.   
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. OVERVIEW 
Family organisations are ever-present. Ernesto Poza (2009:1-2), a renowned professor 
in entrepreneurship at the Thunderbird School of Global Management, suggests that 
there are roughly 17 million family organisations in the United States of America (US) 
alone and that they account for the majority (in the region of 90%) of incorporated 
businesses in the US. Approximately 33% of the Fortune 500 (US) companies are 
under family control and roughly 60% of publicly traded organisations in the US are 
under family influence. Poza (2009:2) also notes that, in spite of the perception that 
family organisations are underperforming due to internal conflict and favouritism, their 
financial performance still exceeds that of non-family organisations. Notwithstanding 
their obvious contribution to international and local economies, as well as their crucial 
role in society, limited research (Van der Merwe 2009:2) has been done on family 
organisations, and more specifically, on private (unlisted) family organisations’ 
governance structures and the effect thereof on organisational value. This study on the 
governance structures of private family organisations will therefore be contributing to the 
current body of knowledge.  
 
Family organisations are unique organisations in that they do not only need to consider 
the demands of their ownership structure and the management of strategic and 
operational activities of the business, but they also need to incorporate and manage 
family dynamics (Schwass 2008:2). The composition of family organisations therefore 
requires a unique form of governance.  
 
One of the reasons for having governance structures in place in any organisation is to 
ensure that the various risks identified by the organisation are managed effectively. 
Agyei-Ampomah and Collier (2009:78), as well as Zalewska (2014:1), highlight the fact 
that the failures of well-known international companies such as Enron and WorldCom—
and in South Africa, companies such as Fidentia and Sharemax—have drawn the 
attention of the public and management, and the shareholders of organisations, to the 
need for adequate corporate governance.  
 
Since unlisted family organisations’ financial and other proprietary information is not 
made available to the general public and the media, information pertaining to the failure 
rate of these organisations as a result of ineffective governance structures is also not 
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available. This study is important and necessary because it has access to the financial 
information of the featured private family organisations and therefore might contribute to 
lessen the gap in the current body of knowledge.   
 
1.2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1.2.1. FAMILY ORGANISATIONS 
 
International research has revealed that family businesses contribute between 64% and 
59% to the gross domestic product in the US (Astrachan & Shanker 2003:217). In terms 
of developing countries, family businesses contribute 63% of the gross national product 
in Brazil and 65% of the gross national product in India (Timmons & Spinelli 2007, in 
Van Buuren 2007:3). In the US, family organisations represent approximately 89% of all 
incorporated businesses (Astrachan & Shanker 2003:216). In Brazil and Chile, family 
organisations represent 90% and 75% of all incorporated businesses respectively 
(Timmons & Spinelli 2007, in Van Buuren 2007:3). These contributions are supported 
by Björnberg, Dias and Elstrodt’s (2014:1) research, which indicates that 60% of 
emerging-market companies are owned by founders or their families. Some of the 
biggest, or more well-known, international family businesses include the following: 
Walmart (Walton family), with a revenue of $476.3 billion, founded in 1962 (Bain 2015); 
BMW (Quandt family); Estée Lauder (Lauder family); and LG (Koo family). 
 
Family organisations are also pivotal to the South African economy. Based on a 
quarterly statistical survey (Statistics South Africa 2012), small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) contribute 34.6% of all organisational revenue generated in South Africa. 
Further research shows that approximately 80% of businesses in South Africa fall within 
the family business framework (Diederichs & Maas 2007:4). According to KPMG, family 
businesses constitute 70% of all businesses in Africa and 65% of all companies in 
South Africa (KPMG 2015:2). The financial and social contribution of family businesses 
to the welfare of the South African and African economies should, therefore, be given 
due consideration. Well-known family businesses in South Africa include Remgro 
(Rupert), De Beers (Oppenheimer), Pick n Pay (Ackerman), Altech (Venter), 
Van Loveren (Retief), and Hirsch’s (Hirsch). The oldest family business in South Africa 
is Boplaas, a wine producer in the Koue Bokkeveld, Western Cape. Boplaas has been 
managed by the Van der Merwe family since 1743 (Family Business Association of 
South Africa 2016).    
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1.2.2. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
 
The draft King IV report states that “Governance is indispensable for growth and 
prosperity” (IoDSA 2016:1). It continues to report that organisations that implement 
good corporate governance support “sustainable value creation in South Africa, Africa, 
and ultimately, globally” (IoDSA 2016:1). Good governance is therefore critical to all 
organisations since it provides structure and control to organisations, which then leads 
to accountability and responsibility of the various role players within the organisations. 
Since family organisations are complex in terms of the various roles played by its 
internal stakeholders, good governance structures assist in clarifying and demystifying 
these roles and responsibilities. It creates a transparent environment and therefore 
builds trust, not only as far as internal stakeholders are concerned, but also in the 
marketplace (Gallo & Kenyon-Rouvinez 2005:45). Governance, as a prerequisite for 
successful trans-generational family organisations, also provides contextual structure 
within which “roles, policies, processes and controls” (Deloitte 2016:13) can be 
developed and applied. This is important since the growth and potential expansion of 
the family organisation, and the resultant need for more resources (e.g. financial and 
human resources), calls for a more structured governance framework within family 
organisations (Deloitte 2016:13). 
 
Accounting and finance researchers have, until recently, mainly been focusing their 
corporate governance research on listed companies. Therefore, it could be reasoned 
that sufficient effort has not been bestowed on the research of governance in private 
companies (Brennan & Solomon 2008:889). This might be due to the general 
perception that corporate governance is exclusively relevant to large organisations that 
trade their shares publicly. Leanordo Viegas (Jordaan & Viegas 2012:1), a founding 
member and deputy chairman of Brazil’s Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC), 
challenges the current status quo by stating that improved governance is even more 
important in private family organisations than in listed organisations.  
 
1.2.3. ORGANISATIONAL VALUE 
 
Governance structures in a family organisation context influence internal stakeholders’ 
stewardship attitudes, agency costs and consequently, organisational value (Greene, 
Guidice & Mero 2013:233). Therefore, the question that needs to be raised should be as 
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to what constitutes organisational value in terms of private organisations and, more 
specifically, as to what constitutes organisational value in terms of private family 
organisations, as defined in Chapter  2.2.   
 
According to Pindado & Requejo (2015:285), organisational value in a family 
organisation context encompasses value from both a financial and a non-financial 
viewpoint. This can include financial performance which is measured through traditional 
accounting methods, e.g. net profit and return on assets (ROA), or alternatively, through 
more market orientated methods, e.g. economic value added (EVA) and market 
capitalisation. In addition to financial value, it might also include value from a non-
financial or socio-emotional—the “utilities family owners derive from the non-economic 
aspects of the business” (Gottardo & Moisello 2015:67)—viewpoint, e.g. ownership 
transfer over generations, sustainability, and socio-economic contributions to the 
organisation’s contiguous community and/or that of society as a whole.  
 
At present, literature on family organisations and firm performance presents conflicting 
results. Some studies of family organisations indicate a correlation between the 
concentrated ownership structure and firm performance, whereas others cannot 
conclude any direct correlation between these two elements (Duran-Encalada & San 
Martin-Reyna 2012:107). The reasons for the differences in the results have not yet 
been properly explained by researchers and therefore require further investigation 
(Giovannini 2010:149). In order to gain a better understanding of why contradicting 
results are obtained in the investigation of value as it relates to family organisations, 
researchers might need to consider the heterogeneity of family organisations (Mengoli, 
Pazzaglia & Sapienza 2013:374), as well as the potential impact of family organisations’ 
socio-emotional wealth attitude on the value of these organisations. Socio-emotional 
wealth has therefore become a prevalent topic in family organisational research (Dou, 
Su & Zhang 2014:260).  
 
1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
“The idea that underlies the moderating effect of corporate governance mechanisms is 
that the impact of family control on business conduct and performance, in terms of 
strength and sign, depends on whether family firms adopt an adequate corporate 
governance structure.” (Pindado & Requejo 2015:292) 
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Family organisations are prevalent role players in both the South African and 
international economies. Family organisations are not restricted to small and medium-
sized enterprises, but also include large corporations and business groups where 
business families exercise control over these organisations (Pindado & Requejo 
2015:280). Should all of the organisations’ financial value be optimised, it may have a 
direct impact on, not only the shareholders and internal stakeholders, but also on 
external stakeholders and society as a whole. One area that can be considered to play 
a defining role in the maximisation or decline of a family organisation’s value is its 
governance structures.  
 
Publicly traded companies are operating in an extremely regulated environment, with 
specific reference to listing requirements,—and in South Africa—the Companies Act 
No. 71 of 2008 (Government Gazette No 32121, 2009), hereafter referred to as “the 
Companies Act”, and good corporate governance principles laid down by King III 
(IoDSA 2009). The composition of their governance structures is therefore regulated 
and do not allow for much innovation. Private companies, as defined in terms of section 
8 of the Companies Act, tend to comply to a lesser extent with any of the governance 
regulations or principles that are applicable to public companies as they do not 
necessarily see the benefit of incurring the related additional costs. This is confirmed by 
the KPMG Family Business Survey 2011 which indicates, in its key findings, that less 
than half of the participating organisations are governed by a board of directors, and just 
more than 20% ensure that the members of management are evaluated objectively 
(KPMG & Family Business Australia 2011:14).  
 
To comply with good corporate governance practices as presented in King III, public 
companies normally have independent directors on their board of directors, as well as 
independent non-executive chairpersons (IoDSA 2009:24). In private family 
organisations this might not be the case as most family members prefer to keep control 
of the organisation’s resources, financial information, and decision making powers 
(Daily & Dollinger 1992:133). 
 
Referring to the earlier discussion on contradicting findings regarding the impact of the 
governance structures on organisational value, prior international studies (which 
focuses mostly on publicly traded companies) have indicated that family members in 
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management, executive management, and on the board of directors, have a positive 
effect on organisational value because they act as stewards, which therefore supports 
the stewardship theory (Andres 2008:432), lowers agency costs (Adiguzel 2013:17), 
allows longer investment and strategic views (Kenyon-Rouvinez & Ward 2005:3), and 
lessens the appetite for undue risk. They also have more insight into, and knowledge of, 
the business than professional managers have (Duran-Encalada & San Martin-Reyna 
2012:107).  
 
Notwithstanding the above, other studies indicated a negative correlation between 
governance structures and organisational value. The reasons given include nepotism 
(Duran-Encalada & San Martin-Reyna 2012:109), increased agency cost—as described 
under the agency theory in Chapter  2.3.1 (Poza 2009:13), limited access to financing or 
new capital (PwC 2012:11), lack of independent views or external experience 
incorporated on an executive management or board of director level (Brenes, Madrigal 
& Requena 2011:281; Duran-Encalada & San Martin-Reyna 2012:109), reservation of 
senior positions for family members whether or not they are qualified for the position 
(Ehsan, Jabeen & Kaleem 2012:10305), family conflict (Franco & Haase 2012:10874; 
Jimenez, Martinez & Palacios 2013:60), and family dynamics that are not attended to 
(Fishman 2009:3).  
 
The three-circle model of family businesses (see Figure 4) highlights the interaction 
between ownership, management, and family. Family businesses can be classified 
based on their tendency to lean more towards one of the three spheres (Poza 2009:9). 
Their inclination towards ownership and family, instead of management, might also limit 
their ability to perform financially at an optimal level. 
 
In order for family organisations to be successful, it is vital to ensure that the three 
circles are in equilibrium. Pindado and Requejo (2015:287-288) explain that, in addition 
to the above, control structures and management impact upon family organisational 
value. Having a management team that is proficient (and where necessary 
independent), owners that are accountable—not only to other shareholders and societal 
stakeholders, but also to the extended family and the business—as well as having 
consistent, affable interpersonal relationships between family members, might 
contribute to this success. Prosperous organisations normally have formal policies 
governing the structure, selection, appointment, and performance management of 
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executive and operational management. The above policies need to make provision for 
family and non-family members (PwC 2011:9). 
 
Unlike family organisations that are publicly traded, limited research has been done on 
family organisations that are not publicly traded (Pindado & Requejo 2015:284-285). 
This may be due to the challenge of obtaining private organisations’ financial and other 
relevant data. Another potential reason for the limited research on private family 
organisations may be the presence of unique non-financial goals of small family 
organisations (Pindado & Requejo 2015:285). These goals may result in findings that 
are not generalisable to the remainder of the family business arena.  
 
In certain countries, private companies are required to make their financial statements 
available to the wider public, whereas in South Africa this is not the case. Except for the 
submission of financial data to the Receiver of Revenue, and the requirement to submit 
revenue figures to the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), no 
regulations could be identified that require South African private companies to submit 
detailed financial statements to any person or institution outside of their organisation or 
direct financiers. As per CIPC’s website, on the “Financial Statements and Independent 
Reviews” page, it is stated that private companies “may elect to voluntarily file their 
audited or reviewed statements with their annual return” (own emphasis) (Companies 
and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because of the limited research on private family organisations, the lack of available 
financial data, and the resulting difficulty of comparison, there is presently no clarity on 
whether, or to what extent, the governance structures of a private family organisation—
especially in a South-African context—adds value to the organisation. This problem 
therefore necessitated the need for this study. 
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1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
The main research objective of this study is as follows: 
A. To determine how the governance of the selected private family organisations is 
structured, why it is structured as such, and whether or not these implemented 
structures add any value to the selected private family organisations. The 
conceptual framework within which this research objective will be explored is 
visually represented in Figure 1.  
 
The main research objective can be broken down into a number of sub-objectives:  
A.1. To determine a theoretical framework, through a detailed literature review, of 
proposed governance structures within private family organisations. The literature 
review includes the minimum legal requirements, or recommendations, for the 
composition of a board of directors, the make-up of executive management teams, 
as well as the policies (if there are any) that govern private family organisations; 
A.2. To identify, through a multiple-case study analysis, the format and levels of 
governance structures in the selected private family organisations; 
A.3. To gain an in-depth understanding, through a multiple-case study analysis, as to 
why the relevant governance structures were implemented in the respective 
private family organisations; and 
A.4 To determine, through a multiple-case study analysis, whether or not the 
implementation of governance structures in the selected private family 
organisations added any value to the respective organisations. 
 
The conceptual framework, as depicted in Figure 1, illustrates the analytical context 
within which this study on private family organisations is located.  The analytical context 
includes the supervisory and managerial governance structures within private family 
organisations. Supervisory governance structures refer to the board of directors, more 
specifically, the chairperson of the board and the individual board members. Managerial 
governance structures refer to the composition of management, as well as the relevant 
policies governing the affairs of the organisation. The value-adding of the governance 
structures as discussed, is considered from both a financial and a non-financial view 
point. 
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Figure 1: Visual presentation of the conceptual framework  
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the literature review)
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1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Research on unlisted or private family organisations displays inconsistent results when 
compared to the results found in publicly listed organisations (Mazzi 2011:172). This 
therefore necessitates a more in-depth investigation into the structure and objectives of 
private family organisations and their effects on the value of private family 
organisations. Chrisman, Gersick and Sharma (2012:8) allude to the fact that there is 
currently a gap in the body of knowledge about the “why” and the “how” of family-
business relationships. This is partly a result of the difficulties that surround the 
definition and measurement of family-business relationships. 
 
A literature review and a qualitative multiple-case study were performed to address the 
research objectives as formulated in Chapter  1.4. Based on the discoveries made 
during this process, certain conclusions were drawn and recommendations were made. 
 
In order to enhance the family business discipline, it is important to build on the 
foundation of prior research (Pindado & Requejo 2015:280). It was therefore deemed 
important to review and comprehend the current body of knowledge as it relates to 
family organisations, governance structures, and the effect of these on the value of 
private family organisations.  
 
The multifaceted nature of private family organisations necessitated an in-depth review 
of their organisational structures. A qualitative multiple-case study design was therefore 
decided upon because it might be able to shed light on how and why family 
organisations are structured. It might also be able to shed light on the effect of these 
structures on the organisational value of family organisations.   
 
1.6. DELINEATION AND LIMITATIONS 
The study is demarcated as follows:  
Subject area:    Family organisations 
Country:    South Africa 
Legal form:    Privately-held companies and closed corporations 
Industry: Agricultural manufacturing industry—specifically dairy  
Turnover:    > R100 million per annum 
Minimum years in business: 6 years 
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The target organisations were South African family organisations which operate in the 
agricultural manufacturing industry (as defined in terms of the Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities (SIC)). These organisations were in business for 
at least six years and their 2012 financial year-end turnover exceeded R100 million. The 
financial data collected was for a period of at least five consecutive financial years. This 
was done in order to control for any short-term, non-continuous, or out of the ordinary 
changes in financial information. 
 
The following limitations played an important role in the decision to follow the specific 
research design: 
Theoretical limitations 
- The objective of this study is to determine the value that governance structures add 
to private family organisations. The objective is not to determine the value that is 
added to the market place and society in general. The findings are accordingly 
aimed at expanding current theories in order to perform analytical generalisation 
and not statistical generalisation. 
 
Methodological limitations 
- There is no national database on family organisations available in South Africa. It is 
therefore difficult and not cost-effective to identify a large enough population on 
which to perform a quantitative study through empirical surveys.  
- Financial information is not easily accessible because private organisations in South 
Africa are not required by law to disclose their financial data to external parties. 
- The potential impact of different accounting frameworks, used in the preparation of 
the annual financial statements, should be considered when performing any 
financial statement analysis. This confirms that a pure quantitative approach will not 
be ideal as the financial data cannot be compared without studying the underlying 
assumptions and policies that were applied in the preparation of the relevant sets of 
financial statements.   
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1.7. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
Corporate governance: The system of rules, practices, and processes by which 
organisations are directed and controlled (Chauhan & 
Chauhan 2014:211). This system includes effective and 
ethical leadership (responsibility, accountability, fairness and 
transparency); business, societal and environmental 
sustainability; and responsible corporate citizenship (IoDSA 
2009:9). 
Family organisation: See definition as described under chapter  2.2 (literature 
review). 
Governance 
structures: 
Stipulate the rights and responsibilities among various 
stakeholders in the organisation, and specify the rules and 
procedures for decision taking in corporate matters. 
(Chauhan & Chauhan 2014:211). 
Independent director: With reference to the Companies Act and King III, an 
independent director should not have a material direct or 
indirect shareholding in the organisation, should not be 
involved in the day-to-day running of the organisation, should 
not be a prescribed officer or full time employee of the 
organisation and should not have been as such during the 
previous three financial years. The director should also not, 
currently and during the preceding 3 financial years, be a 
material supplier or customer of the organisation, or any 
professional advisor or auditor (PSG Capital 2014:39). 
In addition to this, the individuals should not have any prior or 
current relationships with the organisation or any of its 
employees that may impair their ability to act in an 
independent, ethical, and professional manner (McHugh & 
Perrault 2015:8). 
Value: The relative worth or importance to the stakeholders of an 
organisation. Value can include financial and non-financial 
value. See detailed discussion under chapter  2.4  2.2 
(literature review). 
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Value-adding: The increase in value, or the value creation, resultant from 
the presence of certain structures, processes, and/or systems 
in an organisation. 
 
1.8. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
Family organisations are unique organisations wherein business and family dynamics 
play a reciprocal role. The study of these organisations expands on current cross-
disciplinary research because it addresses not only the family research discipline or the 
business discipline, but a combination of these disciplines (Chrisman et al. 2012:8).   
 
As the majority of existing research focuses on listed companies, due to the ease of 
access to data, this study will contribute to the limited research on unlisted family 
organisations, their governance structures, and their organisational value. The study 
might also provide insight into privately held family organisations which would assist 
them in the identification of an optimal governance structure to facilitate enhanced 
organisational value.  
 
Family organisations’ contributions to the country’s gross domestic product are material 
and, therefore, increased organisational value could have a positive effect on the South 
African gross domestic product. In addition to financial contribution, governance 
structures, as an element of effective corporate governance, improve ethical behaviour 
within family organisations and thus allow society to trust the business sector which 
consequently results in social justice. 
 
In addition to the above, academics and future researchers will benefit from the 
additional knowledge created in the fields of family organisations, governance, and 
organisational value. 
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1.9. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The dissertation is divided into five chapters and will be structured as follows: 
- Chapter 1: Introduction 
- Chapter 2: Literature review, within the organisational framework of family 
organisations, governance structure, and organisational value 
- Chapter 3: Research methodology 
- Chapter 4: Presentation and analysis of data gathered 
- Chapter 5: Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
- Reference list 
- Annexures  
 
Chapter 1 provides a brief outline of the project as a whole. It also explains the 
structure of the dissertation. 
Chapter 2 entails a thorough literature review of articles in academic journals, subject- 
related books, surveys performed by academic and non-academic institutions, and 
other relevant sources. It will be broken down into three main focus areas, namely 
family organisations (including the theories applicable to these types of organisations), 
governance structures, and a discussion on financial and non-financial value. 
Chapter 3 will discuss the research design and the methodology followed, which 
includes the identification of the units of analyses, as well as, the data collection and 
research instruments. It will also discuss the data analysis, the limitations and the 
ethical considerations.  
Chapter 4 will present and analyse the case data as gathered from the respective 
family organisations. These findings will be discussed under the featured cases, after 
which, a cross-case analysis will be presented.   
Chapter 5 will discuss the final conclusions and recommendations that may assist 
private family organisations in identifying an optimal governance structure that would 
facilitate improved organisational value. It will also make suggestions for further 
research.  
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section is in response to research objective A.1. which reads as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The literature review will provide an overview of the body of knowledge against which 
the study is theoretically positioned. It is also important to show the varying schools of 
thought and the current debates within the scholarship of this study. As such, this 
chapter then affirms the theoretical and applied areas which this study seeks to 
address. 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Globally, family organisations play an important role in wealth creation. As per Ernst and 
Young, family organisations account for 66,7% of all businesses worldwide and 
contribute up to “80% of jobs in the majority of countries” (Ernst & Young Global Limited 
2015:5). Family organisations are mostly socially responsible organisations that, in 
addition to their material contributions to job creation, generally have a 
transgenerational approach to the economic welfare of their organisations and 
stakeholders; they therefore contribute substantially to the long-term economic 
development in both their local communities and regional economies (European 
Parliament 2015).  
 
Family organisations can take various forms and can also present themselves in 
different sizes, namely small businesses, small and medium-sized enterprises, large 
enterprises, listed companies, and multi-nationals (Carayannis, Del Guidice & Della 
Peruta 2011:115; European Parliament 2015; Kenyon-Rouvinez & Ward 2005:1). They 
are therefore exposed to different challenges which range from estate planning for 
founder members of small businesses, to corporate legislation, and listing requirements 
of stock exchanges.  
 
To determine a theoretical framework, through a detailed literature review, of 
proposed governance structures within private family organisations. This includes the 
minimum legal requirements, or recommendations, for the composition of a board of 
directors, the make-up of executive management teams, as well as the policies (if 
there are any) that govern private family organisations. 
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Research on family organisations, and the implementation of relevant findings, can 
therefore be of significant value to the shareholders and management of family 
organisations, as well as to the other stakeholders connected to family organisations. It 
can also add indirect value to local communities and regional economies because better 
performing family organisations may increase job-creation and may make greater 
contributions to the gross domestic product (GDP).  
 
The literature identifies a number of themes that relate to family organisations, which 
include, but are by no means limited to, interpersonal dynamics and family conflict, 
leadership and management, succession planning and continuity, transgenerational 
wealth creation, and governance (Benavides-Velasco, Guzma´n-Parra, Quintana-
Garcı´a 2013:47; Filser et al. 2015:118). The remit of this study was established through 
searching academic databases including Emerald, EBSCO (data bases for Accounting 
Science) using key search terms such as governance, family business, performance, 
etc. 
 
This chapter will provide a detailed discussion on the literature as it relates to the nature 
and characteristics of family organisations and the relevant governance structures in a 
family organisational context. It will also provide a discussion on the objectives of these 
organisations to create financial and non-financial value. 
 
2.2 FAMILY ORGANISATIONS 
 
Various definitions for family organisations can be identified in the literature (Astrachan 
& Shanker 2003:211-212; Chrisman, Chua & Sharma 1999:21; Hewitt, Janse van 
Rensburg & Ukpere 2012:11866). This inconsistency in the definition of a family 
organisation is cited in the literature, as one of the main reasons for the contradicting 
results found in this field of research. 
 
Classification of a family organisation 
Central to the debate on the definition of a family organisation are the three different 
types of family organisations, that are discussed in the highly-cited work of Astrachan 
and Shanker (2003:211-212). They classify these types of family organisations as 
“restrictive”, “intermediate”, and “wide”. These are depicted as such in Figure 2:  
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Figure 2: Classification of family organisations and related levels of 
restrictiveness  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Astrachan and Shanker (2003:211-212)  
 
The “restrictive” class, as depicted in Figure 2, indicates that the family members do not 
only have control over the organisation but also dominate management and the 
execution of corporate strategies. The “intermediate” class relates to an organisation 
where the strategic decisions and, in a lesser way the implementation thereof, are under 
the control of the family members. The family is therefore involved in the management 
of the organisation, but does not play a central role. Organisations where the family 
members have control over the organisation and the determination of corporate 
strategies, but are not represented on management level and therefore not involved in 
the execution of corporate strategies, fall under the “wide” classification.  
 
Definition of a family organisation 
The different classifications of family organisations, as discussed above, have a direct 
impact on the definition of family organisations. Family organisations are defined by Ali, 
Chen and Radhakrishnan (2007:238) as organisations where the founding family owns 
the organisation and is responsible for the management thereof. These two elements 
(family ownership and family management) were distilled by Chrisman, Chua and 
Sharma (1999:20) as the main elements in the definition of family organisations, after 
Family involved in:  
Ownership and Strategy Execution 
("Restrictive") 
 
Family involved in:  
Ownership and Joint Strategy Execution 
("Intermediate") 
 
Family involved in:  
Ownership and Approve Main Corporate 
Strategies, but NO Strategy Execution 
("Wide")
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identifying 21 different definitions for family organisations through their review of 250 
relevant articles. 
 
In the Final Report of the European Commission Expert Group (European Commission - 
Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General 2009:9-10) the following definition, as it 
relates to unlisted family organisations, is proposed: 
A firm, of any size, is a family business, if: 
1. The majority of decision-making rights are in the possession of the natural 
person(s) who established the firm, or in the possession of the natural person(s) 
who has/have acquired the share capital of the firm, or in the possession of their 
spouses, parents, child or children’s direct heirs. 
2. The majority of decision-making rights are indirect or direct. 
3. At least one representative of the family or kin is formally involved in the 
governance of the firm. 
 
The golden thread running through all the definitions discussed above can be 
summarised to indicate that family ownership, and therefore the family’s right to 
determine direction or to make decisions, and their role (whether direct or indirect) in the 
governance structures, are the predominant factors in defining a family organisation. 
Poza (2009:6) suggests a third element, namely that the owners and management of a 
family organisation should have the vision to transfer the organisation across various 
generations, thus they should be able to visualise transgenerational ownership. Based 
on these arguments, and to avoid confusion for purposes of this study, the European 
Commission’s definition of a family organisation will form the basis of the definition of 
family organisations, adapted to bring into account Astrachan and Shanker’s (2003:211-
212) reference to strategic and operational involvement, as well as Poza’s (2009:6) 
vision of a multi-generation organisation. 
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The definition of a family organisation for purposes of this study will therefore be as 
follows: 
A firm, of any size, is a family organisation, if: 
1. The majority of direct or indirect decision-making rights are in the possession of 
the natural person(s) who established the firm, or who has/have acquired the 
share capital of the firm, and/or their spouses, parents, children or children’s 
direct heirs; 
2. At least one representative of the family or kin is formally involved in the 
governance (strategic and/or operational level) of the organisation; and 
3. The organisation’s vision is to ensure the transfer of ownership and, where 
applicable, management of the organisation to next generations.  
 
Figure 3 visually depicts the various elements of the definition of family organisations as 
adapted for the purposes of this study, and includes the three following elements: 
ownership (decision-making rights), governance, and the transfer of the organisation 
from one generation to the next. 
 
Figure 3: Definition of a family organisation as adapted for purposes of this study 
 
Source: Adapted from the European Commission - Enterprise and Industry Directorate-
General (2009:9-10); Astrachan & Shanker (2003:211-212) and Poza (2009:6) 
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Figure 4 was adapted in order to illustrate the dynamic and interactive nature of the 
various elements. The detailed explanation of the elements is discussed below and the 
explanation is then summarised in tabular form in Table 1. As presented by Matser 
(2013:3), the relationships between family, management, and ownership, as depicted in 
Figure 4 and Table 1, can be described as follows: 
Element number 1 describes a member of the family, e.g. the main shareholder’s 
spouse, who does not own any share capital and is also not employed by, or involved 
in, the management of the organisation. Being the spouse of the main shareholder, he 
might have an indirect, but significant, influence on the strategic direction of the 
organisation. 
Element number 2 represents the professional manager who is involved in the 
operational management, and might even be involved in the executive management, of 
the organisation. He is not a family member and also does not own any share capital.  
Element number 3 indicates an individual who owns share capital (since it is a family 
organisation he probably owns a minority stake), but is not a member of the family and 
is also not involved in the management of the organisation. 
Element number 4 represents a member of the family who owns share capital, but is not 
employed by the organisation, e.g. a child of the founding member that is either a minor 
or not interested in working for the organisation. 
Element number 5 represents a member of the family who is employed by, or involved 
in, the management of the family organisation, but who does not own any share capital, 
e.g. a son-in-law or daughter-in-law of the majority shareholder. These members 
(although they are not owners) have a direct influence on the strategic direction and 
decision-making function of the company as they are involved in operational or 
executive management and are related to the owners of the organisation. 
Element number 6 represents the professional manager who has shareholding in the 
organisation, but no family connection.  
Element number 7 represents a member of the family who owns share capital and plays 
a role in the management of the organisation, e.g. the founding member who also 
performs the function of chief executive officer in the organisation.   
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Table 1: The interaction between family, management, and ownership 
 Family Management Ownership 
Element #1 X   
Element #2  X  
Element #3   X 
Element #4 X  X 
Element #5 X X  
Element #6  X X 
Element #7 X X X 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the literature review) 
 
The complexity, interactive nature, as well as a lack of balance in these elements, may 
contribute to the various challenges experienced by many family organisations. The first 
element, family, adds a unique element to the governance roles of an organisation and 
according to Eybers (2010:2), this can lead to role-confusion and conflict, which could 
ultimately have a negative impact on the organisation’s financial performance. 
 
Challenges associated with family organisations 
In addition to normal market-related challenges, family organisations face unique 
challenges which result in dynamic and complex organisations (Hall 2012:12). These 
challenges are widely discussed in the literature and include family conflict and 
nepotism (Boshoff, Farrington & Venter 2010:34; Dyer 2010:270; Hall 2012:12; Taylor & 
Tucker 2013:28), the role of non-family members within the family organisation (Boshoff 
et al. 2010:38,41), and succession (Ferguson, Hair & Smith 2014:256; June, Kheng & 
Mohamed 2015:5). 
 
Family conflict normally arises because of family members’ inability to separate their 
personal lives from their professional roles within the business (Hall 2012:37). The 
inability to separate these two factors sometimes leads to emotional decision-making 
which can result in negative financial performance within the family organisation. It can 
also lead to the deterioration of family relationships and harmony. Additional factors 
contributing to family conflict are the definition of the family concept, as well as the roles 
assigned to the various family members within the business context.  
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The definition of family is complex and is influenced by matters such as spouses or in-
laws; divorcees or ex-in-laws; individuals who are cohabitating with blood relatives, but 
are not family through blood or wedlock; children of previous marriages and adopted 
children (Hoy & Sharma 2014:116). Defining family members’ roles within the business 
can also contribute to family conflict. This is because the business needs to establish 
whether the specific family member’s involvement will be limited to shareholding, or 
whether the family member will be allowed to be operationally involved in the business. 
Sibling hierarchy (or birth order) within the family context (Hoy & Sharma 2014:116) is 
not necessarily mirrored by the individual siblings’ roles and responsibilities within the 
organisational structures of the organisation and this can also create tension and lead to 
conflict between family members. The presence of the founding member and his/her 
role as parental figure and family mediator, versus his/her role as a business mentor, as 
well as his/her reluctance to step down, should also not be underestimated as a source 
of family conflict (Rosplock 2014:151). 
 
Nepotism in a family organisation context refers primarily to the appointment of family 
members based on their family status and not necessarily based on their qualifications, 
skills, strengths or experience. It also refers to the lack of suitable and fair performance 
management of family members which, in addition to the pro-family appointment 
criteria, results in a system that lacks meritocracy (Dyer 2010:270).  
 
Nepotism might also have an impact on non-family employees. These non-family 
employees are essential to the success of family organisations (Boshoff et al. 2010:50; 
James 2013:5), and employment practices that limit the career development of, and the 
growth opportunities for, non-family employees might negatively affect their individual 
performances, as well as the performance of the family organisation. Non-family 
employees are normally held more accountable for their actions than their family 
counterparts (Greene et al. 2013:238). It is crucial to meet the expectations of non-
family employees and to ensure that they remain committed to the family organisation 
because non-family members in most instances contribute significantly to the 
knowledge base and the professionalism of the family organisation (Boshoff et al. 
2010:50; Eijssen 2014). Non-family employees should not only be appointed based on 
their technical expertise but, even more importantly, they should also be appointed 
based on their cultural fit and commitment towards the values, standards, and 
objectives of the family organisation (Eijssen 2014:2).  
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Many authors proclaim that the majority of family organisations do not survive past the 
third generation (Carlock & Ward 2010:157; Friedrich & Isaacs 2011:283; Gnan, Malmi 
& Songini 2013:78; Prior 2012:96). The lack of succession planning is highlighted as a 
major concern in terms of these organisations’ long-term survival. Founders of family 
organisations are emotionally attached to their organisations, due to the fact that they 
devoted all their time and effort to the establishment of the organisations and to the 
initial growth of the organisations (Hall 2012:39). They therefore try to keep control of 
the organisations by resisting transfer of ownership and/or management of the business 
to the next generation (Hall 2012:38; Prior 2012:23). The succession process is also 
influenced by matters such as family structure, relationships amongst family members 
(Boshoff & Venter 2006:17), existence of able and willing family successors, financial 
considerations, and legal issues (Baù, Hellerstedt, Nordqvist & Wennberg 2014:167).  
 
Notwithstanding the above, effective governance structures have the potential to 
address the challenges experienced by family organisations. As stated by the Jordan 
Institute of Directors (2014:2), corporate governance can assist these family 
organisations with the identification of challenges and the development of strategies to 
ensure the longevity and success of family organisations. 
 
 
2.3 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 
Abraham Lincoln once said: "Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test 
a man's character, give him power" (Weiss 2006:32). The ability to exercise power is 
especially relevant in the context of a family organisation given its complex and 
integrated structure. In order to achieve success in any organisation, there needs to be 
“honest business behaviour” and “sound shareholder-stakeholder relations” (Hefer-
Hendrikse & Hendrikse 2012:104). This can be facilitated by incorporating corporate 
governance measures which are aimed at aligning management’s behaviour and the 
organisation’s actions, and which help to uphold the vision, mission, and other 
objectives of the organisation (Hefer-Hendrikse & Hendrikse 2012:104). 
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Power relationships and governance structures 
Before investigating the need for, and the required format of, governance measures (as 
referred to above) in a family organisation, it is essential to discuss the power 
relationships and governance structures that can generally be found in a non-family 
organisation, as reflected on in the relevant literature. The main role players in a non-
family organisation mostly comprise shareholders, a board of directors, executive 
management, and employees (Hefer-Hendrikse & Hendrikse 2012:3). The relationship 
between an organisation, its shareholders, and its internal stakeholders (directors, 
managers, and employees), as described by Hefer-Hendrikse and Hendrikse (2012:3), 
is illustrated in Figure 5. The family organisation’s unique features and the impact of 
these features on governance structures should be deliberated by comparing them to 
that of non-family organisations. Figure 5 has therefore been adapted to include a family 
organisational perspective of the power relationships and roles in family organisations. 
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Figure 5: The relationship structure of main role players in an organisation 
Non-family organisation    Family organisation 
Non-related owners of the 
organisation. 
 SHAREHOLDERS  Family members own the 
majority shares in the 
organisation. 
   
Strategically manage the 
organisation. The board 
members are not 
necessarily shareholders. 
 BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS 
- Accountable to the 
shareholders 
- Responsible for the 
company 
 Strategically manage the 
organisation. The 
majority of the board 
members are family 
members and also 
shareholders. 
Work for the organisation 
on an executive level. 
The executive members 
are not necessarily 
shareholders. 
 EXECUTIVE 
MANAGEMENT 
- Accountable to the 
directors 
- Report to the          
directors 
 Work for the organisation 
on an executive level. 
Key executive members 
are also family members 
and shareholders. 
Daily operational 
involvement. Receive 
performance-based and 
market-related 
remuneration. 
 EMPLOYEES 
 
 Daily operational 
involvement. Family 
members receive 
remuneration for work 
performed (not 
necessarily performance- 
based and market- 
related, but are also 
financial beneficiaries 
due to family relations 
and shareholding in the 
organisation).  
Source: Adapted from Hefer-Hendrikse & Hendrikse (2012:3) 
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From Figure 5 above, and with reference to the discussion as depicted in Figure 4, it is 
clear that there might be a high risk of role confusion in family organisations due to the 
integrated nature of the various roles to be played by any individual family member. 
These roles can include the role of the owner of the organisation whose main goal is 
generally to optimise his return on investments; the role of the director of the 
organisation who carries the responsibility for strategic management; the role of the 
leader who is part of executive management; and then also the role of the employee 
who is responsible for the execution of certain daily routine functions which are usually 
expected of any normal employee of the organisation. 
 
The role confusion is not only relevant to the specific family member himself, but it might 
also result in role confusion being experienced by other family members or even non-
family members with respect to the perceived role of the family member in the 
organisation. The flexibility of boundaries in family organisations can lead to individuals’ 
inability to prioritise the most relevant role at a specific point in time (Hall 2012:32) and 
therefore, as it has been suggested, there is a need for formal governance structures in 
a family organisation.  
 
Corporate governance definition 
The Cadbury Report (Cadbury Committee 1992:5) and the UK Corporate Governance 
Report (Financial Reporting Council 2012:1) define corporate governance as “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled”. The definition continues by 
indicating two main governance role players, namely the shareholders and the board of 
directors. The shareholders’ main responsibility, as per the definition, is to ensure that 
the appropriate governance systems exist in the organisation. These include the 
appointment of both a board of directors and external auditors. It is also indicated in the 
definition that the directors are accountable to the shareholders with respect to the 
implementation of these organisational governance systems. The board’s duties include 
determining strategic objectives for the organisation; the execution of these objectives 
(i.e. they provide leadership); the supervision of management; and the regular reporting 
to the shareholders on their stewardship (Cadbury Committee 1992:5; Financial 
Reporting Council 2012:1). 
 
From deliberating on the underlying elements included in the above definition, it 
becomes apparent that there are a number of important factors to be considered in the 
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study of corporate governance: 
- Corporate governance can be seen as a system and is therefore not an 
unstructured nor an uncoordinated concept, but it is rather a procedural approach 
and process;  
- Direction and control is implied; 
- The shareholders are ultimately responsible for appropriate governance in an 
organisation; 
- The establishment of a board of directors is one of the tools that should be used by 
shareholders in order to manage the implementation of governance measures; and 
- The definition assumes that the board of directors will act as stewards.  
 
When discussing the above underlying elements in a family organisation context, the 
following should be kept in mind: 
- Family organisations, especially during the founding and sibling stages, prefer to 
keep matters unstructured, and to avoid any bureaucracy as far as possible. This 
results in limited, clearly pronounced policies and procedures (International Finance 
Corporation - World Bank Group 2008:14); 
- The control of an organisation lies with the shareholders, who then also determine 
the general direction of the organisation. Therefore, in a family organisation, the 
control will typically be settled in the founding family, and the family (whether 
formally involved in the activities of the organisation or not) will either directly or 
indirectly determine the direction of the organisation (Astrachan & Shanker 2003; 
Carlock & Ward 2010:20);  
- The family is ultimately responsible for implementing and maintaining appropriate 
governance in the organisation (Degadt 2012:11);  
- Family organisations, especially in the first generation, do not necessarily make use 
of a board of directors as part of their governance structures (Brenes et al. 
2011:281); 
- In the event that a board of directors does exist in the family organisation, it is 
widely assumed that the family members on the board of directors will act as 
stewards. Non-family members on the board of directors are not necessarily viewed 
as stewards of the family organisation, but rather as agents (Mazzi 2011:169). 
Contrary to this view, some researchers state that agency costs increase as family 
members’ emotional attachments to the organisation decrease with each 
successive generation (Duller, Feldbauer-Durstmüller & Mitter 2011:32,41). This 
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therefore indicates that the generation at play should be considered when looking at 
agency versus stewardship assumptions.    
 
In addition to the Cadbury Report and the UK Corporate Governance Report, as 
discussed above, the US issued one of the most prominent pieces of legislation on 
corporate governance, namely the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This was done in 
response to the corporate failures like Enron and WorldCom, and it aimed to strengthen 
the monitoring function of boards (Baldenius, Melumad & Meng 2014:53) and to 
improve financial disclosure. 
 
Governance in a South African context cannot be discussed without reference to The 
King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa and The King Code on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa, collectively referred to as King III (IoDSA 2009). 
King III has been effective in South Africa since 1 March 2010 and is applicable to all 
organisations regardless of their manner or form of incorporation. A draft King IV report 
was issued for public comment during March 2016 and the final report was released on 
1 November 2016. King IV is more principle based and its release is unlikely to 
drastically change the highlighted impact of King III, as discussed in this study (IoDSA 
2015:1). Therefore, and since King IV was only recently released, the author takes note 
of its content, but will not elaborate on it. 
 
Organisational governance 
King III (IoDSA 2009) is a code of principles and practices, and is therefore not legally 
enforceable. One of the key aspects of the Report is that it highlights the fact that “good 
governance is essentially about effective leadership” (IoDSA 2009:9). It further 
highlights the fact that “Responsible leaders direct company strategies and operations 
with a view to achieve sustainable economic, social and environmental performance” 
(IoDSA 2009:9). 
 
Except for its significance as it relates to the definition of a family organisation, this 
study does not concentrate on the shareholder’s role in governance (Cadbury 
Committee 1992:5; Financial Reporting Council 2012:1). Rather, it specifically focuses 
on the governance structures to be implemented and, therefore, it also focuses on the 
effective leadership that is highlighted by King III (IoDSA 2009). Effective leadership, in 
this study, includes the board of directors (as referred to above), the management of the 
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organisation, as well as the presence of any relevant policies and procedures. The 
focus of this study is therefore not on “family governance”, although it is also very 
important in the effective management of a family organisation, but it is rather on 
“organisational governance”.  
 
Family governance refers to the implementation of contracts, policies, and other 
documentation and processes that regulate the family’s interaction and commitment to 
the organisation and each other (Kammerlander, Sieger, Voordeckers & Zellweger 
2015:69). Organisational governance refers to the governance matters that have a 
direct impact on the family organisation as a separate legal entity. 
 
The literature discussion in the following sections will focus on relevant theories, with 
specific emphasis on agency versus stewardship theory, and will then further discuss 
any organisational characteristics, legal requirements, and best practices as they relate 
to good corporate governance and governance structures. 
 
2.3.1 THEORIES APPLICABLE TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Corporate governance structures of an organisation are mostly grounded in one of two 
organisational theories—either that of agency or that of stewardship. Depending on the 
owner’s risk assessment, with regard to the interest alignment of the individual 
managers in the organisation, an organisation will follow a governance structure either 
informed by agency theory or stewardship theory. These theories are relevant as they 
try to explain the personal interactions between individuals within an organisation. 
Taking into account the uniqueness of family organisations—for example, the 
interaction between family managers and other non-management family members, and 
the interaction between family managers and non-family management—the theories, as 
referred to above, should therefore also be explained in a family organisational context.  
 
Agency theory 
Agency theory is a foundational management theory and one of the prevailing theories 
in corporate governance (Bendickson, Davis, Liguori & Muldoon 2016:175) and family 
business studies (Pindado & Requejo 2015:283). It focuses on the relationship between 
two parties, namely the principal and the agent. This theory typically applies to an 
organisation where the principal (owner) appoints an agent (manager) and then 
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delegates certain functions (including the decision-making authority function) that affect 
the organisation, to the agent (Jensen & Meckling 1976:310). Because the agent does 
not have an equity interest in the organisation, there exists a risk that the agent’s 
objectives are not aligned with those of the principal, and even more importantly, with 
those of the organisation. As discussed by Davis, Donaldson and Schoorman 
(1997:27), the agent’s first priority might be self-enrichment, or personal wealth, which 
may result in the financial wellbeing of the business taking second place in the agent’s 
list of priorities. Therefore, this theory assumes that should there be any conflict of 
interest between the agent and the principal and/or the organisation, the agent might 
behave opportunistically (Meacheam & Mitchell 2011:151) and with an agenda of self-
interest (Madison 2014:9). The agent will therefore be motivated by external rewards, 
for example, monetary compensation and external recognition, instead of internal, or 
intrinsic motivating factors like personal accomplishment and job satisfaction. 
 
Information asymmetry between the principal and the agent can also lead to typical 
principal-agent problems and may therefore, in addition to the risks as discussed above, 
result in agency cost. Information asymmetry refers to the situation where the agent and 
principal do not have access to equal information, this then has an effect on both the 
principal and the agent’s decision-making process (Shuttleworth 2009:151). An agent, 
as the manager who is actively involved in the running of the organisation, might be 
aware of information that could be beneficial to himself, but detrimental to the principal 
and/or the organisation if not shared. This consequently increases the risk of agency 
loss. It is suggested by Smith (2011:18) that the more effective the monitoring controls 
are in obtaining information about an agent’s conduct, which therefore decreases 
information asymmetry, the higher the probability of the agent acting in the interest of 
the principal. 
 
In order to mitigate the agency risks—as  discussed under the agency theory—the  
principal needs to implement various monitoring controls, governance structures, and 
suitable incentives in the organisation to align the agent’s interests with those of the 
business. This ensures that the agent will act in the best interest of the entity or, 
alternatively, this prevents behaviour that is not aligned with the interests of the principal 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976:310; Madison 2014:2). These controls, structures, and 
incentives can, unfortunately, result in agency costs that could have a negative impact 
on the financial performance of the organisation. The opposite is also true—if the entity 
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does not implement the necessary monitoring controls, governance structures, and 
incentive schemes, the goal misalignment and self-interest of the individual agent might 
have an even greater negative impact on the financial performance of the entity (and, 
ultimately, on the value of the entity) than the monitoring, governance, and goal-
alignment costs that might have been incurred (Madison 2014:2; Mazzi 2011:168). It is 
therefore important for the principal to determine the point where the financial 
performance of the organisation will benefit from the controls implemented and 
therefore, ensure a positive net contribution to financial performance, thus increasing 
the value of the organisation (Chang, Chrisman, Chua & Kellermanns 2007:1031).   
   
Agency theory is relevant to organisations where there is a contractual relationship 
between the principal (owner/shareholder/residual claimant) and the agent (manager) 
because of the fact that there is separation between ownership and control (Smith 
2011:16). In a family-controlled organisational context, it can be argued that agency 
theory is not relevant since there is no separation, or there is limited separation, 
between ownership and control. This often results in agency costs being regarded as 
immaterial (Holt, Madison, Kellermanns & Ranft 2016:65). The interests of the 
organisation’s management team should be (by default) aligned with the vision and the 
direction of the shareholders, because the management team, or at least the majority of 
senior members of the management team, is, in many cases, also the equity holders of 
the organisation. There should therefore be limited conflict of interest, or limited 
information asymmetry, and the need for controlling mechanisms should therefore be 
negligible.  
 
The reality is, however, that all family members in management, although they are 
family, might not have the same vision for the organisation, since some might be driven 
by self-interest and therefore might not act in the best interest of the organisation nor in 
the best interest of the family as a collective (Chang et al. 2007:1030,1031; Williams 
2015:74). An example of this is where the family members in management might be 
guilty of nepotism because they hire unsuitable family members in senior positions 
simply because they are relatives (Bau & Chirico 2014:212). This, therefore, benefits 
the selected family members but not the organisation. Alternatively, some of the family 
managers might, for instance, have a vision of short-term profit-making for the business 
(e.g. building the business in order to sell it at a profit in the foreseeable future), 
whereas the founding member or other family members in management might have a 
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long-term vision that includes transferring ownership to many generations to come. In 
addition to these agency issues, Holt et al. (2016:66) indicate that agency issues can 
also be created because of the family-nonfamily shareholder relationships, e.g. where 
the organisation has both family (majority) and non-family (minority) shareholders. 
 
Heterogeneous interests of multiple family shareholders sometimes necessitate the 
implementation of family structures, for example, family offices or family trusts, as a 
medium to manage these discordant interests or blockholder conflicts. The risk exists—
especially where there are multiple generations involved—that the interests of those 
entrusted with the management of the family office or trust are at odds with those of the 
individual shareholders/beneficiaries, and/or the management of the family organisation, 
which could result in double-agency cost (Kammerlander & Zellweger 2015:1282-1283). 
 
Bau and Chirico (2014:212) summarise all of the above by noting that, although family 
organisations generally might have an insignificant principal-agency cost, it is clear that 
this type of organisation might be exposed to a different kind of agency cost as 
explained above.  
 
Stewardship theory 
Contrary to agency theory, stewardship theory describes the steward (or manager) as 
an individual who acts in the best interest of the organisation (Davis & Donaldson 
1991:51). His actions are as such, not because of the structures and monitoring 
mechanisms that were put in place by the shareholders of the business, but they are 
rather as such because of the steward’s internal motivation (Davis et al. 1997:27), his 
inherent strive for the business to be successful, and his sense of belonging within the 
business. Based on this description, the assumption is therefore that the interest of the 
steward is aligned with that of the principal and the organisation.  
 
The steward is not motivated by his personal financial wealth (Chang et al. 2007:1031-
1032), but he is typically motivated by structures that empower the individual, and 
facilitate management’s discretion and authority. According to Chang et al. (2007:1032), 
the implementation of monitoring controls, structures, and incentive schemes, might 
have a negative impact on the morale of the steward (or family manager), and therefore 
might contribute to a decrease in the financial performance of the family organisation. 
The implementation of stringent monitoring controls and legislative requirements will 
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only lead to better financial performance if the benefits exceed the direct and indirect 
costs incurred (Bruno & Claessens 2010:462). Davis et al. (1997:28) indicate that the 
steward focuses on intrinsic rewards, e.g. growth and achievement. Because the 
steward is motivated by these factors, he will be able to perform much better in an 
environment that allows the steward the authority to make decisions, for which he is 
then responsible and accountable for (Davis et al. 1997:28). This will, in turn, result in a 
high self-esteem and will also ensure respect from sub-ordinates and fellow managers 
(Madison 2014:141-142). In addition, this gives the steward the opportunity to excel in 
his personal and professional capacity.  
 
Looking at the characteristics of a steward, one can motivate the idea that family 
managers are more likely to conduct themselves like stewards, as opposed to agents, 
because they have a vested interest in the well-being of the company and that of the 
family. They might therefore be driven by their devotion to the organisation, by the long-
term financial performance of the organisation, as well as by non-financial objectives, 
e.g. healthy family relations (Holt et al. 2016:66). If this is the case, theoretically, there 
should not be a need for the implementation of monitoring controls, governance 
structures, and suitable incentives—as described under agency theory—in order to 
align the family managers’ actions and goals to those of the organisation (Siebels & zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseß 2012:285).  
 
The implementation of the above controls, structures and incentives, might lead to 
agency costs with limited associated benefit and lack of management innovation and 
entrepreneurial activities, and will therefore result in a potential decrease in financial 
value. It is argued in the literature that family organisations with virtuous stewards attain 
positive financial outcomes as the family organisation can direct the monitoring and 
control resources that it would have used to avoid agency cost, directly into 
performance maximisation (Allen, Davis & Hayes 2010:1094). These authors also 
indicate that family organisations perform better because superior stewardship attitudes 
by leaders lead to less conflict in the family organisation, more strategic flexibility, and a 
focus on the wellbeing and success of the organisation. Stewardship theory is, 
therefore, found to be suitable as a theoretical basis for family organisations. 
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The impact of agency and stewardship theories on the structuring of governance 
measures  
In reality, however, both the agency and stewardship theories are likely to apply to 
family organisations to a greater or lesser extent. Depending on the behavioural 
assumptions and governance structures in the organisation, it could predict enhanced 
organisational performance (Madison 2014:iv). Different approaches to the structuring 
of governance measures, as grounded in agency and stewardship theory, are therefore 
demonstrated in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2: The approach to governance structures based on agency and 
stewardship theory 
 Agency Theory Stewardship Theory 
The 
shareholder’s 
objective: 
To maximise the principal’s (shareholder’s) return on investment. 
How to 
achieve it? 
a. Financial investment by the 
principal; and 
b. Reducing agency cost through 
designing and implementing 
governance structures and 
systems of control, 
monitoring, and incentives, 
e.g. 
o Board of directors with a 
non-executive as the chair-
person  
o Delegation of authority 
o Financial and other 
incentive schemes 
a. Financial investment by the 
principal; and 
b. Reducing agency cost through 
empowering governance 
structures and a shared 
organisational vision, e.g. 
o Board of directors where the 
chief executive officer is the 
chairperson 
o Management empowerment 
o Growth and other career 
opportunities for the steward 
Why use the 
above 
approach? 
The governance structures and 
control systems facilitate the 
alignment of the agent’s 
(manager’s) interest to that of the 
principal (shareholder) and the 
organisation. 
The steward is self-motivated by 
his/her sense of responsibility and 
belonging, as well as the principal’s 
confidence in the steward’s 
decision making abilities and 
management skills. Controlling 
mechanisms instead of 
empowering mechanisms will 
demotivate the steward. 
Financial 
performance 
Contradicting results on the financial performance of organisations 
under both these theories. 
Cost minimisation Wealth maximisation 
Source: Adapted from Davis, et.al (1991), Davis et.al (1997) Madison (2014) and Holt 
et.al (2016)  
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Taking into account the theories discussed above, an organisation needs to structure its 
business in such a manner so as to avoid the pitfalls that are associated with agency 
theory. At the same time, the organisation should take cognisance of the opportunities 
that are created by the family organisational environment which are a result of the 
stewardship characteristics presented by some family and non-family management 
members. The following sections will consider these underlying theories as part of the 
discussion on supervisory and managerial governance structures. For purposes of this 
study, the phrase “supervisory governance structures” refers to the board of directors or 
to a similar governing body that can be found in a private family organisational context. 
The phrase “managerial governance structures” will refer firstly to management, and 
secondly to policies and procedures.  
 
2.3.2 SUPERVISORY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
 
Both agency theory (Smith 2011:18) and stewardship theory (Napoli 2012:10985) 
support the presence of a board of directors as one of the performance enhancement 
mechanisms in an organisation. Under agency theory, the board of directors is seen as 
the main controlling mechanism in an organisation. It is responsible for ensuring the 
alignment of the manager’s (agent) interests, to those of the organisation. This is done 
through the regular monitoring, and the effective gathering, of agent behaviour 
information (Smith 2011:18). Contrary to this, stewardship theory implies that the board 
can play more of a management support role which could result in positive, strategic, 
and innovative change (Napoli 2012:10985). The behavioural assumptions about the 
individual managers at play will, however, determine whether the board of directors will 
be established for controlling purposes (agency theory) or whether it will be established 
as a tool to empower steward managers (stewardship theory) (Madison 2014:16). 
 
The need for controlling and monitoring mechanisms—as  discussed under  agency 
theory—and the need for motivational schemes—as  discussed under stewardship 
theory—are relevant to all forms of incorporation. In the context of this study, when a 
private family organisation is discussed, it will be with specific reference to organisations 
that are incorporated as close corporations or private companies. Therefore, in addition 
to the underlying theories, this study needs to refer to any relevant statutory 
requirements applicable to these methods of incorporation. The common law and the 
Companies Act will form the legislative framework for this study and, in addition to them, 
the recommendations of King III (IoDSA 2009) will be discussed.   
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Legislation and best practice 
The common law duties of the directors of a company include firstly, to perform their 
duties with the necessary care, skill, and diligence; secondly, to act in the best interest 
of the company; thirdly, to act within their powers and for a proper purpose; fourthly, to 
exercise independent judgement and therefore, to make independent and unbiased 
decisions; and lastly, to avoid conflict of interest (Bowman Gilfillan 2014:5-6; Grant 
Thornton 2011:12). These common law duties have been enacted in section 76 of the 
Companies Act. Based on previous discussions relating to the overlay of family, 
management, and ownership, these duties might pose a challenge to certain family 
directors as they, for example, might act in the best interest of the family and not 
necessarily in the best interest of the organisation and all its stakeholders. Alternatively, 
they might not exercise independent and unbiased judgement, since they might support 
the view of other family members purely based on the fact that they are family. The 
family organisation’s long-term strategy may also be distorted by the personal strategies 
of individual owners or family members. As with non-family organisations, it is therefore 
clear that there is a need for formal governance structures in order to determine the 
direction and strategy of the family organisation, and to take cognisance of shareholder 
and other stakeholder requirements (Adams & Spinelli 2012:538; Gallo & Kenyon-
Rouvinez 2005:45). 
 
Sections 1 and 2 of Article 66 of the Companies Act requires companies to establish a 
board of directors which must, in the case of a private company, consist of at least one 
director. Section 3 states that this number can be increased, if so required, by the 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation. These sections only state the required 
number of directors on the board, but do not prescribe more details in terms of the 
composition of the board. King III (IoDSA 2009:25-31), on the other hand, is very explicit 
in its recommendations for the composition of a company’s board of directors. For 
example, it is recommended that the majority of board members be independent non-
executive directors, that the chairperson of the board be an independent non-executive 
director, that the chief executive officer and the chairperson of the board not be the 
same person, and that disclosure of board members’ remuneration also be required. 
However, these regulations and codes of best practice do not provide guidance on how 
an organisation should structure executive and operational management.  
 
The requirements of King III could be applied to private family organisations, but they 
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are not legally enforceable, because King III is a “code of principles and practices” 
based on an “apply or explain approach” (IoDSA 2009:6). Companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is however required, in terms of section 8.63 of 
the JSE Listing requirements (JSE 2014:128,411; IoDSA 2013:2) to report as to how 
they applied and to what extent they applied, the principles of the King Code. This 
raises the question as to whether compliance with King III is in fact legally enforceable 
in so far it concerns listed companies. Considering this, it is clear that private family 
organisations have more flexibility than listed companies in the configuration of their 
governance structures. This could result in private family organisations with the majority 
of their board members consisting of executive, non-independent directors, instead of 
non-executive, independent directors as recommended by King III (IoDSA 2009). 
Brenes et al. (2011:281) support this view in that they argue that some family 
organisations do not even have a board of directors and, if they do, it might only consist 
of family members. They add that this all-family board impairs the board’s ability to 
manage the organisation objectively which is normally to the detriment of the 
organisation’s performance (Brenes et al. 2011:281).  
 
Generation in control and the organisational life-cycle 
In addition to legislative requirements and best practice, the board composition and 
management structure could also be influenced by the current phase within an 
organisation’s generational timeline and the relevant life-cycle stage.  
 
The first generation of a family organisation is usually owned and managed by the 
founders who are actively involved in the day-to-day running of the business. Because 
of the founders’ involvement in the organisation, their in-depth knowledge, and the 
assumption that their interests are generally aligned with those of the organisation 
(therefore indicating a lack of agency relationship), there is a limited need to argue for 
monitoring and control structures (Arosa, Iturralde & Maseda 2015:1206; Brenes et al. 
2011:281). That being said, it should be realised that the first generation private 
organisation might have a limited number of human resources available. These limited 
human resources might result in the need to incorporate both internal (executive) and 
external (non-executive) non-family board members who could add to the knowledge 
and experience of the all-family board. This might then further result in the broadening 
of the resource base. This has come to be known as the resource-based view (RBV) 
theory. The integration of the family members’ internal business knowledge with the 
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industry knowledge, and other relevant experience and expertise of the external board 
members, can lead to improved strategic thinking and decision-making in the 
organisation (Arosa et al. 2015:1212).  
 
According to PwC’s Family Business Survey 2014 (2014b:13), 63% of South African 
family organisations have non-family members on their board of directors. This 
compares favourably to the 50% of non-family members identified in the 2012 survey. 
The 2014 survey indicates that South African families are beginning to realise the value 
of experienced non-family members on their boards. This also indicates that families 
increasingly appreciate the importance of professionalising the family organisation 
which then results in organisations being “owned by family” but “managed 
professionally”. It should, however, be noted that according to the survey, the perceived 
value created by the appointment of non-family board members is diluted when 
appointing the same individual as both the chief executive officer of the organisation 
and the chairperson of the board (PwC 2014b:13). Unfortunately, this survey does not 
distinguish between generational timeframes and it is therefore assumed that it refers to 
a combination of firms with various generations in control.  
 
As family organisations begin to move towards the second generation, the risk of 
conflict with regard to the position of the next chief executive officer and/or chairman of 
the board becomes a reality. Van den Heuvel, Van Gils and Voordeckers (2007:143) 
hypothesise that the likelihood of a non-family board coming into being increases when 
a family organisation moves towards the point where the next generation will need to 
take over. A reason for this is that, often, the non-family board member will act as an 
arbitrator and a conflict resolution consultant during the generational transfer. The board 
of directors can therefore fulfil various potential governance roles at distinct stages in an 
organisation. Therefore, the value add of well-functioning boards cannot be ignored. 
These roles include strategic thinking, technical advice, networking, as well as 
mediation, and conflict resolution between family members (Van den Heuvel et al. 
2007:138). 
 
It is observed by Boshoff et al. (2010:50) that non-family board members, by being non-
family employees and/or external professional consultants, play a vital role in the growth 
and performance of a second generation organisation. The non-family members’ 
experience gained outside of the family organisation, their knowledge, their 
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qualifications, and their objectivity are all important ingredients in the family 
organisation’s governance structure. Contrary to popular belief, Van den Heuvel et al. 
(2007:148) conclude, after using survey data of 295 family organisations, that a second 
generation family organisation is less likely to have an external independent board of 
directors than a first generation family organisation. They motivate this by suggesting 
that, although the second generation might have more agency problems than the first 
generation—and one would therefore argue that there is a greater need for external 
directors in order to limit the agency cost—the higher level of internal business 
knowledge of the second generation (generally referred to as the “familiness” in family 
business literature) outweighs the need for control mechanisms facilitated by external 
directors (Van den Heuvel et al. 2007:151).  
 
This view is confirmed by Arosa et al.’s (2015:1212) findings after the testing of 
341 Spanish firms. They found that the optimum percentage of independent directors on 
the board of directors for a first generation organisation amounts to 47% compared to 
39% in the second generation. The reason for this is attributed to the role that the 
independent directors are required to play on the board of directors. During the first 
generation, it is more a control role (as informed by agency theory), as well as a value 
add in terms of knowledge and experience. During the second generation, the role of 
the independent director is more a service role and a strategic role, which therefore 
assists the organisation in determining its strategic direction. 
 
When moving on to the third generation (sometimes informally referred to as the ‘cousin 
stage’) the risk of family members—in management and on the board of directors—
having alternative or different objectives that are not necessarily aligned with of the 
majority shareholders, and the business as a whole, may increase the need for control 
mechanisms as mentioned under agency theory. This again necessitates the increased 
need for external directors (Le Breton-Miller & Miller 2013:1395). In addition to this, the 
shareholders’ focus will also be less on family and more on business success, thus 
increasing the probable need to appoint objective, experienced, external board 
members (Van den Heuvel et al. 2007:151).  
 
The composition, roles, and objectives of the board of directors are dynamic and will, in 
countries where there are no legislative requirements on the structuring of private 
organisations (or where legislative requirements are limited), also be influenced by the 
Master’s Dissertation – R vd Westhuizen Page 42 
 
organisation’s current stage within the life-cycle framework. Family firms, in their first 
stage—the entrepreneurial stage—will either initially have no formal board, or they will 
have a small board with the majority of the board members being founders or family 
members (Brenes et al. 2011:281). Reasons for this might include the founder’s 
requirements for control; less stakeholders in the organisation (as it will still be a small 
organisation and the need for monitoring will still be low); the requirement for quick 
decision-making and effective strategising; or, the belief that the chief executive officer’s 
interests are generally aligned with those of the organisation’s shareholders 
(Filatotchev, Toms & Wright 2006:261; McHugh & Perrault 2015: 2-7).  
 
The second stage can be classified as the growth stage and it follows directly after the 
entrepreneurial stage. Filatotchev et al. (2006:261) indicate that the requirements for 
strategic direction and internal effectiveness are high in the growth stage. It can 
therefore be assumed that since the board of directors, in conjunction with the 
shareholders, is the driver of strategy, it is essential that the board of directors is 
structured in such a way so as to facilitate growth and effectiveness. This view is 
confirmed by Solomon Potgieter, the co-founder of the MadWorld Group: a South 
African family business in the communications industry. He stated that, in his 
experience, a board consisting only of family members leads to “a degree of 
complacency” (Entrepreneur Magazine 2015:42). The moment his company appointed 
non-family directors, it forced the executive family members to be more professional 
and clearer in their thinking and decision-making. Solomon believes that the MadWorld 
Group’s business has grown by approximately 15% since the appointment of the non-
family members to the board of directors. He attributes this to a more focused board of 
directors and an improved business model. In addition to this, they also benefited from 
“fresh perspectives, fresh ideas and a challenge to convention” (Entrepreneur Magazine 
2015:42). 
 
Format of boards in family organisations 
It is important to note that the board of directors in a family organisation can take 
various forms: firstly, that of a pure family member board; secondly, that of an internal 
board consisting of family members and other non-family employees; thirdly, that of a 
board consisting of family members, non-family employees, and external affiliated 
professionals (e.g. an organisation’s lawyer or auditor); and fourthly, that of a board 
consisting of family members, non-family employees, and external independent 
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professionals not affiliated with the organisation (Van den Heuvel et al. 2007:141). As 
alluded to in this literature review, the board’s main role can either be a monitoring role 
or it can be an advisory role, depending on the agency or stewardship characteristics of 
the family organisation. 
 
Summary 
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that, before determining the board 
composition, one should first determine the role that the board of directors of a specific 
private family organisation should play, while taking into account the agency or 
stewardship tendencies, the relevant legislative requirements, the generation in control, 
and the stage within the organisation’s life-cycle. In determining the board composition, 
one should also consider the current ownership and management structure, the 
knowledge and experience of human resources in the structures, as well as any 
independence gaps identified, before deriving the optimum supervisory governance 
structure.  
 
Supervisory governance structure can be seen as the first pillar of an organisational 
governance structure. The second pillar to be discussed is that of managerial 
governance structures.  
 
2.3.3 MANAGERIAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
 
Managerial governance structures include the structures that are put in place in order to 
control and align the executive management and employees’ behaviour with the best 
interest of the family organisation, the shareholders, and other relevant stakeholders. 
Managerial governance is more inward-looking than supervisory governance structures, 
and the discussion will focus on the executive management of a family organisation, as 
well as any relevant policies and procedures.   
 
2.3.3.1 EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT 
 
Management’s role in an organisation is the execution of strategy, as formalised by the 
board of directors, in conjunction with the shareholders. As previously discussed, family 
members on the management team of a private family organisation might overlap with 
the board of directors and the shareholders, making the identification of roles and 
responsibilities more complex than in the situation of non-family organisations, which 
might therefore lead to role confusion.  
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Legislation and best practice 
Family members in management positions might, in addition to role confusion and in 
line with agency theory principles, not always act in the best interest of the company as 
a separate legal entity (Adams & Spinelli 2012:525). This might result in non-
compliance with their fiduciary responsibilities as prescribed officers of the organisation, 
which are required by section 76 of the Companies Act. A prescribed officer is seen as 
a director of a company for the purposes of (but not limited to) section 76 “Standards of 
directors conduct” and section 77 “Liability of directors and prescribed officers” of the 
Act. This therefore requires these individuals to have the same standards of conduct as 
a registered company director would have and it would also expect to hold them liable in 
the same manner.   
 
Chapter 1, Part A of the Companies Act, defines a ‘‘prescribed officer’’ as “the holder of 
an office, within a company, that has been designated by the Minister in terms of 
section 66(11)”. In terms of this authority, Regulation 38 (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2011) was promulgated and it states that -  
(1) Despite not being a director of a particular company, a person is a ‘prescribed 
officer’ of the company for all purposes of the Act if that person - 
(a) exercises general executive control over and management of the whole, or 
a significant portion, of the business and activities of the company; or 
(b) regularly participates to a material degree in the exercise of general 
executive control over and management of the whole, or a significant 
portion, of the business and activities of the company. 
 
Based on the above definition, it is safe to assume that the chief executive officer, the 
chief operations officer and the chief financial officer will, among other senior or 
executive managers, be implied prescribed officers due to their ability to exercise 
control and to manage a significant portion of the business or the activities of the 
organisation. This assumption is confirmed by PwC in their report on “Duties of directors 
and prescribed officers under the Companies Act” (2014a:21), as well as Mazars in their 
report “Prescribed officers – Do you know who you are?” (Van Heerden 2012:1). Being 
defined under the Act, these individual managers need to ensure that they act, at all 
times, in the best interest of the organisation. Again, with reference to conflicts as 
identified under agency theory, the Act requires both family and non-family managers to 
act in the best interest of the organisation as a separate legal entity. 
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Although there are no specific legal requirements in terms of the composition of the 
management team, principle numbers 2.17 and 2.18 of King III’s “Code of governance 
principles” (IoDSA 2009:25) stipulate that at least two members of management, 
namely the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer, should serve on the 
board of directors. It specifies that the chief executive officer must be appointed by the 
board of directors and the board should provide input on the appointment of senior 
management. In addition, the board should prescribe the role and responsibilities of the 
chief executive officer and the chief executive officer’s performance should be 
measured against this. King III (IoDSA 2009) specifically highlights the designations of 
chief executive officer and chief financial officer in the “Code of Governance principles”, 
as well as the significant impact these two positions have on an organisation. Therefore, 
the remaining portion of the literature review as it relate to management governance 
structures, will focus specifically on these two management positions.  
 
The role and characteristics of the chief executive officer 
The role of the chief executive officer in any organisation generally includes: 
- executing the board-developed short- and long-term strategies;  
- ensuring the flow of complete, accurate, and timely information to and from the 
board of directors;  
- overseeing the daily operational activities;  
- obtaining financing for the organisation;  
- putting management systems in place to ensure compliance with relevant laws and 
regulations;  
- implementing information-, internal control- and risk-management systems; and 
- being responsible for the identification and population of the key human resource 
positions in the organisation. 
(Brenes et al. 2011:2; Carlock & Ward 2010:137; PwC 2015:3; PwC 2016:6,11,20; 
Steinberg 2011:123).  
In addition to the above roles, the chief executive officer in a family organisation also 
has the responsibility to ensure the right balance between the economic and the non-
economic goals of the organisation in order to secure profitability and sustainability 
(Kellermanns, Mazzola & Sciascia 2014:133).  
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An important question to ask in the search for the optimum governance structure, and 
specifically in terms of the managerial governance of a family organisation, is whether 
the chief executive officer should be a family or non-family member (Cennamo et al. 
2013:1353; Kellermanns et al. 2014:131). Family organisations tend to reserve the role 
of chief executive officer for family members in order to keep control of the daily 
operations of the family organisation and to ensure the pursuance of the family’s socio-
emotional objectives. Cennamo et al. (2013:1343) addressed the chief executive officer 
value proposition from a socio-emotional viewpoint and found that the appointment of a 
family chief executive officer can be a strategic placement by the family in order to 
preserve and enhance socio-emotional wealth. Socio-emotional wealth will be 
discussed in greater detail under chapter  2.4.2. 
 
It was found by Kellermanns et al. (2014:135) that higher family management presence 
is positively associated with increased profitability during later generational stages. 
However, their results also highlight the fact that founder managed family organisations 
exceed both family managed and non-family managed organisations in terms of 
performance. It was found by Polsiri and Sitthipongpanich (2015:126) that the presence 
of family chief executive officers reduces the value of family organisations in Thailand. 
One of the reasons listed is that family shareholders might be guilty of nepotism and 
they consequently have a limited family resource pool from which to select a chief 
executive officer. It is therefore important, in the appointment of a family chief executive 
officer, for the remainder of the governance structures to be set up in such a way so as 
to offset any negative effect on organisational value created by the family chief 
executive officer. This can include, as suggested by Polsiri and Sitthipongpanich 
(2015:126), the appointment of experienced, diverse (especially in terms of age), and 
well connected board members.   
 
According to Corbetta et al. (2014:556), the ownership and management contextual 
setting of the family organisation plays an important role in the effectiveness of the chief 
executive officer. They found, in their study of 893 private family organisations, that if 
there is more than one shareholder who performs the monitoring function in the family 
organisation, in other words a “disperse[d] ownership” structure, a non-family chief 
executive officer will outperform a family chief executive officer. For this to be true, there 
should not be a family member who is co-chief executive officer as this weakens the 
authority of the non-family chief executive officer. In this study, companies with non-
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family chief executive officers in a “concentrated ownership” setting performed the 
worst. Interestingly, the study found that the performance of a family chief executive 
officer is influenced to a much lesser degree by the contextual setting than that of the 
non-family chief executive officer (Corbetta et al. 2014: 561).  
 
In order to ensure that the chief executive officer’s behaviour prioritises the 
organisation’s needs above the needs of the family, it is suggested by Feldbauer-
Durstmüller and Hiebl (2014:53) that the position of the chief financial officer be 
occupied by an independent, therefore a non-family, person. This will facilitate clear and 
rational thinking, with the necessary amount of criticism, in order to act as a critical 
counterpart to the chief executive officer.  
 
The role and characteristics of the chief financial officer 
The chief financial officer is a key member of an organisation’s senior or executive 
management. This role entails more than the traditional finance and accounting role of 
the organisation. A chief financial officer needs to act professionally and needs to be a 
responsible steward. As an organisational leader, the chief financial officer needs to be 
a business partner to both the chief executive officer and the board of directors. The 
chief financial officer’s function does not only include the compilation and reporting of 
accurate financial figures, but also the implementation of internal controls, ethical 
financial management, effective and efficient use of resources in the best interest of the 
organisation, and development of sustainable value generation strategies. In smaller 
organisations, the chief financial officer also acts as the risk and compliance manager. 
In order to perform all these duties and functions, the chief financial officer should have 
an inherent ethical mind-set, technical expertise, leadership skills, and business 
acumen. (IFAC 2014:4,6) 
 
In a family organisation, the chief financial officer’s role is even more challenging than in 
a non-family organisation. After conducting interviews with several board members, 
including chief financial officers, Hiebl (2014:481-482) concluded that many chief 
financial officers in a family organisation are responsible for the financial wellbeing of 
the family organisation and that they also need to take cognisance of the financial 
wealth of the family over the long term. They are therefore unofficially partly responsible 
for individual family members’ wealth management. This can lead to contradictory 
objectives, or as referred to by Feldbauer-Durstmüller and Hiebl (2014:57) as “inter-role 
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conflict” which, if not managed properly, can negatively affect the organisation’s value 
because the chief financial officer might spend more time and energy on individual 
family members’ goals than on organisational objectives. Should the chief financial 
officer be a family member (therefore not independent), the additional pressure of 
ensuring that the chief financial officer’s activities do not affect his relationship with 
family members might exacerbate the inter-role conflict even more.  
 
Supporting evidence can be found in a study by Feldbauer-Durstmüller and Hiebl 
(2014:58) which compared the role of the corporate chief financial officer to that of the 
Benedictine cellarer (the “monastic family” chief financial officer). They found that being 
part of the monastic family meant that any actions taken by the cellarer affect the 
cellarer’s private life as well. The non-family-corporation chief financial officer, on the 
other hand, experienced a limited impact on his private life. Since relationships in a 
monastery are comparable to a family, which could include non-blood relations, it can 
be argued that the same concept can be applied to the family chief financial officer in a 
private family organisation.  
 
The resource-based view of organisations is concerned with the analysis and effective 
usage of all assets or resources available within an organisation in order to achieve 
competitive advantage in the market place. To ensure this, the available resources need 
to achieve a return on assets above the opportunity cost to the owner of the resources. 
Wernerfelt (1984:172) listed skilled human capital as one of the most important 
resources in an organisation. One could therefore adopt the view that human capital 
plays a vital role in ensuring competitive advantage in the family firm, which in turn, 
might lead to improved financial performance and value.  
 
The chief financial officer, as driver of financial strategy and control, can thus be seen 
as one of the more significant and strategic assets within the human resource asset 
base. This might explain why one of the first senior management positions in a family 
organisation which is normally filled by a non-family member is that of chief financial 
officer (Hiebl 2014:466). The reason for this might be the need for their specialised skill 
set and knowledge, not only in terms of specific financial reporting requirements and 
taxation, but also in terms of their experience in, for example, implementing internal 
controls, budgeting, financial management, and strategic thinking. In some cases, a 
chief financial officer’s professional education and training might promote 
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professionalisation of the family organisation. Furthermore, their ability to act objectively 
may also assist them with the unofficial role of mediator in family conflict within the 
structures of a family organisation (Hiebl 2014:487).  
 
The chief financial officer, in conjunction with senior management and the board of 
directors, is responsible for the implementation of control measures, which includes the 
establishment of various organisational policies and procedures.  
 
2.3.3.2 POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
 
Both family and non-family organisations must be resilient enough to manage and 
survive the challenging international and national economic climate. Recent events in 
SA, such as the renewed devaluation of the Rand, record levels of labour unrest, 
infrastructure challenges (PwC 2014b:3), as well as the political instability (CFA Institute 
2014:14) all add to the economic pressures of South African organisations. PwC’s 
Family Business Survey 2014 (PwC 2014b:3) states that, in order to face these 
challenges, family organisations need to professionalise their organisations and they 
also need to professionalise the controlling family. As discussed under both the 
supervisory governance structures and the managerial governance structures, family 
organisations will need to draw on the knowledge and experience of suitable non-family 
individuals in order to survive these trying times. The Family Business Survey 2014 
(PwC 2014b:3) suggests that, as part of their professionalisation, family organisations 
need to develop and document formal processes and procedures that “form the 
backbone of the business operations and provide it with the context and structure it 
needs to grow and adapt”.  
 
In order to professionalise a family organisation, the shareholders need to consider both 
family and organisational governance. Family governance includes inter alia, the 
implementation of a family charter that regulates the family’s interaction and 
commitment to the organisation, a shareholder agreement that stipulates the voting 
rights and any transfer or selling of shares, as well a dividend policy that specifies under 
which circumstances dividends will be declared and how they will be calculated 
(Kammerlander et al. 2015:69). The contribution and value of a family constitution, 
shareholder’s agreements, and dividend policies, as sub-sections of family governance 
are therefore recognised, but will not be concentrated on in this study. 
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Organisational governance refers to the governance matters that have a direct impact 
on the family organisation as a separate legal entity. The remainder of this section will 
therefore focus on any legal requirements, best practice, and literature as they relate to 
policies and procedures within an organisational governance context. 
 
From a Companies Act perspective, there are very few references to the legal 
requirement for policies and procedures relevant to private family organisations. 
King III’s “Code of governance principles” (IoDSA 2009:25) however, although not 
legally enforceable, has a number of recommendations with regard to policies to be 
implemented for the effective governance of any organisation. These policies include, 
but are not limited to, the following: 
 
Board related policies: 
- Recommended Practice number 1.1.7 (IoDSA 2009:20) and Recommended 
Practice number 1.3.6 (IoDSA 2009:21) recommend that the board establish a 
code of conduct in which it formulates the values of the organisation. These values 
should describe the key moral principles upon which the organisation will conduct 
business, as well as regulate its interaction with all internal and external 
stakeholders. It is also the board’s responsibility to ensure the implementation of 
ethics related policies, which will guarantee the effective management of the 
organisation’s ethics; 
- Recommended Practice number 2.1.1 (IoDSA 2009:21) states that the board of 
directors should develop a board charter or terms of reference which set out its 
responsibilities to act as the custodian of corporate governance in the organisation; 
- Recommended Practice number 2.17.3 (IoDSA 2009:25) recommends that the 
board of directors determine a materiality framework and develop and implement a 
formal delegation of authority policy to manage the delegation of executive 
functions to the chief executive officer and management; 
- Recommended Practice number 2.23.1 (IoDSA 2009:28) states that, without 
discarding its responsibilities, the board of directors should appoint relevant sub-
committees to assist the board in the execution of their tasks. These sub-
committees should have formal terms of references; 
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- Recommended Practice number 3.1.2 (IoDSA 2009:31) recommends that non-
listed and non-state-owned companies establish effective and independent audit 
committees. This should be read with the audit committee requirements as 
stipulated in the Companies Act. Section 84(1)(c), in conjunction with section 
84(4)(c) of the Companies Act, requires a private company, if it is required to be 
audited in terms of section 30, to establish an audit committee. With reference to 
Recommended Practice number 2.23 (IoDSA 2009:28), formal terms of reference 
should be developed for the audit committee. Recommended Practice 
number 3.9.4. (IoDSA 2009:34) states that the audit committee must outline a 
policy for non-audit services to be provided by external auditors; 
- Recommended Practice number 4.1.1 (IoDSA 2009:35) indicates that the board of 
directors should develop a risk management policy for the governance of risk; and   
- Recommended Practice number 5.1.2 (IoDSA 2009:39) highlights that the board 
of directors should establish and implement an information technology (IT) charter 
and policies to ensure the governance of IT. (own emphasis) 
 
Management policies: 
- Recommended Practice number 1.2.6 (IoDSA 2009:21) elaborates on the 
organisation’s responsibility as a responsible corporate citizen, and management 
therefore needs to implement policies to develop responsible corporate citizenship. 
Ethical behaviour and responsible corporate citizenship ensure stakeholder trust in 
an organisation and therefore improves the organisation’s reputation. The 
improved reputation will positively impact upon the organisational value; 
- Recommended Practice numbers 2.25-2.27 (IoDSA 2009:30) pronounce that, in 
order to ensure fair and responsible remuneration, the organisation should adopt a 
formal remuneration policy that is linked to the organisation’s strategic objectives, 
as well as individual performance; and  
- Recommended Practice number 8.2.1 (IoDSA 2009:47) recommends that 
management establish stakeholder policies to proactively deal with stakeholder 
relations. The board should ensure that these stakeholder policies lead to a 
balanced approach towards the rightful interests and expectations of all 
stakeholders. (own emphasis) 
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Family organisations, especially in the first generation, prefer to negate any 
bureaucracy and therefore choose to, as far as possible, avoid the implementation of 
formal policies and procedures. Family conflict in family organisations (Farrington, Van 
der Merwe & Venter 2012:70; Taylor & Tucker 2013:28) and nepotism (Block et al. 
2015:3; Duran-Encalada & San Martin-Reyna 2012:109) are cited in the literature as 
two of the main reasons for the destruction of organisational value in family 
organisations, and therefore necessitate family organisations to have policies and 
procedures in place to manage any potential value destruction due to family conflict and 
nepotism. 
 
These policies include human resource policies that deal with recruitment and 
appointment of family members, management succession, remuneration and leave, 
discipline, as well as performance management of family members (Carlock & Ward 
2005:23-28). In addition to these policies, the code of conduct and the delegation of 
authority, as discussed under board policies, will also assist in decreasing any potential 
family conflict. The code of conduct will determine an acceptable way of doing business 
with internal and external stakeholders (including family members) and the delegation of 
authority will create boundaries within the management structure, therefore decreasing 
potential conflict situations. Aronoff, Astrachan and Ward (2016:8) confirms the value of 
implemented policies, by stating that these policies: avoid future conflict, because it 
changes implied policies (based on historical behaviour) into explicit policy, it gives 
families the opportunity to discuss their issues, before these issues become personal; 
and it promotes dialogue through the process of questioning assumptions and 
understanding the different perspectives of the relevant stakeholders.  
 
2.4 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO 
ORGANISATIONAL VALUE 
 
The three-circle model (see Figure 4), indicates interaction between family, ownership, 
and management in a family organisation. The interaction of these sub-systems can 
result in certain challenges, but it also has the potential to create value through the 
optimisation of the synergies within these three sub-systems. These challenges and 
synergies, as well as the attributes as identified under both agency and stewardship 
theory, might have a significant effect on the objectives—both financial and non-
financial—of the organisation and resultantly on the perceived value of the family 
organisation. Therefore, it is important to implement a clear governance structure 
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(International Finance Corporation - World Bank Group 2008:56) that allows for the 
alignment of financial and non-financial objectives as they relate to these three sub-
systems. Organisational value should therefore be considered from both a financial and 
a non-financial viewpoint, since the family organisation’s objectives will influence 
behaviour and ultimately the financial performance of the organisation (Chrisman & 
Patel 2012:992; Mazzi 2011:167).  
 
When considering organisational value from a financial viewpoint, the financial 
objectives of the organisation should be considered. Financial objectives are normally 
measured in monetary terms, for instance, the increase in revenue or profit before tax 
on a year-to-year basis; the growth in the asset or capital base of the organisation; 
and/or a positive cash flow position. These objectives are distinct from the non-financial 
objectives which will be discussed under the non-financial viewpoint section. The non-
financial objectives, or differently stated, the socio-emotional wealth objectives, are key 
reference points in the decision-making process of a family organisation (Dou et al. 
2014:259) and could include family control, transgenerational wealth, social identity, and 
reputation. 
 
2.4.1 ORGANISATIONAL VALUE FROM A FINANCIAL VIEWPOINT 
 
Financial performance is one of the main contributors to family organisational value. 
Should the family organisation not achieve its financial goals, it will have a direct impact 
on the shareholders and/or the owner family, as well as other stakeholders. Therefore, 
should the family organisation not be financially sustainable, the shareholders and all 
the stakeholders (for example, employees and suppliers) will be negatively affected. 
Financial objectives could include growth in the equity value of the organisation, 
financial security, and dividend pay-outs (Astrachan & Jaskiewicz 2008:139).  
 
The literature presents contrasting results on the relationship between the governance 
structures and the financial performance of private family organisations. This might be 
because of various reasons, which include, but are not limited to, the use of different 
definitions for family organisations when performing the various studies (Chrisman, 
Debicki, Kellermanns & Pearson 2016:50); the differences in the vision and mission (or 
objectives) of the family organisation; the various financial performance measurements 
used; the use of different independent and control variables in the various studies, e.g., 
outsiders versus insiders on the board, independent versus non-independent board 
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members, family chief executive officers versus non-family chief executive officers; the 
role of the chief executive officer and the role of the chairman of the board; the 
generation in control; the organisational life-cycle; the presence of non-family 
shareholders; and the in-laws in management. Another reason could be the 
organisation’s orientation of family-first versus business-first. The question is thus, are 
family objectives prioritised above those objectives of the organisation? 
 
Objective financial measures 
As discussed above, various financial measures are used in the literature to determine 
the financial performance of a family organisation. The two main categories are market-
value-based measures and accounting-based measures (Barnard & Oberholzer 
2015:946; Williams 2015:96). Examples of market-value-based measures include 
Tobin’s Q (ratio of market value to replacement value), Economic Value Added (EVA) 
and Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) (net operating profit less adjusted taxed on 
invested capital, normally expressed at market value) (Skae 2014). An example of 
accounting measures include return on assets (ROA) (operating income return on 
assets) (Barnard & Oberholzer 2015:946; Williams 2015:96). Accounting measures are 
frequently based on measures other than market values. This is often as a result of 
difficulties in observing or reliably quantifying market values, especially in the case of 
entities not listed on a stock exchange. Accounting measures therefore frequently 
include a combination of book value and fair value accounting as required by 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). It is therefore important to review 
these measures and identify the most appropriate ones for the current study.  
 
Four different measures, on which financial performance of an organisation can be 
measured, were identified by Bhagat and Black (2001:242). These measures are 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, ratio of sales to assets, and market adjusted stock price returns. 
Duran-Encalada and San Martin-Reyna (2012:111), in their analysis of the data from 
the Mexican stock exchange, used the Tobin’s Q ratio and the asset market-to-book 
ratio. The majority of the above measures are mainly used for listed organisations due 
to their focus on market values. It is recommended by Barnard & Oberholzer (2015:951) 
that, in order to determine organisational performance, both market and accounting 
based measures be used. However, since market values are not directly observable in 
the case of private family organisations, other, more appropriate measures have to be 
sought. 
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In their study, Arosa et al. (2015:1208) used ROA (in this case, defined as a ratio of 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) to total assets) 
and return on equity (ROE) (i.e. ratio of net income to book value of equity) as indicators 
of performance in their study of 341 unlisted Spanish family organisations. Corbetta et 
al. (2014:555) used an industry-adjusted ROA1 when analysing the performance of 
893 private family organisations. In addition to this, they performed supplementary 
testing to establish the robustness of their results by using unadjusted ROA, ROE, and 
return on sales (ROS). ROA was one of the two performance measurements used by 
Lodh and Rashid (2014:436) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008:261), the other method used 
was Tobin’s Q. They calculated the ROA as “the earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) scaled by the book value of average net total assets.” Block et al. (2015:6) 
analysed 380 primary studies when performing a meta-analysis on the financial 
performance of family organisations. They used ROA, ROE, ROS, sales growth, and 
market-to-book value as indicators of firm performance. In Barnard & Oberholzer’s 
(2015:952) study of 40 published studies on chief executive officer/executive pay, it was 
found that ROA, ROE, and earnings per share (EPS) are the most used accounting-
based performance measures. Their best practice framework for accounting-based 
performance measurements also includes EBITDA as a proxy for return. In a review of 
the existing theoretical frameworks and the current state of knowledge, as it relates to 
financial performance, Mazzi (2011:175) found that ROA is “undoubtedly the most used 
variable” to determine financial performance in family organisations. This finding by 
Mazzi is verified by Brabec, Hnilica and Machek (2013:6) who also state that ROA is the 
most frequently used method of measuring performance in family business studies. 
 
Subjective financial measures 
Another study, specifically focused on SME’s (Eddleston & Kellermanns 2007:1052), 
applied a more subjective approach. Management was required to show how their 
performance, with specific reference to “growth in sales, market share, employees and 
profitability, return on equity, return on total assets, profit margin on sales and the ability 
to fund growth from profits”, compared to those of other players in the market. This 
method was used due to the general unavailability of private companies’ financial data. 
As per Love, Lumpkin and Priem (2002:617-618), and supported by Dess and Robinson 
                                                          
1 The difference between the firm’s ROA and the average ROA of the firms in the same two-digit SIC code industry 
in the same year. 
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(1984:271), these personal views on organisational performance “highly correlated” with 
independent performance data. These personal views of management also have the 
benefit of “indirectly control[ling] for industry effects” (Eddleston & Kellermanns 
2007:1052). Management has an embedded knowledge of the business and industry 
trends and its insight into the financial performance of an organisation should thus not 
be underestimated (Cadieux et al. 2013:2). 
 
Summary of objective and subjective financial measures 
In summary, the literature indicates that the most universally-applied, objective financial 
performance indicator, for a private family organisation, is ROA. It also indicates that, 
market-value-based methods are less suitable to private family organisations. The value 
of subjective financial measures, as formulated by the management of the private family 
organisation, would also be of value, especially if considered in conjunction with 
objective performance indicators. 
 
It would be short-sighted to look at a family organisation’s financial performance solely 
from an economic perspective and to try to compare this performance directly with other 
SME’s or the industry’s financial performance because family organisations usually 
have more than the outperformance of their bottom-line as a financial objective (Chirico 
& DeTienne 2013:1303; Williams 2015:ix). Their objectives might include sustainability 
of income for current shareholders and future generations, job-creation for family 
members, and contributions to the socio-economic circumstances of their local 
community. It is therefore imperative for the researcher to understand the vision, goals, 
and motivations of the family organisation before trying to determine the effectiveness of 
its organisational structure in terms of organisational value (Astrachan 2010:10-11; 
Cadieux et al. 2013:1-2; Chrisman, Memili & Misra 2013:4-5; PwC 2012:5).  
 
2.4.2 ORGANISATIONAL VALUE FROM A NON-FINANCIAL VIEWPOINT 
 
Socio-emotional wealth is an important factor to consider when determining the value of 
a family organisation, as this distinguishes the family organisation from the non-family 
organisation (Chirico & DeTienne 2013:1302). Non-family organisations generally have 
financial performance as their main driver of value. In contrast to this, family 
organisations usually need to, in order to be successful, find a balance between the 
organisation’s financial performance and the controlling family’s intuitive longing for 
socio-emotional wealth. 
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Socio-emotional wealth is grounded in behavioural theory (Vancauteren & Vandemaele 
2015:167) and is defined as the non-economic value that the family, as the owners of 
the organisation, can gain from their shareholding in the family organisation over an 
extended timeframe (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz 2013:340; Ganter & Kammerlander 
2014:361-362). When looking at this definition, the two important points to consider are 
non-economic value, and the extended timeframe. Non-economic value refers to the 
emotional investment of family members in the family organisation. These non-
economic values, although very important, are difficult to measure, and have therefore 
not received the same amount of attention from researchers as economic values 
(Astrachan & Jaskiewicz 2008:142; Williams 2015:58). The impact of the extended 
timeframe is that researchers need to consider the generation in control when 
performing their studies. Vancauteren and Vandemaele (2015:176), in their study, 
“Nonfinancial goals, governance structures and dividend pay-out in Private Family 
Firms” researched 839 Flemish companies. Based on this research, they concluded that 
socio-emotional objectives are of higher importance in first and second generation 
organisations than in third generation organisations. They propose that this is mainly 
because of the higher presence of family members in the governance structures of the 
first and second generation organisations. Additional reasons supporting this view are 
given by Kellermanns et al. (2014:133): family members are less emotionally attached 
to the organisation; higher levels of family conflict are present in later generations due to 
the diversity of objectives and agendas; and the organisations have more formal control 
mechanisms in place, resulting in less emotional decision-making. 
 
When determining the socio-emotional wealth created in a family organisation, it is first 
and foremost important to identify the organisation’s non-economic goals, as the goals 
are a precursor for understanding the organisation’s behaviour and value creation 
proposition (Barnett, Chrisman, Chua & Pearson 2012:268). These non-economic 
goals, as discussed in the literature, mainly include family control, transgenerational 
wealth, family members’ identities, and organisational reputation. 
 
Family control 
One of the main priorities of a business family is to keep control of the family 
organisation (Abdellatif, Amann & Jaussaud 2010:109) in both present and future 
periods. Control provides them with the ability to determine the strategic direction of the 
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organisation and to regulate the day-to-day activities, therefore maintaining the 
organisation’s internal socio-emotional wealth plan (Williams 2015:66). Gondo and 
Vardaman (2014:1318) make the comment that family organisations will not implement 
best corporate governance practices if the implementation could result in potential loss 
of control over the daily activities of the family organisation. Relinquishing control of a 
family organisation is, from the controlling family’s point of view, seen as a crucial socio-
emotional loss (Colli 2012:249; Vancauteren & Vandemaele 2015:168). The family 
organisation’s desire to keep control is one of the reasons for family organisations to be 
hesitant to professionalise the governance structures of the organisation, especially if 
this professionalisation relates to the appointment of independent directors and non-
family chief executive officers or chief financial officers.  
 
Ownership control offers the family the opportunity to control the daily operations of the 
organisation, either through non-executive structures or through executive structures, 
therefore ensuring better monitoring and lower information costs (Burton & Krivogorsky 
2012:192). In addition to the daily operations, ownership control also allows the owners 
to embed and transfer family values into the organisation. Jimenez, Jimenez and Martos 
(2015:269) suggest a positive relationship between the presence of values, e.g. trust 
and organisational harmony, and the performance—financial and non-financial—of a 
family organisation.  
 
Control of the family organisation might be detrimental to the organisation’s long-term 
financial performance because the family’s relative power can affect the degree to 
which family goals are prioritised above the goals of the organisation (Barnett et al. 
2012:268). Should the family members’ presence be dominant within the various 
governance structures and should they choose to influence the decision-making 
process as such, they will be afforded the opportunity to make non-economic decisions 
that would not necessarily have been made in a non-family organisation (Barnett et al. 
2012:269,284). Barnett et al. also suggest that these non-economic decisions are 
possible because there is less external accountability and internal bureaucracy in family 
organisations compared to non-family organisations.  
 
Another reason for potential diminishing economic performance is the owner family’s 
refusal to relinquish control of the organisation which might limit the organisation’s 
ability to obtain external capital injections, which in turn, might limit organisational 
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growth and expansion (Vancauteren & Vandemaele 2015:167; Williams 2015:70,80). 
Contrary to the detrimental effects, as already discussed, this internal financing 
approach has the potential to result in positive returns. This is because the family 
owner’s preference for internal financing (decreased dividend pay-outs (Williams 
2015:81) and capital being retained within the organisation), will limit the high cost of 
debt, and will consequently contribute to increased returns (Vancauteren & Vandemaele 
2015:168). This view is supported by Caspar, Dias and Elstrodt (2010) because they 
state that family organisations normally try to avoid undue risks to family wealth and the 
control of the organisation and, therefore, their long-term perspective results in 
moderate levels of risk-taking. The lower risk profile is in the interest of any debt 
holders, and it therefore lowers the cost of debt for the family organisation when 
compared to its corporate peers (Caspar et al. 2010).  
 
In addition to the capital resource scarcity as discussed above, nepotism (due to family 
control) could result in a human resources scarcity within the family organisation. 
Probably the most contentious element of socio-emotional wealth is the employment of 
individuals based solely on the fact that they are members of the controlling family or 
that they have very close family-ties (Chrisman, Chua & De Massis 2015:174). This is 
generally done to the detriment of applying stringent competency criteria as part of the 
human resource recruitment process, which in turn, can lead to the destruction of value 
within the organisation.  
 
With reference to family control, a major threat to owners of some South African family 
organisations is that families might lose control over the family organisation when 
complying with the requirements of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
(BBBEE) Act, No 53 of 2003 (Orton 2008:94). As discussed above, nepotism 
sometimes results in family members being present on supervisory and managerial 
governance levels within the family organisation. These management control levels, in 
combination with the family owners’ majority control of the organisation’s shareholding, 
make it challenging, if not impossible, for family organisations to comply with the 
requirements of the BBBEE Act (PwC 2013:23). If these organisations do not comply 
with the relevant BBBEE requirements, due to the fact that they retain their biggest 
socio-emotional wealth priority, namely control, they might limit their opportunities to 
participate in any governmental, and even non-governmental contracts, thus restricting 
their potential revenue income and consequently their return on invested capital.  
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Transgenerational wealth 
Family organisations are, as discussed earlier in the chapter, unique organisations and 
one of the key factors that distinguishes them from non-family organisations is the 
“value they place on longevity” (Marchisio, Shepherd & Woods 2013:50). In the 
literature, this long-term view is referred to as the family’s need, and the family 
organisation’s need, to create transgenerational wealth. Transgenerational wealth is 
twofold in that firstly, wealth needs to be created (whether economic or non-economic), 
and secondly, this created wealth should be for the benefit of not only current family 
members, but also for the benefit future generations as well.  
 
Wealth is normally created by the founders of the family organisation as a result of their 
desire to “fill a void” as stated by Dr Lize Albert, a South African wealth psychologist, in 
an interview with James Hughes, an American family wealth specialist (Hughes 2015). 
This void can be the founder’s longing to be financially independent, the flexibility and 
control associated with entrepreneurship and being your own boss, or it can be the 
desire to make a difference in life and to leave a legacy. In an interview with James 
Hughes titled “From shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves” (Hughes 2015), Dr Ilze Alberts (the 
interviewer) addressed the well-known phenomenon of family organisations that 
struggle to survive past the third generation. As per Hughes (2015), the failure of long-
term wealth preservation in families is seen in all cultures around the world as it takes 
one generation to found a business, the second to build it, and the third to dispense of 
it. This phenomenon, as seen across the world, can be appreciated from the following 
proverbs: "shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves in three generations” (Knowles 2006); “clogs to 
clogs in three generations” (Knowles 2006); “rice paddy to rice paddy in three 
generations” (Fitts 2009). 
 
The transfer of wealth over generations is dependent on the success of the succession 
process. Hughes (2015) theorises that the first generation, as the motivated 
entrepreneur who works towards realising his dream, might be so focused on his own 
dreams that he does not afford the second generation the opportunity to individualise 
the dreams or to identify and live their own dreams within the sphere of the family 
organisation. The second generation, therefore, only becomes the custodian of the first 
generation’s dreams and it is not inspired or enabled to perform its role as the second 
generation owner and/or manager. Hughes (2015) suggests that in order to sustain the 
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family wealth, the second generation should be given the opportunity, with the help of 
the relevant governance structures and advisors, to evolve its own dreams, not at the 
expense of the founding generation’s dreams, but with the possibility of its own 
individualisation and differentiation of the dreams. This individualisation and 
differentiation will potentially have a positive effect on the organisational value of a 
second generation organisation. 
 
It is suggested that the third generation became so used to the financial wealth factor, 
that it, as the beneficiary of the transgenerational wealth, does not have the ability nor 
the motivation to actively contribute to the financial success of the organisation. In order 
for the third generation to be successful, the first and second generations need to make 
a decisive decision that they want to create transgenerational wealth, and then 
subsequently to this decision, they need to put the relevant structures and processes in 
place in order to ensure that the third generation (and any further generations) will have 
the ability to successfully manage and grow the family wealth. A work ethic needs to be 
instilled in these generations and the current generation therefore needs to ensure that 
the next generations will be accountable and responsible for other generations as well 
as itself (Alberts 2015). This will potentially transpose the “three generation 
phenomenon” and will potentially contribute significantly to increased organisational 
value during this stage as well as future generational stages. 
 
Family relationships, interpersonal dynamics, and conflict are critical factors to be 
considered and managed in order to ensure the successful growth and transfer of multi-
generational family organisations (Boshof et al. 2010:34). The presence of family 
harmony, hence limited family conflict, was proved by Farrington et al. (2012:69) in their 
study of private family organisations, as positively, and significantly related to the 
perceived future continuity of the family organisation. 
 
Social identity 
Social identity theory proposes that an individual’s self-conceptualisation depends not 
only on his self-concept or personal identity, but also on his social identity, therefore his 
sense of belonging in a certain social environment or context (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz 
2013:341; Greene et al. 2013:236). A family member of the controlling family’s identity 
will hence be developed not only through his own personal experiences but also 
through his connection to the family and the family organisation, therefore an inside-out 
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perspective. According to Deephouse and Jaskiewicz (2013:341), the family member is 
more “aware” of its association with the family organisation than non-family members. In 
many cases, the family member sees the family organisation as an extension of the self, 
even if the family member is not actively participating in the family organisation (Orton 
2008:53), and it is therefore very important for his personal identity to uphold the image, 
brand, and reputation of the family organisation. 
 
Family members of “founded or inherited” family organisations identify more with these 
organisations than with those family organisations that were “acquired”. Founding or 
inheriting an organisation results in higher levels of personal identification with the 
organisation than if the organisation were to be acquired. Because of this personal 
identification, the owner will be more concerned with the protection of the organisation’s 
reputation and will also adopt more virtuous business behaviour, which will positively 
affect quality earnings (Mengoli et al. 2013:381) and enhance organisational value.    
 
From an outside-in perspective, individuals external to the family organisation and who 
are aware of the family organisation’s identity and image, tend to classify individual 
family members based on the context and their perceptions of the family organisation. 
As simplified by Stephan Greyser: Harvard Business School, corporate reputation is a 
“window to the fundamental character of a company and its leaders” (Martinez & 
Norman 2004:25). Therefore, the family organisation’s reputation has a direct impact on 
the social identity of the individual family members.  
 
Considering the above, it might be beneficial for the individual family member to 
prioritise organisational strategies and goals, as opposed to family-centred or self-
centred goals, since this will most likely improve organisation value, and thus ultimately 
promote the family member’s social identity. 
 
Organisational reputation 
The identity overlap between the family and that of the organisation, as discussed 
above, makes it important for the family members to ensure a favourable organisational 
reputation, as this has a direct impact on the family members’ social identities and 
reputations. Reputation is one of the key strategic resources in a family organisation as 
it is normally linked to the market’s perceptions of improved performance and value 
creation when compared to that of other market players. The long-term positioning of 
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family organisations, the continuity of relationships with various stakeholders, the key 
employee tenure and their involvement in the community—to name but a few—assist 
the family organisation in building a positive reputation (Clinton, Nason, Sieger & 
Zellweger 2011:342). A good reputation develops “family-based brand identity” and 
improves organisational value (Pindado & Requejo 2015:287).  
 
One of the contributors of an organisation’s positive reputation is the level of donations 
to social and charitable projects. Dou et al. (2014:269) found, in their review of 
2 821 private Chinese firms, that the presence of family members in strategic 
governance positions within the organisation has a significant and positive impact on 
charitable donations. Therefore, companies with family members as chief executive 
officers and/or chairpersons are more likely to make charitable donations than 
companies where these positions are occupied by non-family members. These findings 
are supported by those of Campopiano, Chirico and De Massis (2014:251), in their 
study of 148 Italian private organisations, where they found that owners of family 
organisations are in favour of social involvement and philanthropic engagement 
because it enhances their reputations as stewards in the community. The family owners’ 
stewardship behaviour is aligned with, and in support of, their longing for 
transgenerational business continuity. It was also found that philanthropic behaviour is 
negatively related to financial performance. This indicates that family organisations 
invest in their reputation when economic performance is low with the intention to gain 
future, not current, economic benefits (Campopiano et al. 2014:252), thus confirming 
their long-term perspective. 
 
The board of directors should acknowledge that stakeholders’ perceptions can affect an 
organisation’s reputation and consequently the organisational value. These perceptions 
should be measured and managed in order to enhance the organisation’s reputation. 
King suggests, in Chapter 8 of the Code of Governance Principles, that this should be a 
standing point on the board’s agenda (IoDSA 2009). Good governance plays a very 
important role in gaining the respect of outside stakeholders, and the implementation of 
a robust governance structure is therefore crucial to assist the family organisation in the 
mitigation of reputational risk (Institute of Directors 2010:12). 
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A good reputation in a family organisational context is generally representative of the 
market’s perception of the presence of virtuous family values and general 
entrepreneurial capabilities. This reputational capital assists the organisation in building 
lasting networks and attracting new business opportunities, thus enhancing the 
organisational value (Clinton et al. 2011:343-344).  
 
2.4.3 BUILDING ORGANISATIONAL VALUE THROUGH BOTH FINANCIAL AND 
NON-FINANCIAL GOALS 
 
A holistic approach should be followed when determining the value of a family 
organisation. This, as opposed to looking only at financial value and measurement, 
becomes incredibly difficult. The holistic view should include the generations involved, 
the life-cycle of the organisation, the culture of the owning family, as well as the family 
and organisational objectives (Colli 2012:243).  
 
Socio-emotional goals should be considered an integral part of the value creation in a 
family organisation. However, it is important that the costs associated with such goals 
should not be ignored. These costs might include the cost of incorrect decision-making 
due to incompetent family managers who were appointed in order to keep 
organisational control even though they did not possess the relevant qualifications and 
experience, or limited growth due to financing limitations, as control is favoured above 
external capital. 
 
As proposed by Astrachan and Jaskiewicz (2008:143), the value of a family 
organisation should therefore be determined as the total of financial and non-financial 
value, where the non-financial value is determined as the net of emotional value created 
and emotional costs incurred. Assessing the above discussions relating to financial and 
non-financial values, it can be suggested that organisational value can potentially be 
improved by taking cognisance of both financial and non-financial goals. The 
governance structures of a private family organisation should therefore facilitate the 
coordination of these goals, in order to increase the value of the organisation. Chrisman 
et al. (2013:1251) confirms this view, by stating that there are “dynamic linkages” 
between financial and non-financial goals, and the governance of a family organisation.
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The governance structures, as suggested in the literature, aim at somehow distancing 
the family from the organisation in order to ensure business orientated, non-emotional 
decision-making. However, Baron, Ehrensberger and Lachenauer (2015:5) remind one 
that the organisation, although distanced from the family on an operational level, should 
always be aware of, and be sensitive to, the owner’s vision for the family organisation.   
 
Family organisations compete against non-family organisations for human and financial 
resources, as well as market share. In order to be competitive, family organisations 
need to ensure that their governance structures, which for the purposes of this study 
include the organisation’s supervisory and managerial structures, are aligned with best 
practice. In addition to this, family organisations should safeguard against losing their 
unique family characteristics and objectives—for example longevity, stability, trust, and 
entrepreneurial nature—as these characteristics distinguish family organisations from 
their competitors and therefore add financial and non-financial value to the family 
organisation (Fernández-Aráoz & Zehnder 2015:85-86).   
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CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter guides the reader through the research methodology followed in the study. 
The rationale and the methodological detail of the study are important because they 
enable the reader to assess the research process followed, and also to conclude on the 
findings of the study (Hofstee 2011:107). Information about the research methodology 
will also allow the reader the opportunity to replicate the study, should he wish to do so 
(Hofstee 2011:107).  
 
The purpose of this study, as indicated earlier, is to identify the governance structures in 
family organisations and to determine whether the presence of these structures has any 
value-adding effect on the organisation. The research process selected for this study 
was specifically chosen to address the need to obtain an in-depth understanding of how 
the selected family organisations are structured. Even more importantly, the research 
process was chosen to obtain an in-depth understanding of the reasons for, and the 
effectiveness of, the structures as perceived by the individuals involved in the 
organisations. Both this study and the methodology applied are also a response to 
various calls issued for further research of family organisations as heterogeneous 
groups (Barnett et al. 2012:268; Chirico & DeTienne 2013:1302; Vancauteren & 
Vandemaele 2015:167). Therefore, there is a need to gain an in-depth understanding of 
the variances in the governance structures of the selected organisations in order to 
address the identified gaps in the body of knowledge. 
 
This chapter will discuss the research design in more detail and it will shed light on the 
methodology followed, which includes the research instruments used, the data 
collection process, and the process of data analysis. It will also elaborate on any 
research limitations and ethical considerations. Ethical clearance for this study was 
obtained from the Research Ethics Committee of the College of Accounting Sciences 
prior to performing the study (refer to Annexure G: Ethical clearance certificate). 
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3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This study consists of a detailed literature review and a qualitative multiple-case study 
analysis. This two-stage research strategy was deemed necessary in order to grasp the 
extent of the current body of knowledge on the subject matter and to gain an in-depth 
understanding of how the governance structures of the selected cases are structured, in 
order to determine why the private family organisations have configured their 
governance structure as such, and to understand whether the chosen governance 
structures add any value to these organisations.  
 
The literature review encompasses an investigation into the nature of family 
organisations, the relevant governance structures, and the factors that determine value 
in family organisations. The literature review was carried out by making reference to 
various peer-reviewed academic journals, books, survey reports, and other publications.  
The review was a mechanism to set up the theoretical framework for the study (and 
therefore informed the methodology of the study). The review was also critical to 
explore fully the extant body of knowledge around the research objective and sub-
objectives. 
 
The qualitative multiple-case study analysis involved the use of multiple information 
sources and techniques, including semi-structured interviews and document reviews. 
This will be discussed in more detail later on in this chapter. 
 
Available research methods 
Various research methods are available and it is thus essential to determine the most 
relevant method for a specific study. In other words, it is important to select a research 
method which speaks to the study’s underlying research paradigm, and which is best 
suited to address the set research objectives. The available research methods include, 
but are by no means limited to, experiments, surveys, analysis of archival records, 
histories, and case studies. Since this study works within an interpretivist paradigm as 
well as a social constructivist paradigm, the focus will be shifted towards a more 
qualitative methodological approach. An interpretivist-to-social-constructivist research 
paradigm is appropriate for this study since the researcher believes that reality is 
socially constructed and is a reflection of individuals’ subjective experiences (Thomas 
2010:295).  
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Leading author, Yin (2009:8) specifies three conditions that should be considered when 
deciding on the most appropriate method of research for a specific study. These 
conditions are (1) the form of research question (how, why, who, what, how many, how 
much, etc.); (2) whether the researcher needs to control the behavioural events; and (3) 
the level of focus on contemporary versus historical events. 
 
These methods have distinct characteristics but they also have some overlaps. The 
most appropriate method should therefore be selected without creating any “gross 
misfits” (Yin 2009:8). The analogy of a traffic light is used in Table 3 to indicate the 
relevance of the current study to the various listed conditions. The colour green shows 
that the indicated method is very suitable to this study, whereas the colour red indicates 
limited or no relevance. Yellow therefore indicates partial relevance, which therefore 
places it between green and red. 
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Table 3: Suitability of different research methods 
       Research    
  method 
 
Condition 
Survey Archival 
Analysis 
Historical 
method 
Case Study 
 
 
1. Form of research question? 
Question to be 
answered as 
per Yin: 
who, what, 
where, how 
many, how 
much? 
who, what, 
where, how 
many, how 
much? 
how, why? 
 
 
how, why? 
 
 
Applicability to 
this study: 
Partly 
 
Partly 
 
Applicable 
 
Applicable 
 
 
 
2. Requires control of behavioural events? 
Control required 
as per Yin: 
No No No No 
Applicability to 
this study: 
Applicable Applicable Applicable Applicable 
 
 
3. Focuses on contemporary opposed to historical events? 
Focus as per 
Yin: 
Contemporary Contemporary / 
History 
History Contemporary 
Applicability to 
this study: 
Applicable Partly 
 
Not applicable Applicable 
Source: Adapted from Yin (2009:8)  
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The current study is concerned with how the selected family organisations structured 
their supervisory and managerial governance. It is also concerned with understanding 
the reasons as to why these specific structures were implemented. In addition, it tries to 
understand whether or not these structures add value to the organisation. The 
behaviour of events was not controlled by the researcher as the investigation took place 
in the organisation’s natural environment and in its normal state of business. The study 
focuses on current contemporary issues that are experienced in the fields of 
management, corporate governance, and family organisations. Based on this analysis, 
and as depicted in Table 3, it is clear that the case study design is the most appropriate 
design for the current study. 
 
Case study as a qualitative research design 
A case study is a design that is frequently used as a research design in the “social 
sciences disciplines” (Yin 2009:5) since it affords the researcher the opportunity to gain 
insight into “organisational, professional and social circumstances” (Parker 2012:57) 
within the selected organisations. The understanding of the dynamics in these 
circumstances is crucial to establish trustworthiness (Begley & Tobin 2004:3). 
Qualitative research contributes significantly to the field of accounting studies, as it 
contextualises and explains the various phenomena found in the field (Hiebl 2014:472). 
As posited by Parker (2012:55), the information obtained through the use of a 
qualitative approach in conjunction with the quantitative research already performed by 
other various researchers, could significantly contribute to the current body of 
knowledge in the management accounting discipline, specifically including, in this case, 
the family business discipline. A qualitative approach also speaks to the stated research 
objectives of this study. 
 
Case study design as applied in the current study 
A case study is a qualitative research design that is designed to create “managerially 
relevant knowledge” (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki 2008:1465). It also, with specific 
reference to this research project, helps the researcher to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the governance structures of the selected units of analyses, as well as 
an understanding of the value that the structures add (if any) to the selected 
organisations within their contextual environments. It therefore speaks to real-life 
situations within a specified time-frame and context (Yin 2009:18).  
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In order to enhance the robustness of the study, it was decided that a multiple-case 
design, instead of a single-case design, should be used. A multiple-case study provides 
a “stronger base for theory building or explanation” (De Massis & Kotlar 2014:18) as it 
enables the researcher to analyse his/her findings within the specific case and across 
cases, and it therefore clarifies whether the findings are isolated or replicated in other 
cases. 
 
A literal replication process of enquiry (Yin 2009:54) was followed in the multiple-case 
design, therefore replicating the data collection procedures for both cases. The 
procedural replication for both cases ensured fair and valid findings (Creswell 2013:99; 
Yin 2009:54). It also facilitated the development of a rich theoretical framework, which 
could then be used, as stated by Yin (2009:54), as a “vehicle for generalising to new 
cases”. The goal of case study research is, as explained by Yin (2009:15) and 
supported by Johansson (2003:8), to “expand and generalize theories (analytical 
generalization)”, and therefore not to “enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalization)”.  
 
In addition to the reasons discussed above, a multiple-case design was selected due to 
the need to truly understand the applied governance structures of the selected family 
organisations and to identify whether there were any similarities, common themes, or 
contrasting themes that emerged from the two organisations (Eisenhardt 1989:540). 
Another reason for the design decision was that it offered the researcher the opportunity 
to gain different perspectives from various interviewees, involved in the respective units 
of analyses, on the common issues within a family organisation’s structural design. 
 
This multiple-case study can be categorised as an explanatory case study (De Massis & 
Kotlar 2014:16; Stake 1978:7) because it seeks to facilitate the development of theory 
through an in-depth understanding and explanation of practices implemented by the 
selected units of analyses. The value of an explanatory case study, such as the current 
study, is that it facilitates the understanding of the organisations’ motivations for their 
respective governance structure choices, the complications experienced with the 
implementation thereof, the effectiveness of these structures, and the perceived value 
added by these structures.  
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Data collection 
The data collection process used several instruments and sources of evidence as 
proposed by Yin (2009:11) and Bowen (2009:28). The benefit of a multiple-case study 
approach with multiple data sources (data triangulation) is that it facilitates the 
production of much richer data than what would have been obtained through other 
research strategies (Yin 2009:114-115). Data triangulation involves the process of 
obtaining information from various sources to supply corroborating evidence. The 
multiple data sources assist to, in addition to assisting the production of richer data, 
verify findings as discovered during the interview process (Albon, Hubball & Pearson 
2015:3).  
 
These methods of data collection included interviews–with semi-structured interview 
guidelines and question data sheets (Kvale 1999:111)–as well as document analysis 
(Bowen 2009:28), namely the reviewing of policy documents, the obtaining of 
information from the units of analyses’ respective websites, and the analysing of annual 
financial statements. The amalgamation of information from various data sources, to be 
discussed under the data analysis section, results in data triangulation as proposed by 
Yin (2009:18) and therefore enhances the credibility and overall trustworthiness of the 
findings (Barrette et al. 2002:15; Guba 1981:80).  
 
As suggested by Bowen (2009:29-30), the document analysis was used for the 
following reasons: to provide context to the family organisation and to provide the 
organisation’s history; to guide the researcher towards certain questions to be included 
in the interview schedule; to supplement the interview data to be obtained; and lastly, to 
verify the findings from other data sources. Therefore, it was used as part of the data 
collection triangulation within the case-study design and not as a separate qualitative 
research method. 
 
Reporting 
Reporting entails detailed and rich descriptions of the respective cases and any case 
themes identified. Corresponding themes across both cases are also identified and 
reported on. In addition to the common themes, any discrepancies or differences 
between the two cases, which are of theoretical value, are highlighted and reported on. 
Creswell (2013:252) suggests that rich descriptions will enable the readers to transfer 
the information of the selected cases to other cases, which then gives the reader the 
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option to decide on the transferability of the findings, due to the common characteristics 
of these and other cases.  
 
The detailed and rich descriptions of the respective cases, and any case themes that 
were identified, were submitted to the chief executive officers of the relevant units of 
analyses. This was done in order to obtain their views as to the credibility and accuracy 
of the respective case findings and interpretations (Creswell 2013:252). The member 
checking, as per best practice in research ethics and integrity, supports the process of 
ensuring dependability on, and conformability with, any research findings and 
interpretations (Visagie 2014:24).   
 
The following section will discuss the process that was followed in order to identify the 
units of analyses, the research instruments and the data collection process, as well as 
the method of data analysis. 
 
3.3 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
3.3.1 IDENTIFICATION OF THE UNITS OF ANALYSES  
 
For the purpose of this study, the units of analyses are two private family organisations. 
The process of identifying the two units of analyses that were to be used in this multiple-
case study was complicated by the lack of a publicly available South African family 
business database, as confirmed by Farrington et al. (2012:79), Orton (2008:57), and 
Van der Merwe (2009:3). It was also complicated by the lack of publicly available 
financial data on private companies. The Bureau van Dijk Orbis (Orbis) database, which 
offers general business information, was therefore used as the starting point. This 
database provides ownership, board, and financial information for firms worldwide 
(Deephouse & Jaskiewicz 2013:346). Since data on private shareholding is not always 
available in the database, companies with more than one director sharing the same 
surname were identified. This, unfortunately, did not yield the required result because it 
led to an extremely long list of entities with no guarantee that the entities were actually 
family organisations. Thus, this list was disregarded and an alternative selection method 
was therefore attempted. This then led to the selection of the industry first.  
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South African family businesses account for approximately 65% of all business 
organisations in the country (KPMG 2015:2). This percentage should however, be 
examined from an industry perspective, as it is reported that family organisations 
account for 90% of South African agricultural businesses (Dynes 2010:1). The oldest 
recorded family organisation in South Africa, Boplaas, is a fruit producer in the Koue 
Bokkeveld which is close to Ceres (Family Business Association of South Africa 2016). 
This farm has been managed by the controlling family since 1743. The long history of 
South African agricultural enterprises, which originated and continue to operate mainly 
as family organisations, as well as the sector’s contribution to food security in South 
Africa, encouraged this study’s focus on agriculture.  
 
Various agricultural sectors were assessed; however, the dairy industry was selected 
because it affords organisations the opportunity to be involved in both the primary and 
secondary production processes, and it therefore allows organisations to contribute to 
the milk value chain by using the raw milk, by adding value through various processes, 
and then by supplying these raw and value-added products directly to retailers. Milk 
production is the fifth largest industry within agriculture in South Africa (Milk SA 
2014:13). There are over 4 000 milk producers in South Africa and they employ 60 000 
farm workers and provide 40 000 indirect jobs within the dairy value chain (Department 
of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries 2012:3). They therefore play an important role in 
alleviating the South African employment crisis.  
 
A list of private entities in the dairy production and manufacturing sector was obtained 
from the Orbis database. This was done as a first step in the process of identifying 
family organisations within the sector. The search criteria specified (1) all active 
companies, (2) within the dairy cattle and milk production industry, (3) which are 
classified as private entities, and (4) registered in South Africa. The specified criteria 
and search results are depicted below: 
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Figure 6: Search criteria for potential family organisations in dairy production 
  Step result 2 Search result 
1. All active companies and companies with unknown situation 106,220,071 106,220,071 
2. NAICS 2007 (All codes): 11212 - Dairy Cattle and Milk 
Production 
428,304 339,711 
3. Public/Private/Branch: Private 
(GmbH/SARL/SRL/BV/OY/AS/YK etc.) 
37,342,469 51,992 
4. World region/Country/Region in country: South Africa 576,842 215 
 Boolean search : 1 And 2 And 3 And 4   
 TOTAL  215 
Source: Bureau van Dijk Orbis (Orbis) database 
 
The refined selection process resulted in a list of 215 entities. The list included entities 
that were involved solely in the primary sector of milk production, as well as entities that 
were involved in both the primary and secondary sector–therefore the processing 
(manufacturing and value-adding) of dairy products. The 215 entities were therefore 
investigated in more detail in order to identify entities that were specifically involved in 
the manufacturing and distributing of dairy products–i.e., the secondary sector. Entities 
that were solely involved in the primary sector were excluded, as well as entities that did 
not have an official website (this was used as an indication of size and impact that the 
entity had within the secondary market). Since there are quite a number of dairy 
products available in the secondary market, the product list considered was limited to 
fresh milk, yogurts, drinking yogurts, and fruit juices.  
 
In addition to the criteria as discussed and listed above, the organisation had to conform 
with the definition of a family organisation as defined in this study, and it also needed to 
be a major role player in the industry before being considered for the study. Their 
respective websites were screened to determine the following: 
- Does the organisation define itself as a family organisation? 
- What is the organisation’s history? 
- Which generation is currently in control? 
- What are the product ranges? 
- Who are the organisation’s clients?  
 
 
                                                          
2 Each added step narrows the search and therefore reduces the number of qualifying entities under the “search 
result” column. 
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Along with the above review, independent news and other news articles, relevant to the 
dairy industry, were reviewed to identify any major role players in the industry before a 
shortlist of six potential units of analyses was generated. The CIPC “abridged 
certificate for annual returns” was also reviewed in order to identify the surnames of the 
company directors. This was done because corresponding surnames may possibly be 
an indication of family relations. 
 
The above process was followed in order to facilitate theoretical sampling. A 
comparable basis is ensured by the following factors: the organisations are from the 
same industry; they have similar products and clients; they are major role players in the 
market; they are privately owned; they are defined as family organisations; and they 
have similar generations in control. This allows for the prediction of similar results and 
literal replication as proposed by De Massis and Kotlar (2014:18). 
 
All the shortlisted companies were contacted in order to determine their willingness to 
participate in the study. Due to various reasons, inter alia restructuring and time 
constraints of management, only two companies were willing to participate. Formal 
written consent for the studies was obtained from the chief executive officers of both 
companies, as per the requirements of the Research Ethics Committee of the College 
of Accounting Sciences. The two companies will, for confidentiality reasons, be referred 
to as Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd. 
 
3.3.2 DATA COLLECTION AND RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS 
 
Based on the information obtained from the literature review, two question data sheets 
(Annexure C: Factual organisational information and Annexure D: Company goals and 
success measures) as well as two interview schedules (Annexure E: Interview schedule 
– executives and management and Annexure F: Interview schedule – non-executives) 
were developed. The interview schedules were designed to make provision for 
responses by executive management and non-executive management. 
 
The organograms of both organisations were obtained. These organograms stipulated 
all of the employees of the respective family organisations. Therefore, the individuals, 
as listed on the respective organograms, were identified as the population for sampling 
purposes. Purposive sampling was performed, thus identifying all the board members, 
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executive management, and senior management within the identified population. All of 
these individuals were contacted —through the office of the CEO— and appointments 
were scheduled with the available identified individuals. Semi-structured interviews were 
then conducted with members of the board, and/or executive and senior management, 
after which an analysis of the selected organisations’ financial information and other 
relevant documentation was performed. It is important to note that the one-on-one 
interviews included both family and non-family members. In the end a variety of 
individuals was interviewed which resulted in multiple-informant reports (De Massis & 
Kotlar 2014:21).  
 
In order to ensure data triangulation, as recommended by Yin (2009:114-117), and in 
order to test the credibility (Parker 2012:59) of the information obtained, the data 
collection process was designed to ensure that certain key information aspects will be 
obtained from various data sources (Eisenhardt 1989:534). An example of this is where 
information was obtained in writing from the chief executive officers and then verified 
against other information obtained from the same individuals, and then was further 
verified against other executives/management during the interview process. Official 
company and public documents in the form of, but not limited to, audited annual 
financial statements, policy documents, and schedules from the Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) were obtained and also used to validate the 
information gathered during the interview process.  
 
The data collection process, as well as the research instruments used, will now be 
discussed in greater detail. 
 
3.3.2.1 QUESTION DATA SHEETS 
The analysis of documentary sources is an important method of data collection and is 
seen as “meaningful” and “appropriate” (Mason 2002:103) in the context of this study. 
These sources may include documents that already exist prior to the research process, 
or these documents might be produced through the research process (Mason 
2002:103).  
 
Biographical data (Mason 2002:56) of the respective private family organisations were 
obtained through the use of a question data sheet (see Annexure C: Factual 
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organisational information). The required biographical data included the share 
ownership and voting rights; the governance structures formally in place; the individuals 
and/or structures responsible for the strategic direction of the organisation; the current 
shareholders and whether they have the intention to transfer ownership to the next 
generation; and, where applicable, the structure of the board of directors, management, 
policies and any other relevant governance structures. This formed the basis of further 
investigations, as the information was used to assess against the definition of a family 
organisation as defined in this study. It was also then compared to information obtained 
during the interview process to ensure the trustworthiness of the data. The chief 
executive officers were requested to complete this question data sheet (Annexure C: 
Factual organisational information). 
 
The second question data sheet (Annexure D: Company goals and success measures) 
dealt with the goals and success measures of the organisation. The question data sheet 
was designed in such a manner so as to not specifically distinguish between financial 
and non-financial goals because the objective was to obtain richer data. Therefore, this 
required the respondent to rate his goals. Based on the analysis of the obtained 
information, it could be determined whether the company is leaning more toward 
financial or non-financial goals. The purpose of this was to explore the theories that 
suggest that family businesses are more focused on non-financial goals than on 
financial goals (Ganter & Kammerlander 2014:362). 
 
Another objective of this second question data sheet was to determine what the 
organisations’ specific goals are because this would provide context within which to 
analyse organisational value. The organisation can only be assessed against something 
that it aimed for (Barnett et al. 2012:268). If this context is not taken into account, it 
might lead to incorrect or skewed findings. 
 
The chief executive officers of the respective organisations were invited to complete 
both Annexures C and D, and the chief financial officers of the organisations were 
invited to complete only Annexure D. The chief executive officers completed both 
question data sheets as requested, but the chief financial officers, of both organisations, 
unfortunately did not complete annexure D, as requested. This was compensated for 
through the interview process, where the interviewees were asked to explain their 
company’s financial and non-financial performance objectives. The chief executive 
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officers were requested to not discuss their respective responses with the other 
interviewees prior to submitting the completed question data sheets. Again, this was 
done to ensure the trustworthiness (Guba 1981:83) of the information received and also 
to obtain an in-depth understanding (Dimitratos, Leppäaho & Plakoyiannaki 2016:167) 
of the interviewees’ respective views on this matter. The information gathered from this 
will be used as part of the value analysis.  
 
3.3.2.2 INTERVIEWS 
Interviews formed the basis of the data collection process and were used to obtain a 
deeper understanding of the interactions, dynamics, and processes within the specific 
company. The literature review (refer to Chapter 2) was used as a basis for the 
development of a conversation-guiding interview schedule, as presented in Annexure E: 
Interview schedule – executives and management, and Annexure F: Interview schedule 
– non-executives. In order to obtain rich data, the majority of the questions were open-
ended and semi-structured. The questions were also asked in a way which afforded the 
interviewee ample opportunity to express and explain their views regarding the various 
discussion points, without leading the interviewee to any specific conclusion. The 
interview schedule was divided into sub-categories, namely personal information of the 
respondent; formal governance structures in the company; succession; recruitment and 
appointment of employees; performance management of individual employees; 
accountability; privileged information; company performance; general information; and 
concluding/additional information. The purpose of this structure was to obtain facts (e.g. 
whether the person was a family member or non-family member; what their 
shareholding percentage is; etc.), as well as the respondents’ opinion on the current 
processes and governance structures in place. In an attempt to obtain honest 
reflections from the interviewees, the researcher indicated, in the “Interviewee 
information sheet” (Annexure B) as well as on the front page of the “Interview schedule” 
(Annexures E and F), that the responses would be treated as confidential and that the 
individual contributions would not be linked to the specific individuals when reporting on 
the findings. 
 
Individual interviews were scheduled with the registered members of the board, 
including non-executive representatives (where applicable), executive management, 
and where applicable, operational management of the respective private companies. A 
comprehensive sample was used since all the registered directors, the executive 
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managers, and senior managers, as stipulated on the organogram, were selected and 
approached for interviews. The majority of the selected individuals were available and 
participated in the interviews. All interviewees were issued an “Interviewee information 
sheet” (refer to Annexure B) prior to the interview. This sheet explained the aim of the 
study, the reasons as to why their company had been selected, the approximate 
duration of the interview, that the interview would be recorded, the type of questions that 
would be asked, the benefits to the organisation for participating in the study, and that 
he would not be adversely affected if he decided to withdraw during, or even after, the 
process, thereby ensuring informed consent. Written consent was obtained from all 
interviewees prior to the individual interviews being conducted.  
 
Interviews were held with the following company representatives of both Yogurt (Pty) 
Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd: 
- Chief executive officer 
- Chief operational officer/operational director 
- Chief financial officer 
- Other executive directors 
- Non-executive director (only one director, being at Yogurt (Pty) Ltd) 
- Senior operational management 
The interviewees included family and non-family members, thus creating multiple-
informant reports (De Massis & Kotlar 2014:21) from both a family and a non-family 
perspective.  Ten interviews at Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and nine interviews at Cream (Pty) Ltd 
took place. For confidentiality reasons, the individual interviewees will not be discussed 
in more detail. 
 
3.3.2.3 SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION 
The interviewees were very cooperative in supplying their respective organograms, 
financial statements, and other supporting financial and policy documentation (Mason 
2002:103). The member information as per the CIPC website was used to validate the 
accuracy of the completed question data sheets in so far it related to the registered 
board members. The company registration numbers were used to obtain the names, 
surnames, statuses and types of directors, as well as the registered auditors, directly 
from the CIPC website.  
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Documents, including policy documents, were obtained from the chief executive officer, 
chief financial officer, or delegated company representatives e.g. the secretary of the 
chief executive officer, or the human resources manager. No specific sample method 
was used because the chief executive officers were requested to supply, where 
available, all relevant policy documents, therefore not only a sample of the policy 
documents. The chief executive officers therefore had the prerogative to decide upon 
which policies to supply. The information obtained during the interview process was 
compared to the provided documents in order to determine whether, inter alia, these 
policies were in fact implemented within the organisation, or whether they were 
formulated more for the sake of appearance, and therefore not necessarily for the sake 
of implementation. The purpose of this was not to determine the extent or quality of the 
policies developed and implemented, but it was more to understand the types of policies 
that are being prioritised by the respective organisations.  
 
Financial information, starting from the 2010 financial year, was requested from the 
respective private family organisations and was received from the chief financial officers 
in the form of audited annual financial statements. The annual financial statements of 
both Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd were received. These included the financial 
statements for the financial years ending 2010, up until their most recent available sets 
of audited financial statements, namely the 2015 financial year for Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and 
the 2016 financial year for Cream (Pty) Ltd. The organisations were requested to 
provide financial information starting from 2010 in order to ensure that enough data was 
available to determine any relevant trends within the data sets. 
 
3.3.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
A within-case analysis was done for both units of analyses, after which a cross-case 
analysis was performed, as recommended by Creswell (2013:101). A within-case 
analysis entails a detailed description of the specific case and any themes identified 
within the case. This process supports the understanding of the complexities found 
within the specific unit of analysis. The cross-case analysis is an analysis across the 
cases whereby common themes between the two cases are identified and analysed. 
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Primary data analysis 
All the interviews, nineteen in total, were captured by means of digital voice recordings 
and have been kept in a secure archive. The interviews lasted, on average, between 60 
and 90 minutes each. Eighteen out of the nineteen interviews were conducted at the 
respective company’s premises and one interview was conducted telephonically. In the 
latter instance, the interviewer briefly met with the interviewee who requested that the 
interview be rescheduled. This meeting took place at the company’s premises during 
the site visit, after which, the interviewee requested that the interview be rescheduled 
two weeks later and over the phone. All the interviews were conducted in the 
interviewees’ language of choice and this therefore resulted in some of the interviews 
taking place in English and some taking place in Afrikaans. There was no risk of 
inconsistent translation and interpretation, as the primary researcher is fluent in both 
English and Afrikaans. To enhance confidentiality, should a response be quoted 
verbatim, it is always indicated in English, even if the original response was in 
Afrikaans. Once recorded, all the interviews were transcribed verbatim by an 
independent professional transcriber. A confidentiality agreement was signed by the 
transcriber prior to her obtaining the digital voice recordings. Subsequent to the 
transcribing of the recordings, the interviewer reviewed the respective transcripts by 
comparing them to the digital voice recordings. This was done to ensure the accuracy 
and completeness of the transcripts. 
 
As the first step of the data analysis, the primary researcher read through all the 
transcriptions and summarised the responses that were received during the semi-
structured interviews by making use of a matrix—a technique described by Yin 
(2009:129) and Tracy (2013:188), and implemented by Craig and Moores (2010)—for 
qualitative data analysis. The matrix was prepared in Microsoft Excel (Excel), thus 
following a computer-aided approach using everyday software (Tracy 2013:188). The 
matrix listed the respective interviewee numbers horizontally and the questions that 
were posed vertically. The matrix also made provision for any information obtained 
during the interview process that did not necessarily relate to any specific questions 
asked. Some interviewees were more verbally articulate than others and deliberated on 
various matters which were not necessarily in the same order as proposed in the 
interview schedule. These deliberations were categorised and summarised under the 
relevant questions that they pertained to, after which, the data was reflected upon and 
coded accordingly. A systematic process was followed in order to uphold the credibility 
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of any findings (Guba 1981:80; Guba & Lincoln 1982:246).  
 
In order to complete the above mentioned matrix, transcripts were printed and reviewed. 
As suggested by Saldaña (2016:17), these printed transcripts were separated by lines 
into sub-units whenever the topic or sub-topic changed. These topics or sub-topics were 
linked to the pre-numbered items on the vertical axis of the matrix. This ensured a 
credible and systematic method of performing data reduction and also of transferring 
relevant data to the matrix. Important and/or relevant phrases in the transcripts were 
also highlighted.  
 
A priori codes, a priori sub-categories, and a priori categories were used for the data 
analysis (Saldaña 2009:49). These were theoretically derived from the literature and the 
semi-structured interview schedules. This process was deemed important in order to 
ensure harmonisation with the study’s research objectives and conceptual framework 
(Saldaña 2016:2,5). In addition to the a priori codes, some additional codes were 
identified during the data analysis process. These codes were also categorised under 
the relevant a priori sub-categories and a priori categories. The codes, a priori sub-
categories, and a priori categories were combined and included in a code book—the 
details of which can be found in Annexure H: Code book. This code book was used as 
the basis for the deductive coding process. These codes, sub-categories, and 
categories formed the basis to identify themes relevant to the research objectives. This 
process is depicted in Figure 7 through the use of an adapted version of Saldaña’s 
(2016:14) “streamlined codes-to-theory model”.   
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Figure 7: Adapted codes-to-theory model 
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Once the data reduction and the coding were completed, the document was reviewed 
for any common themes and any contradictory findings, as depicted in Figure 7. These 
were then summarised and they are discussed under Chapter 4 – Presentation and 
analysis of data gathered. 
 
The processes, as discussed above, were replicated for the second unit of analysis. 
The within-case and cross-case procedural replication (Yin 2009:54) supported fair and 
credible findings. Once the second organisation’s within-case analysis was completed, 
a cross-case analysis was performed between the two units of analyses. Any common 
and/or contradictory themes were documented accordingly. 
 
Secondary data analysis 
Available industry information supported the discussion on the dairy industry in 
Chapter  4.2. Company websites, generally accessible electronic information, and official 
company documentation were used as the basis to document each company’s history 
and characteristics. Company policies and other official documentation were used to 
test the credibility and conformability of the information obtained during the interview 
process. These documents and pieces of information were therefore supplemental in 
nature.  
 
Financial statements were obtained from the respective chief financial officers and they 
were then analysed. The financial statements were not compared, as such, between the 
two units of analyses, but any trends that were identified within a unit’s financial data 
were cross-referenced with the other unit’s financial data to see whether the same trend 
was visible. The purpose of the financial data analysis was not to identify the actual 
performance of the company, but rather to infer whether there was any relative growth 
that could have been associated with the implementation of the governance structures 
put in place. The financial statements were also supplemental in nature as the 
transcribed interviews formed the basis of the data analysis. 
 
3.4 LIMITATIONS 
 
The main limitations of the overall case study design were that it will not be possible to 
perform a direct comparison between the two units of analyses and it will not be 
possible to extrapolate the findings. It will also not be possible to perform a scientific 
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generalisation as would have been the case with a quantitative design because the 
context of the individual cases might differ. However, scientific generalisations were 
never the intention of this study since the purpose was to understand the governance 
structures and their value within the context of the specific cases. As Yin (2009:16) 
indicates, a case study approach is able to describe the “how” or the “why” in a 
particular situation or case and is therefore “generalizable to theoretical propositions 
and not to populations or universes” (Yin 2009:15).  
 
Some limitations of the specific design elements used in this research project are 
highlighted below: 
 
Literature review 
The literature available on private family organisations, especially in a South African 
context, is very limited. There are only a few contributors in the South African context 
and their research focuses mainly on themes relating to strategic planning, succession, 
and family relationships (Friedrich & Isaacs 2011:279). Internationally, there is more 
literature available on private organisations, but the focus of the family organisation 
research to date has mainly been on public family organisations due to the ease of 
access to information.  
 
The above highlights the need for further research to be performed on private family 
organisations in a South African context. This study therefore responds to the call from 
Friedrich and Isaacs (2011:285) for more research on South African private family 
organisations. 
 
Interviews 
For fear of negative repercussions, interviewees may have been reluctant to give their 
honest opinions on certain sensitive matters, especially if it relates to their direct line 
manager or employer. These risks were mostly mitigated by assuring the interviewees 
that their confidentiality, as it relates to their individual contributions to the study, would 
be protected.  
 
Document analysis as part of data triangulation 
The advantage of document analysis is that it is an efficient and cost-effective method 
which, depending on the availability of the documents, could provide broad coverage of 
the issues at hand (Bowen 2009:31). A limitation experienced in this study was that, 
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although many documents were available in the public domain, there was a risk that the 
information might have become incomplete or outdated, for example the directors’ 
information found on the CIPC website. The use of document analysis as part of the 
data triangulation process, however, adds to the accuracy, independence, and 
impartiality of the findings, therefore outweighing the disadvantages of the document 
analysis method (Bowen 2009:31-32; Mason 2002:103).  
 
3.5 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
As indicated under the Introduction section of this chapter, ethical clearance for this 
study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee of the College of Accounting 
Sciences prior to performing the multiple-case studies (Annexure G: Ethical clearance 
certificate). The ethical clearance obtained included the approval of the detailed 
question data sheets and interview schedules to be used during the fieldwork, as well 
as the use of secondary data e.g. financial statements and policy documents.  
 
Before conducting the interviews and any analysis of financial data, the target 
organisations were informed as to the purpose of the study, the extent of the study, and 
the method to be followed. Formal approvals to engage were obtained from the chief 
executive officers of the respective family organisations. 
 
An Interviewee information sheet was given to all interviewees prior to the interviews 
(Annexure B: Interviewee information sheet). This document explained the purpose of 
the study, the reasons for the selection of the specific organisation and the 
interviewees, the envisaged duration of the interview, as well as the content to be 
covered. It also indicated that the interviews would be recorded by using a digital sound 
recording and then transcribed by a professional transcriber to ensure factual accuracy 
and completeness of the data captured. They were informed that the professional 
transcriber had signed a confidentiality agreement. The interviewees were assured that 
the individual interviews would be treated as confidential and that their names would not 
be linked to their individual contributions. They were informed that this would be 
ensured through allocating a respondent number to the various responses. Any 
personal information that was obtained during the performance of the case study is 
restricted to the interviewee’s relationship/involvement in the family structure. The 
acquired information is thus not of a sensitive nature. 
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Because of the non-personal and non-sensitive nature of the study, it was indicated to 
the interviewees that no potential harm is/was anticipated from their participation in the 
study, and that they had the right to withdraw their participation at any time during the 
research process. All the interviewees gave their consent prior to the interview and 
signed the letter of consent (refer to Annexure B). 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, a multiple-case study was performed in order to answer the how and why 
questions as they related to the governance structures of the private family 
organisations. This method was used to obtain an in-depth understanding of the 
described phenomena within a real-life context.  
 
The methodological challenges of trustworthiness were addressed in this chapter. 
Credibility was accomplished e.g. through member checking. In line with the ethical 
approval obtained for this study, the results were submitted to the featured private 
family organisations in order to obtain feedback from the respective organisations on 
the interpretations and conclusions of the study (Thomas 2010:319). Member feedback 
is important to establish credibility (Guba & Lincoln 1982:246). The findings are also 
supported by direct quotations, thereby ensuring a chain of evidence. A structured 
research approach and data management process was also followed, thus achieving 
structural coherence (Krefting 1991:217). The findings of this study are presumed to be 
credible since it is believed that the human experience, as reported, will be recognised 
by others who share the same experience (Krefting 1991:216)  
 
Sufficient descriptive data has been presented to allow for comparison. This will 
therefore enable other researchers to transfer this study’s findings to other situations or 
populations (Krefting 1991:216). Transferability has thus been addressed. Dependability 
was achieved through detailed descriptions of how the entire case study was 
conducted, through the establishment of a record database (inter alia interview 
transcripts and archival data), through triangulation, and through assuring a meaningful 
comparison of findings across multiple data sources (Krefting 1991:217). The use of 
multiple sources of evidence (inter alia interview data, financial statements, press 
articles, and other secondary data), in other words, data triangulation, contributed to the 
conformability of this study.   
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CHAPTER 4 – PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA GATHERED 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will present and analyse the data of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd. 
The presentation and analysis of the data will be divided into four sections. Section A 
includes a short introduction on the South African dairy industry (Section  4.2), the 
organisational history of both Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd (Section  4.3), the 
relevance of these organisations as they relate to this study’s definition of a private 
family organisation (Section  4.4), and the biographical data of the featured family 
organisations (Section  4.5). The first three sub-sections provide the context within which 
the featured cases operate. The fourth sub-section, biographical data, is a response to 
research objective A.2. The full objectives will be repeated below, at the relevant 
section. 
 
Section B comprises a detailed data analysis (Section  4.6) of both Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and 
Cream (Pty) Ltd. This is in response to research objective A.3. Due to confidentiality 
reasons, the interviewees are not named, but unique reference numbers were allocated 
to each of the individual interviewees. The numbers allocated to the interviewees of 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd range from Interviewee #Y1 up to, and including, Interviewee #Y11. 
The numbers allocated to the interviewees of Cream (Pty) Ltd range from Interviewee 
#C1 up to, and including, Interviewee #C9. 
 
Section C discusses the impact of organisational governance structures on the value on 
these private family organisations (Section  4.7) and presents a summary of both 
organisations’ structures (Section  4.8). This is done in response to research 
objective A.4. 
 
Section D presents and discusses the cross-case analysis (Section  4.9), and concludes 
with a summary of the entire chapter (Section  4.10). It therefore addresses the overall 
research objective—research objective A— of this study. 
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SECTION A 
 
4.2 DAIRY INDUSTRY 
 
The Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries (2012:1), in their report, A profile of 
the South African dairy market value chain, stated that South Africa contributes to 
approximately 0.5% of the world’s milk production. The South African dairy industry is 
comprised of various economic activities which include the primary production of raw 
milk and the secondary production of, for example, long-life (UHT) milk, flavoured milk, 
yogurt, cream, and cheese. In addition to these products, some of the bi-products 
include whey, condensed milk, and butter. Liquid products, of which pasteurised liquid 
milk and long-life (UHT) milk are the main products, comprised 58% of the South 
African dairy market during 2015, and concentrated products, for example hard cheese, 
comprised 42% of the South African dairy market in the same year (Milk South Africa 
2015:25).  
 
The generic dairy production and distribution process (in its simplified form) can be 
described as follows: it starts with the farmer who commercially farms with milking cows; 
the farmer then sells “raw milk” in bulk to dairy manufacturers or processors. Some 
dairy manufactures also have their own commercial farming divisions. The dairy 
manufacturers add value to the raw milk by producing products like long-life (UHT) milk, 
flavoured milk, yogurt, and cream from the raw milk. These products, in addition to the 
fresh milk, are then packed, marketed, and distributed to retailers who then, in the end, 
sell them to the end user (see Figure 8).   
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Figure 8: Simplified generic dairy production and distribution process 
 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the fieldwork) 
 
The dairy industry, like most agricultural activities, is relatively seasonal. This statement 
is supported by the “monthly raw milk purchase trend from January 2010 to 
December 2014” which clearly indicates that the demand for milk decreases in the 
winter months and steadily increases from August onwards—with the highest demand 
being in December (Milk SA 2015:13). This decrease might also result from a decrease 
in milk supply during the winter months. As per the information presented by Milk SA, 
this trend has been consistent for the last five years.  
 
Dairy farmers or producers often feel that they have no control over the milk price 
because general market conditions and dairy manufacturers determine the price at 
which the raw milk will be sold. It is therefore debated, on a regular basis, whether the 
dairy farmer receives a fair share of the price paid by the end user (Coetzee 2014:9). 
The price issue might force dairy farmers to either increase their farming activities to a 
much larger scale, which then also normally includes adding value to the raw milk, or 
alternatively, the farmers are forced to close down their dairy farms. The number of 
South African milk producers, i.e. dairy farmers, decreased from 3 899 in January 2007 
to 1 834 in January 2015 (Milk South Africa 2015:20). 
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As of March 2015, there was a total of 122 South African dairy producer-distributors 
(PDs)—i.e. producers that also manufacture and distribute—registered with Milk SA. 
The majority of these PDs are located in Gauteng (21,3%) and the Western Cape 
(20,5%), with the minority being located in Limpopo (6,6%) and North-West (4,9%) (Milk 
South Africa 2015:25). 
 
While this sub-section has indicated some important statistics and processes that are 
relevant to the industry in which the selected units of analyses operate, the remainder of 
the chapter will focus on a detailed presentation and analysis of data obtained at the 
selected units of analyses.  
 
4.3 ORGANISATIONAL HISTORY 
 
Organisational history is important in order to fully understand the context within which a 
specific case operates. In order to contextualise the featured cases, the organisational 
histories will be discussed. This discussion will focus on how the organisations came 
into existence, the timeframes within which this happened, their status within the 
market, as well as other interesting information about them.  
 
4.3.1 YOGURT (PTY) LTD: ORGANISATIONAL HISTORY 
 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd’s organisational history started more than 150 years ago as a small 
scale farm and was transferred from generation to generation until it reached the 
fourth/fifth generation. At that point, the focus was mainly on wheat, wine, and dairy 
farming. The farm supplied milk to larger dairy manufacturers who operated in a highly 
regulated environment, where government intervened in the supply and demand 
principle. This resulted in an uncompetitive industry with limited opportunities for new 
players to enter the market of manufacturing of dairy products. Since the dawn of 
democracy in 1994, the agro and agro-processing environment adopted the free-market 
principle. In a free-market environment, the working of the markets is determined solely 
by supply and demand, with very little or no government intervention. This change of 
scenery opened the way for the family to start a process of adding value to the milk 
produced on their farm. A dedicated production facility was subsequently built and the 
company, represented by the first generation in terms of the manufacturing division, but 
represented by the fifth generation in terms of farming, entered into an exclusive supply 
contract with one of the South African premium brand retail companies.  
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Currently, the company still supplies products to this premium brand retail company 
under the retailer’s house brand. They have, however, also very successfully launched 
their own private brand at various retailers. The company’s product range includes milk 
(flavoured and unflavoured), cream, yogurt, fruit juice, and dessert. For confidentiality 
reasons, their main distribution areas in South Africa will not be indicated. 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd is a major role player in the dairy industry, and the company and/or its 
representatives has/have been nominated for, or has/have won various industry related 
titles and awards. 
 
4.3.2 CREAM (PTY) LTD: ORGANISATIONAL HISTORY 
 
Thirty-five years ago, the founders of Cream (Pty) Ltd bought a small dairy with less 
than twenty cows, of which not even 50% were producing milk. The dairy was situated 
in a non-traditional milking area and the market for fresh milk was very limited, i.e. less 
than 35 litres were required per day. Through hard work—including door-to-door 
deliveries—and a quality product, the founder managed to increase the supply, as well 
as the demand in that area, to 1 200 litres per day. Five years later, an increase in 
demand in nearby areas motivated the founder to relocate and purchase the farm where 
they are currently operating from. They constructed a cowshed, a small factory, and a 
barn, after which the just more than one hundred and fifty cows were moved to the new 
facilities.  
 
The family organisation has always been very involved in community development and 
has, as a result, received a lot of support from the local community. The organisation 
grew from strength to strength, and eighteen years after the establishment of their new 
facilities, the family bought out their biggest competitor. This enabled them to actively 
extend their market share. In order to ensure the quality of their products, all 
manufacturing activities were moved to Cream (Pty) Ltd’s current premises.   
 
During the period of 1992 to 1994, the second generation became involved in the 
management of the organisation which resulted in a multi-generation management 
team. The presence of more than one generation, and the impact of the inter-family 
relationships on the organisation as well as on the family relationships, necessitated the 
need for a review of the structures that were in place. This review resulted in the 
implementation of new governance structures and a decrease in family members 
formally involved in the daily operations of the organisation.  
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The owners and management of Cream (Pty) Ltd believe in using the latest technology 
in their operations and they have, therefore, implemented world-class milking and other 
machinery. This assisted them in becoming one of the leading food manufacturers in 
the country. They are regularly audited by food auditing firms, and they comply with all 
the relevant food safety requirements. The organisation’s clients include well-known 
premium brands and other retailers. Cream (Pty) Ltd is a major role player in the dairy 
industry, and the organisation and/or its representatives has/have been nominated for, 
or have also won various industry related titles and awards. 
 
4.4 DEFINITION OF A FAMILY ORGANISATION  
 
The definition of a family organisation, as discussed under the literature review (see 
Chapter  2.2), lists three key elements as the basis for an organisation to be defined as a 
family organisation. They are the following: ownership, which includes the majority of 
the decision-making rights; the involvement of family members in the governance of the 
organisation; and thirdly, the current owners’ multi-generational visions (European 
Commission - Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General 2009:9-10; Astrachan & 
Shanker 2003:211-212 & Poza 2009:6). 
 
4.4.1 YOGURT (PTY) LTD: DEFINED AS A FAMILY ORGANISATION 
 
In Yogurt (Pty) Ltd, the majority of the decision-making rights—with the majority being 
92%—belong to members of the owning family through indirect shareholding. Family 
members are formally involved in the governance structures of the organisation—38% 
of the board of directors and 56% of the executive management are represented by 
family members. The majority of interviewees were of the opinion that the company is 
structured and managed with a long-term vision in mind. This is evident from the 
training and orientation programs that are put into place in order to develop the next 
generation family members into potential members of management. The long-term view 
is also evident from the fact that the shareholding is owned through vehicles that were 
established to try to mitigate the negative effects on the management of the 
organisation as a result of an increase in the number of family shareholders. These 
vehicles also safeguard the transgenerational transfer of ownership without selling the 
actual shares to next generation family members. It can, therefore, be deduced that the 
current intention is to transfer the company to the next generation and the generations 
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to come. It was, however, mentioned that should the current owners receive a worthy 
offer for the business, the shareholders would consider selling the manufacturing 
company. However, it was indicated that they probably would not consider selling the 
farms. The motivation for this is likely to be more emotional than financial due to their 
long family history of farming. 
 
Taking into account the current shareholding structure of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd; the 
information that is publicly available on this organisation; the reasons given for the 
specific ownership structures in place; and the interviewees’ comments on the question 
posed as to whether or not they believe that it is the current owners’ intention to transfer 
the company to the next generation, the researcher believes that the unit of analysis 
falls within this study’s definition of a family organisation.  
 
4.4.2 CREAM (PTY) LTD: DEFINED AS A FAMILY ORGANISATION 
 
In Cream (Pty) Ltd, 100% of the ownership and decision-making rights, although 
indirectly through trust structures, is in the hands of the owning family. The voting rights 
at shareholders’ meetings are in line with their share ownership percentage. The 
supervisory governance structures consist of an advisory board and a company board 
of directors. Family representatives, who include executive and non-executive 
members, constitute 62.5% of the advisory board members. 50% of the company’s 
board of directors are family members. Taking cognisance of the above percentages, it 
is clear that the family, directly or indirectly, controls the majority of the decision-making 
rights and is involved in the governance structures of the organisation.  
 
It is the founder’s intention, as well as the intention of the second generation owners, to 
transfer the organisation to their children and grandchildren. Formal succession plans 
regarding both ownership and management are also in place. The majority of the 
interviewees confirmed the current owners’ multi-generational vision. Comments with 
respect to the founder indicated that the founder’s sole purpose, since the 
establishment of the organisation (Interviewee #C2), was to build the organisation for 
the benefit of his children and grandchildren (Interviewee #C4). The second generation 
owners realised that it was their parents’ dream to transfer the organisation to the next 
generation and they therefore feel obliged to help realise that dream (Interviewee #C1). 
The current owners see themselves as stewards (see Chapter  2.3.1 for the principles of 
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stewardship), who manage the organisation for the benefit of future generations 
(Interviewee #C2), as their parents did. This multi-generational vision is also 
demonstrated through the investment vehicles used for the structuring of the 
organisation’s shareholding.  
 
It is important to note that the current owners are not oblivious to the general financial 
challenges, as well as the potential financial value, locked within the family organisation. 
The feasibility of the multi-generational vision will therefore need to be tested on a 
regular basis (Interviewees #C1 and #C3). However, it was noted that, should the family 
decide to sell the organisation, they would probably still work together as a family in 
future because “what we do, works” (Interviewee #C2).  
 
Interestingly, some of the interviewees felt that the implemented changes in the 
governance structures of the organisation and the resultant decrease of family members 
working at the organisation are indicative of the fact that the multi-generational vision 
relates mainly to shareholding and not necessarily to management. It is therefore 
envisaged by these interviewees that the family members will, in the long-term, retain 
ownership control of the organisation, but that they will not necessarily play an active 
role in the daily execution of strategy. It might therefore be deduced that the long-term 
intention of the organisation is to aim towards a more corporate or professional 
organisational structure (Interviewee #C7). 
 
Taking into account the current shareholding structure of Cream (Pty) Ltd, the 
information publicly available on this organisation, the reasons given for the specific 
ownership structures in place, as well as the interviewees’ comments on the current 
owners’ intention to transfer the company to the next generation, it is believed that 
Cream (Pty) Ltd falls within this study’s definition of a family organisation.   
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4.5 CURRENT STRUCTURE OF SUPERVISORY AND MANAGERIAL 
GOVERNANCE 
 
This sub-section addresses research objective A.2., which is the following:  
 
 
 
 
The chief executive officers of the featured cases were requested to complete a data 
question sheet (Annexure C: Factual organisational information) which supplied 
biographical data about the structure of the governance mechanisms within the 
respective organisations. This information, in conjunction with interview data and 
information from the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) website, 
was used to paint a picture of the current structure of supervisory and managerial 
governance structures within these private family organisations. These will be discussed 
under the headings of ownership, supervisory, and managerial governance structures 
as per the conceptual framework depicted in Figure 1.  
 
4.5.1 YOGURT (PTY) LTD: CURRENT STRUCTURE OF SUPERVISORY AND 
MANAGERIAL GOVERNANCE 
 
In the following sub-sections, the current organisational structure of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd will 
be presented after which a detailed discussion will take place on the role of these 
structures within the family organisation.  
 
4.5.1.1 OWNERSHIP 
 
The shareholding of the manufacturing company consists 92% of family shareholding 
which is indirectly held through a holding company, and of which its shares are held 
100% by a main family trust. The beneficiaries of the main family trust are the individual 
siblings’ trusts. The residual 8% of the manufacturing company’s shareholding is 
indirectly held by a non-family executive member through his personal family trust. 
  
To identify, through a multiple-case study analysis, the format and levels of 
governance structures in the selected private family organisations.  
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Figure 9: Shareholding of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd 
 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the interviews) 
 
In terms of various agreements that support these ownership structures, only the 
current generation’s shareholders can sell their respective shareholding in the company 
to any of the other shareholders. From the second generation onwards, those 
generations are only beneficiaries of the family trusts and are thus not allowed to sell 
their shareholding. It is structured as such in order to avoid dilution of the shareholding 
to a point where it is impossible to manage the company effectively. Only the directors 
of the company can decide to sell the company as a whole; therefore, no piecemeal 
selling of shares is allowed (Interviewees #Y2 and #Y8).  
 
The family shareholders anticipated that, if the current structures were not in place, the 
organisation would end up with large numbers of next generation shareholders, each 
with a very small shareholding percentage. According to the interviewees this would 
make it impossible to manage the business effectively. The interviewees also indicated 
that the current organisational design has the benefit of limiting the number of minority 
shareholders, who would otherwise have a say in the management of the company 
simply because they have the family surname and, not as a result of their knowledge 
and expertise.  
 
The shareholding issues raised by the shareholders, and the subsequent 
implementation of the current ownership structure, are supported with the following 
quotations, as depicted in Table 4:  
92%
8%
Shareholding ‐ Yogurt (Pty) Ltd
Family
Non‐family
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Table 4: Reasons given for the ownership structure of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd 
No. Reason given Interviewee 
1. “Specifically to avoid what happens to all businesses in the third 
generation when there are a thousand shareholders…everyone 
has the objective to buy a speedboat and a car”. 
#Y2 
2. “Everybody just wants to unbundle the trust’s wealth to 
themselves”. 
#Y5 
3. “At the end of the day he is only worried about what he can get 
and not whether he is killing the goose that lays the eggs”. 
#Y2 
4. “That you do not dilute the shareholding to the point where there 
are individuals involved, just because he is a descendant of 
myself”. 
#Y5 
5. “My great-grandchildren later on own three percent and five 
percent or whatever in the company and they want to swing the 
sceptre”. 
#Y5 
Source: A selection of interviewee responses 
 
In order to strengthen the family governance structure, the trustees of the main 
shareholding trust have officially been predetermined (in the trust deed) and will, going 
forward, always consist of one representative of each individual family trust and one 
representative from the non-family executive member’s trust. In addition to the 
“shareholder representatives”, the board of trustees will always include three 
independent trustees, namely a businessman, a legal specialist, and a 
financial/accounting specialist. The board of trustees will have the authority to appoint 
the directors of the company. 
 
4.5.1.2 SUPERVISORY GOVERNANCE 
 
The study initially focused specifically on the operational section of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd. 
After a discussion with the various interviewees, it became apparent that 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd could not be investigated in isolation as the board of Yogurt 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd plays an important role in the governance of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd. Both of 
these supervisory structures will therefore be described. 
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Supervisory Governance: Board of Directors 
Yogurt Holding (Pty) Ltd’s board of directors consists of 50% family executives, 
20% non-family executives, and 30% non-family, non-executives (see Figure 10). These 
members are all registered directors as per the 2016 Companies and Intellectual 
Property Commission database. With reference to the non-family, non-executive 
directors, 67% are totally independent, whereas 33% form part of the company’s 
professional support network. The chairman of the board of directors is a non-family, 
non-executive director. The non-executive board members are well qualified and/or 
highly experienced individuals. The board officially meets at least once a quarter. An 
annual general meeting is held once a year where the financial statements are 
presented to the meeting by the company’s auditors. 
 
Figure 10: Board of Directors of Yogurt Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the interviews) 
 
In comparison to the board composition of Yogurt Holdings (Pty) Ltd (Figure 10), 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd’s registered directors—at the time of the interviews—consisted of 
60% family executives and 40% non-family executives. This information was verified 
against the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission database during the 
year 2014. This composition subsequently changed to 50% family executives and 
50% non-family executives, as depicted in Figure 11. 
 
 
50%
20%
30%
Board of Directors ‐
Yogurt Holdings (Pty) Ltd
Family executives
Non‐family executives
Non‐family non‐executives
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Figure 11: Board of Directors of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd 
 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the interviews) 
 
Various board sub-committees with formal terms of references are in place. These sub-
committees include, but are not limited to, a financial committee, an audit committee, a 
risk committee, a human resources and ethics committee, a marketing committee, and 
an information technology committee. These committees (except for the audit and risk 
committees) are not required by law but are put into place because the board of 
directors is of the opinion that it is an important part of the company’s corporate 
governance structure. There is a good blend of family, non-executive, and executive 
directors on these sub-committees, which then again feeds into the board meetings 
(Interviewee #Y9). The board’s sub-committees then also “dovetail” into operational 
management committees (Interviewee #Y9). This facilitates communication flow both 
upwards and downwards in the organisational structure of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd. 
 
4.5.1.3 MANAGERIAL GOVERNANCE 
 
The managerial governance structures of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd will be presented under the 
two headings: Executive Management, and Policies. 
 
Managerial Governance: Executive Management 
With regard to the executive management, the chief executive officer is a family 
member and indirect shareholder; the chief operations officer is a non-family, indirect 
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shareholder; and the chief financial officer is a non-family, non-shareholding director. 
Risk management and human resources are headed up by non-family, non-
shareholding managers with, as stated by Interviewee #Y11, “intense autonomy”. The 
remaining family members head up key departments within the company. This results in 
a family representation of 56%, a non-family shareholder representation of 11%, and a 
non-family, non-shareholder representation of 33%, as depicted in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Executive Management of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd 
 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the interviews) 
 
Managerial Governance: Policies 
After discussions with the various interviewees, it was clear that there were quite a 
number of policies in place. The existence of these policies was validated by performing 
a high-level review of the various policy documents as supplied by the office of the chief 
executive officer. One of the main policy documents identified is a chart of authority that 
determines the authorisation levels, limits, documentation, and signatories required for, 
for example, the purchasing of capital and non-capital goods, sales to new customers, 
specials run, deals made with certain customers, credit limits, cheque and electronic 
payments made, as well as foreign exchange payments. It also stipulates the approvals 
required for the appointment of new employees, the entering into of new contracts, and 
travel arrangements.  
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Other policies that are in place can be summarised under the following headings and, 
for example, include the following: 
- Finance: accounting policy, accounts payable, capital expenses, credit and 
collection, and discounts. 
- Human resources: annual bonus, dress code, corporate gifts, education assistance, 
leave, nepotism, new employee induction, profit sharing, recruitment and selection, 
training and development, and world class focus. 
- Information technology: digital camera usage, internet usage, laptop usage, and 
password usage.  
- Logistics: cold room security, cost centre management, delivery of loads, picking 
and loading of cages, and route allocation procedure. 
- Procurement: acquisition of new assets, disposal of assets, purchase orders and 
goods received notes, and reallocation of assets.  
- Risk management: risk management policy, risk management strategy, key control, 
and risk control organogram. 
- Sales and marketing: company logo usage, price changes, sales forecasting and 
performance, sponsorship and donations, vehicle tracking, media communication, 
and trade shows. 
 
4.5.1.4 DISCUSSION OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
 
From the above structures, as well as from the information obtained during the 
interviews, it is clear that the principles of King III (IoDSA 2009) formed the foundation 
of the governance structure development in Yogurt (Pty) Ltd. The establishment of 
these good corporate governance structures and policies started during 2009/2010 
whereas, in the past, there were almost no formal structures in place (Interviewee #Y6). 
The development, as well as the implementation thereof, was driven by the chief 
executive officer and the then non-executive independent director, who, as per one of 
the interviewees, “was a demon on corporate governance” (Interviewee #Y11). The 
corporate governance structures in the organisation are very formal. “I think we are 
formal…hundred and twenty percent structured” (Interviewee #Y1). “I would almost say 
it’s kind of…it’s a great amount of governance” (Interviewee #Y9).   
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A culture of good corporate governance is established within the company, but as one 
interviewee put it, “Yes, it is formal, these things became inextricably part of our 
business, with our formal management structure. It doesn’t always work one hundred 
percent…especially between family…it is a very difficult thing to put in place between 
family. It’s [sic] not coming easily, they need to buy in…and they should want to keep to 
it” (Interviewee #Y2). Exploring this statement, it is clear that governance structures are 
important to the organisation and have, therefore, formally been implemented. It is, 
however, evident that the challenge experienced by Yogurt (Pty) Ltd is to consistently 
enforce these structures, especially with respect to family members who are actively 
involved in the management of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and/or the wider family business group. 
 
4.5.2 CREAM (PTY) LTD: CURRENT STRUCTURE OF SUPERVISORY AND 
MANAGERIAL GOVERNANCE 
 
In the following sub-sections, the current organisational structure of Cream (Pty) Ltd will 
be presented, after which a detailed discussion will take place on the role of these 
structures within the family organisation.  
 
4.5.2.1 OWNERSHIP 
 
The shareholding of Cream (Pty) Ltd consists of a main family trust that owns 70% of 
the organisation, and three individual family trusts that each own 10% of the 
organisation, therefore resulting in an indirect 100% family ownership. The shareholding 
of Cream (Pty) Ltd is depicted in Figure 13. 
  
Master’s Dissertation – R vd Westhuizen Page 105 
 
Figure 13: Shareholding of Cream (Pty) Ltd 
 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the interviews)  
 
The founding members of Cream (Pty) Ltd, as well as the three family trusts, each 
holding a 10% shareholding, are nominated as the beneficiaries of the main trust. The 
main trust’s board of trustees consists of 75% family trustees and 25% independent 
trustees. The independent trustee of this trust is a member of the organisation’s 
professional network. The chief executive officer of Cream (Pty) Ltd is currently the 
chairman of the main family trust’s board of trustees; the chairman is, therefore, a non-
independent and executive family member. The three siblings and their spouses are on 
the board of trustees of their own individual 10% family trusts. No in-laws are allowed as 
trustees on the main 70% family trust. This is done in order to limit the extent of conflict 
at these meetings since, according to the interviewee, conflict increases when all the 
siblings and in-laws are present in the same meeting.  
 
The primary responsibility of the main family trust’s board of trustees is to ensure that, 
from a shareholder perspective, the organisation retains its strategic direction. From the 
question data sheet completed by the chief executive officer, it was noted that the 
trustee meetings are held on a quarterly basis, and they are mainly used to discuss the 
financial performance of Cream (Pty) Ltd, as well as any family-related issues.  
 
Initially, the family held formal family meetings as suggested by many family 
researchers (Carlock 2009:20; Dana & Smyrnios 2010:48; Diederichs & Maas 
2007:137). These family meetings did not include any external, non-family advisors, but 
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did include the family in-laws. The meetings were seen as a waste of time because of 
the conflict that arose between the various family members and in-laws or because the 
conflict that arose between the in-laws themselves, and the meetings were therefore 
discontinued. 
 
4.5.2.2 SUPERVISORY GOVERNANCE 
 
As the organisation developed and expanded, the shareholders were no longer able to 
attend to all the operating functions of the organisation. In line with agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976:310), the shareholders (i.e. the principals) identified the need 
to appoint managers (i.e. agents) and to delegate certain functions to these managers. 
Consequently, the shareholders needed to mitigate any potential agency risk and they 
therefore implemented certain governance structures in order to ensure the alignment of 
the agents’ interest and/or behaviour with that of the principals. These implemented 
structures included the establishment of a family advisory board and a company board 
of directors. 
 
Supervisory Governance: Family Advisory Board 
The family advisory board is an unofficial board with no registered members. The board 
consists of 25% family executives, 37.5% family non-executives, 12.5% non-family 
executives, and 25% non-family non-executives. The non-family, non-executives are 
specialists in the primary and secondary dairy industries and act as independent 
advisors on the family advisory board. Their purpose is to offer strategic advice to the 
advisory board. They also assist the non-executive family members on the family 
advisory board with respect to the measurement of executive performance and the 
setting of executive salaries. The advisory board has the responsibility of appointing the 
chief executive officer of Cream (Pty) Ltd. The composition of the family advisory board 
of Cream (Pty) Ltd is depicted in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Family Advisory Board of Cream (Pty) Ltd 
 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the interviews) 
 
This board initially met three times a year, but the official meetings were later reduced to 
once a year. Although the advisory board officially only meets once a year, it formally 
receives financial information on a bi-annual basis. In addition to this, the independent 
advisors regularly interact with the executive members. They are also involved in any 
major projects that the organisation might undertake during the financial year.  
 
Supervisory Governance: Board of Directors 
The chairman of the board of directors is a family, executive director; therefore, he is not 
an independent chairperson. Cream (Pty) Ltd’s board of directors consists of 50% family 
executives, 25% non-family executives, and 25% non-family, non-executives. The 
composition of the board of directors of Cream (Pty) Ltd is depicted in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Board of Directors of Cream (Pty) Ltd 
 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the interviews) 
 
The non-family, non-executive director is an unofficial director since he is not formally 
registered as a director of Cream (Pty) Ltd (Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission (CIPC) 2014). The board does not have any formal board sub-committees 
or board policies. The board meets on a monthly basis (Interviewees #1 and #6).  
 
4.5.2.3 MANAGERIAL GOVERNANCE 
 
The managerial governance structures of Cream (Pty) Ltd will be presented under the 
headings: Executive management and Policies. 
 
Managerial Governance: Executive Management 
With regard to the executive management, both the chief executive officer and the chief 
operations officer are family members and indirect shareholders. The chief financial 
officer is a non-family, non-shareholding director. The executive management team is 
therefore comprised of 67% family members and 33% non-family, non-executive 
shareholders. The executive management of Cream (Pty) Ltd is depicted in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Executive Management of Cream (Pty) Ltd 
 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the interviews) 
 
A formal organisational structure, visually depicted by the organisation as an 
organogram, is in place. Since the organogram indicates the various positions and their 
grading levels within the organisation, it allocates specific responsibilities to all 
employees (Interviewee #C4). These allocated responsibilities ensure discipline in 
actions (Interviewees #C6 and #C9) and streamlined communication (Interviewees #C2, 
#C5, and #C9). From a family perspective, the formal role allocations also changed life 
as it was generally known and accepted. Initially the family members earned the same 
salaries. Subsequent to the implementation of the organogram and other governance 
structures, family members’ remuneration was linked to their respective positions, roles, 
and responsibilities (Interviewee #C1). The salaries of family managers are, therefore, 
now market related and are no longer on the same levels simply due to the fact that the 
family managers are siblings. 
 
Managerial Governance: Policies 
From the question data sheet that was completed by the chief executive officer, it is 
apparent that most implemented policies relate to human resource matters. These 
include policies regulating recruitment, selection, and appointment policies; 
performance management policies; disciplinary policies; grievance policies; 
remuneration policies; and leave policies. Also listed are training and bursaries, career 
development, and ethical and professional conduct policies. According to the chief 
executive officer, the human resource policies are applicable to both family and non-
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family executive and operational management. There is neither a delegation of 
authority, nor any procurement, credit card, or travel policies in place. The organisation 
has a formal dividend policy.  
 
4.5.2.4 DISCUSSION OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
 
The operations of Cream (Pty) Ltd evolved over time and it therefore became necessary 
to implement formal governance structures. When considering the current structures, as 
well as the information obtained during the interviews, it can be deduced that the current 
governance structures are predominantly implemented with the main aim of managing 
potential inter-personal conflict situations between family members, and to limit 
frustration. This supports the view of Taylor and Tucker (2013:32), who stated that the 
implementation of governance structures reduces conflict in family organisations. The 
conflict situations as identified in Cream (Pty) Ltd, most likely arose due to the overlap 
of family, ownership, and management as referred to in the literature review in the 
discussion surrounding the three circle model (Figure 4). The current governance 
structures were put in place only after certain family members indicated that they were 
no longer prepared to work in an unstructured environment. They consulted a family 
business specialist to guide them through the restructuring process. 
 
People are not always comfortable with change and some initial “teething problems” 
were, therefore, experienced with the implementation of the new governance structures. 
However, these teething problems did not outweigh the benefits derived from these 
structures. When asked whether the interviewees felt that it is important to have formal 
governance structures in place, they confirmed the importance and they spoke about 
the positive contributions that the structures have made to the organisation. As one 
interviewee mentioned, “People like structure; structure is important to take an 
organisation forward” (Interviewee #C7).  
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SECTION B 
 
4.6 DETAILED DATA ANALYSIS 
 
This sub-section is in response to research objective A.3., which is the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
A within-case analysis was performed on both Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd, 
and some common themes and certain contradictory findings emerged during the data 
analysis process. These were explored and will be discussed in detail. These 
discussions will be presented under the a priori sub-categories: family organisation, 
supervisory governance structures, and managerial governance structures. 
 
4.6.1 YOGURT (PTY) LTD: DETAILED DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The interview data of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd was coded (refer to Chapter  3.3.3 for more detail) 
and organised according to the a priori sub-categories and identified themes, as 
depicted in Figure 17 below.  
   
To obtain an in-depth understanding, through a multiple-case study analysis, as to 
why the relevant governance structures were implemented by the respective private 
family organisations. 
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Figure 17: A pathway to the data analysis of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd as it relates to 
research objective A.3. 
 
Sub-category Category 
 
Theme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted extract from Figure 7: Adapted codes-to-theory model 
 
This sub-section will discuss the various themes identified during the data analysis of 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd. The themes will be presented under the relevant a priori categories. 
 
 
Supervisory structure 
Managerial structure 
Organisational 
governance 
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4.6.1.1 FAMILY ORGANISATION 
 
Family organisations are regularly referred to, in the literature, as complex 
arrangements with overlapping interactions between family, management/employees, 
and ownership (Algarin et al. 2013:1; Davis and Tagiuri 1996:200; Dawson & Mussolino 
2014:170). The literature also suggests that these organisations have a number of 
common challenges such as succession planning, conflict resolution, ownership control, 
and wealth distribution (June et al. 2015:5). Unlike research on non-family 
organisations, family business research, including this study, has a considerable focus 
on the unique features and common challenges of a family organisation (Dawson & 
Mussolino 2014:169). The underlying theory of the unique and distinctive characteristics 
of a family organisation was challenged by one of the non-family interviewees when he 
made the following thought-provoking comment: 
A family firm is only a forum. Either you are part of an organisation or you are a 
sole proprietor. In my mind, those are the two options. In a family organisation, the 
rules are a bit different, but it is still just a forum (Interviewee #Y8). 
 
The value of governance structures for non-family stakeholders 
Taking into account the above quote from Interviewee #Y8, two things are implied. 
Firstly, although he is a non-family manager in a family organisation, the interviewee 
does not seem to feel alienated. This could indicate that the non-family stakeholders 
perceive the family organisation, and its current structures, to take the needs of both 
family and non-family stakeholders into consideration. Secondly, the rules of 
engagement between all stakeholders are important and should be given ample 
consideration by family organisations’ shareholders and management. 
 
Governance structures establish the rules within which any family or non-family 
organisation should function. These rules or structures are, as described by a family 
interviewee, an absolute prerequisite in order to prevent complications like nepotism 
and self-interest in an organisation (Interviewee #Y2). The overlapping interaction 
between family, management, and ownership, as well as the resulting risk of nepotism, 
deems these rules and structures especially relevant and important within a family 
organisational context (Dyer 2010:270). Interviewee #Y2 stated that a family 
organisation should aim to remove “the person” from the business. In order to do this, 
the organisation needs to be controlled by policy, and there should be independence in 
the organisation’s “thinking” process (Interviewee #2). This can be achieved through the 
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implementation of formal governance structures in the family organisation, or, as stated 
differently by an independent board member, “corporate governance in a family 
organisation, compared to that of a non-family organisation, brings balance against the 
risk of negative family dynamics.” 
 
The non-family interviewee (Interviewee #Y8) who challenged the general perception, 
as discussed above, explained the value of governance structures in a family 
organisation from a non-family stakeholder’s perspective. He stated that, “When 
working within structures, it makes it easier for a non-family member to be part of the 
business” (Interviewee #Y8). He continued by explaining that the structures force the 
family shareholders to realise that they are not the only people in the business and that 
there are other stakeholders as well. It is, according to him, important to create these 
structures and operate within them since they create the opportunity for other 
stakeholders, and not only shareholders, to feel that they can perform and express 
themselves within their respective positions, and that there is a place and a future for 
them in the family organisation (Interviewee #Y8).  
 
Governance structures as they relate to family and non-family employees 
A risk was identified through this investigation—family members within the family 
organisation might potentially feel that the implemented organisational structures are 
only applicable to non-family management and employees, and not to family members. 
Alternatively, they might feel that the organisational structures apply to a lesser degree 
to family members. In one family interviewee’s opinion, it is important to implement 
structures, and specifically policies, because these stipulate what can and cannot be 
done within the organisation. He said that the implementation of the “agreed-upon” 
structures will help to alleviate conflict. However, he continued to expound by saying 
that it is not necessary to implement the structures very meticulously, especially in a 
family context, since they are merely guidelines within which to operate (Interviewee 
#Y5). In addition to this view, it was also noted that all family members were aware of, 
and had accepted, the fact that certain family members do not always follow the correct 
procedure. An example of this is when leave forms need to be submitted. It was noted 
that some family members do not complete the leave forms at all. Alternatively, some 
family members only complete the leave forms until they have reached their maximum 
amount of available leave days after which, they simply do not complete the forms, but 
they still take the required leave days. Non-family managers and employees are not 
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allowed to engage in this type of behaviour. Having explored this phenomenon, one can 
appreciate the challenges of implementing governance structures consistently and fairly 
within a family organisational context. 
 
4.6.1.2 SUPERVISORY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 
Family organisations in the dairy industry need to compete with big corporate entities—
for example, Clover—for resources and market share. Clover is the largest milk buyer in 
South Africa and has approximately 29.4% of the South African fresh milk market, and it 
has approximately 19% of the ultra-high temperature processing milk (UHT) market 
(WESGRO Cape Town & Western Cape Research 2014:1). Its total market share 
amounts to approximately 23% of the milk market (WESGRO Cape Town & Western 
Cape Research 2014:9).  
 
Therefore, as a starting point, it is important to consider the power dynamics (see 
Chapter  2.3) of corporate entities compared to the power dynamics of private family 
organisations. One interviewee (Interviewee #Y5) mentioned that a non-family 
organisation will usually have a board of directors and a separate management team as 
part of its governance structures. The management team of non-family organisations 
will report, through the chief executive officer (who is also a member of the board of 
directors), on a quarterly or semi-annual basis to the board of directors. The 
management team will, therefore, report the company’s financial results to the board of 
directors. The board, without getting operationally involved, then advises on or criticises 
the company’s performance. According to Interviewee #Y5, Yogurt (Pty) Ltd does not 
have a clear distinction between an advisory board and a management team because 
there is an overlap of responsibilities. As he explained, “We actually report to ourselves” 
(Interviewee #Y5).  
 
When the suggested advisory and review role of a non-family organisation’s board of 
directors is explored, and when it is compared to the advisory and review role of 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Yogurt Holdings (Pty) Ltd, it can be assumed that it is important for 
private family organisations to design their governance structures in a way that allows 
them to compensate for the role confusion and in a way that ensures a balance 
between operational and advisory structures. 
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The board of directors of Yogurt Holdings (Pty) Ltd consists of family executives, non-
family executives, and non-family non-executives—i.e. independent directors. The 
chairperson of the board, although being seen by the family as “independent” (not a 
member of family, nor in an executive position), is a long-time family friend of one of the 
family directors. He is also the legal advisor of the firm and, therefore, he is part of the 
company’s professional services network. He can therefore from an independent 
director definition (refer section  1.7) viewpoint not be seen as a truly independent 
director. The other non-executive directors are truly independent and are well-qualified 
in terms of academic qualifications and/or experience. The board of directors has a very 
strong non-family (executive and non-executive) component, as can be seen from the 
above discussion as well as the discussion under Section  4.5.1.  
 
Taking into account the non-family influence on the board of directors, the question was 
raised as to whether the family or whether the board of directors is responsible for 
determining the strategic direction of the organisation. The responses were divided and 
they detailed the family, the board of directors, the executive members on the board, the 
chief executive officer, and a joint effort between family and the board, as being 
responsible for determining the organisational strategy. As can be seen from the 
responses, there is no clear answer and it is therefore important to obtain an in-depth 
understanding of the interviewees’ perspectives in this regard. 
 
Who determines the organisational strategy: the shareholders, the family, the 
chief executive officer, or the board of directors? 
Some interviewees felt that the strategic direction is not determined by the board of 
directors. The strategic direction, initiative, and drive, according to these interviewees, 
are initiated by the CEO, who then obtains the buy-in of his siblings. He spends time 
thinking about these things (Interviewee #Y9), and then he drives the direction of the 
company accordingly. Therefore, he is the strategic guider (Interviewee #Y11). 
According to the first interviewee (Interviewee #Y1), the CEO will, however, not be 
successful if his siblings do not believe in the proposed strategic direction. According to 
Interviewee #Y9, it is all about balancing the views of all of the parties. One interviewee 
suggested that the executive family members, and not the board of directors, determine 
the strategic direction of the organisation. He motivated this by stating that the external 
directors attend a board meeting once every six months (and that they sometimes 
attend board sub-committee meetings on a quarterly basis), whereas the family operate 
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the business on a daily basis (Interviewee #Y3). 
 
Half of the board of directors is made up of family members, and the only non-family 
shareholder on the board is perceived to be a “brother” by the majority of the family 
members (Interviewee #Y5). This can result in the shareholders (family and non-family) 
having the majority of the voting rights at a director’s meeting since voting at director’s 
meetings is based on one vote per director. The information on voting protocol was 
obtained from the completed question data sheet (Annexure C: Factual organisational 
information). According to one interviewee, in terms of strategy, there had not been any 
major disagreements between the family shareholders and the non-family shareholder 
(Interviewee #Y5). Therefore, although the interviewee suggested that the family 
determines the strategic direction, when one examines his reasoning, one realises that 
it might actually be the shareholders (family and non-family) who determine the strategic 
direction of the organisation. His view is supported by the other interviewees who also 
said that the directors, but more specifically, the family members and the non-family 
shareholder (in his capacity as chief operations officer) determine the strategic direction 
(Interviewee #Y4). It was mentioned that the chief operations officer has a lot of 
influence in the company (Interviewee #Y7) and that he is “just about the go-to-man for 
everything in the business” (Interviewee #Y6). It was also stated that the executive 
directors are not protective of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd just because it is a family business, but 
rather because it is a business (Interviewee #Y11).  
 
One interviewee felt that the development of strategic direction is a joint effort between 
employees, managers, and the board of directors. He mentioned that everybody was 
involved in the analysis of the company's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats (SWOT analysis), and that the SWOT analysis informs the company's strategic 
document (guiding principles). The strategic document then informs action plans for 
each department with specific, individualised goals. Therefore, a very structured 
process was followed in determining the organisational strategy (Interviewee #Y6). 
Another interviewee partially supported this view by stating that ideas originate at the 
lower levels of the organisation and are then escalated up to board level. Therefore the 
board, and not the family, ultimately determines the strategic direction 
(Interviewee #Y1). 
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The various views, as discussed above, were summarised by one of the executive 
directors. He concluded that since the family and the directors are so integrated, the 
majority of the decision-making is done by the family, but the family makes the 
decisions at the director’s meeting “these days”. This has not always been the case. 
Currently, the organisation has policies in place that drive the strategy approval 
process. In addition to this, it is important to note that the non-family executives, as well 
as the independent directors, are professional people and they are put at risk if protocol 
is not followed (Interviewee #Y2). In terms of section 76 of the Companies Act, all 
directors need to exercise their powers and perform their functions with the “degree of 
care, skill and diligence that may be resonably expected” in their position. If this is not 
done, they might be liable in terms of section 77 of the Companies Act. Interviewee #Y2 
continued to explain that the board of directors forces discipline into decision-making 
and the shareholders, therefore, cannot do whatever they please. The family, however, 
still has major input into the strategic direction of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd (Interviewee #Y2). 
 
Role and contribution of the independent directors 
The reality of a private family organisation is that "the non-executives are there by the 
grace of the family” (Interviewee #Y9). One of the non-executive, independent directors 
of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd stated that the non-executive directors would not be able to change 
the overall direction of the family organisation. The non-executive, independent director 
also explained that it is not the responsibility of a non-executive director to change the 
direction of the family organisation.  
 
Although they are seemingly not the drivers of strategy within Yogurt (Pty) Ltd, the non-
executive directors on the board contribute tremendously to the organisation’s strategic 
process. They force discipline into decision-making (Interviewee #Y2), they ask critical 
“out-of-the box” questions (Interviewee #Y3), and they assist in keeping matters as 
objective as possible (Interviewee #Y8). When making a decision that could be harmful 
to the company, but beneficial to the family, the family executives might tend to, either 
consciously or unconsciously, make decisions in favour of the family (Interviewee #Y9). 
The non-executives are there to ensure balance in this decision-making process. They 
therefore take into account the best interest of the company (Interviewee #Y9). This 
then also ensures that the directors comply with the requirements of the Companies Act 
(Interviewee #Y9).  
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Since the shareholders, directors, and employees are the same people, it is sometimes 
difficult for them to think differently or more widely than their current frame of reference 
(Interviewee #Y3). The independent directors’ critical thinking and questioning therefore 
adds value to strategy, but it does not necessarily change the strategic direction of the 
organisation (Interviewee #Y3). Two interviewees alluded to the fact that the 
independent directors’ views on the organisation’s proposed strategy had in the past, 
however, resulted in an altered strategy (Interviewees #Y2 and #Y9): 
He approached it from a different angle and I think where the added value in a 
family business comes in, is the fact that the answer came from him. I think that in 
the event that the answer, the same answer, came from a family member it might 
have been shot down (Interviewee #Y9). 
 
In addition to the value-adding as discussed above, the independent directors play a 
balancing role in the event of conflict between board members. Therefore, their role is 
not to mediate, but, in a sense, their role is to give both parties a point of reference from 
which to work, or if stated differently, to act as a “lightning conductor” (Interviewee #Y9). 
The presence of non-executive directors also leads to the accountability of individual 
executive members in terms of decision-making and performance evaluation 
(Interviewee #Y9). 
 
Summary: Supervisory governance structure 
The governance structures, including the board and its sub-committees, force the 
organisation to look at matters in a more structured way. They further ensure that 
necessary attention is given to compliance with the relevant laws and 
regulations (Interviewee #Y6). 
 
Yogurt Group has a management/operational board (Yogurt (Pty) Ltd) and a 
professional board (Yogurt Holdings (Pty) Ltd). The operational board provides a 
platform to discuss operational matters which might not necessarily be dealt with at a 
professional board level. The professional board, with independent, external 
representation, fulfils an advisory role which, in addition to strategy direction, can also 
contribute to “new ideas, skills and capabilities” (De Massis et al. 2016:9).  
 
 
4.6.1.3 MANAGERIAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE  
 
The senior management members of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd are, except for the three 
independent directors and one senior manager, the same individuals as those on the 
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board of Yogurt Holdings (Pty) Ltd. It is therefore clear that there is an overlap of roles 
and responsibilities with respect to the majority of senior individuals in the 
Yogurt Group. Therefore, the question was raised as to whether there would have been 
any effect on the financial performance of the organisation if there had been fewer 
family managers, and more non-family professional managers in senior positions. The 
majority of interviewees commented that, in their view, the financial performance of 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd would not necessarily have been better with more non-family 
professional managers in senior positions.  
 
One of the interviewees, who did believe that the organisation might have performed “a 
little bit” better, motivated his opinion by explaining that external people do not operate 
in the same “comfort zone” as the family members. He gave an example by stating that, 
“I cannot fire the child” (Interviewee #Y1). He therefore suggested that family members, 
within a family organisation, are more likely to be tolerated than non-family members if 
they did not perform at the required standard. Non-family members do not have that 
privilege. This phenomenon, known as nepotism, will be discussed in more detail later 
on in this chapter. 
 
The majority of the interviewees indicated that they were not sure about what effect 
fewer family managers would have on the financial performance of the organisation. 
Some, alternatively, indicated that fewer family members would not necessarily have 
improved the performance of the organisation. Since it is difficult to demonstrate any 
correlation between the financial performance and the type of management structure, it 
is important to obtain an in-depth understanding of the interviewees’ experiences and 
motivations in this regard. These motivations were summarised under the following 
themes: 
 
Trust 
Trust is defined by Davis, Mayer, and Schoorman (1995:712) as the ‘‘willingness of a 
party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the 
other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control that other party’’. Trust is central to family organisations and it is often 
seen as a competitive advantage for this type of organisation (Sundaramurthy 2008:89). 
Trust is also, in a family organisation context, positively related to stewardship, and 
negatively related to agency perceptions (Chrisman et al. 2010:1047). Therefore, family 
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managers sometimes rely on mutual trust as a substitute for formal internal controls and 
procedures within their governance structures. One interviewee stated that the 
presence of so many family managers within Yogurt (Pty) Ltd’s governance structures 
contributed positively to Yogurt (Pty) Ltd’s financial performance because there was no 
need to monitor the siblings on a daily basis (Interviewee #Y4). He continued to explain 
that, if an organisation appoints non-family managers, it would be required to monitor 
them more closely. In further support of his view, he mentioned that non-family 
managers do not have any personal interest in the well-being or success of the 
organisation. This finding supports the line of research that believes that family 
organisations use trust, instead of control systems, to manage risk (Davis, Mayer & 
Schoorman 2007:346).  
 
Passion and drive 
According to a family interviewee (Interviewee #Y3), family members are more 
passionate about their business than salaried employees within the family organisation 
are. This view was supported by a non-family interviewee who said that the family 
members are pretty driven (he repeated this three times) to perform well and they are 
quite a tight unit. The non-family interviewee explained that if the company were to 
perform badly, they would experience it directly. For family members it is about the fact 
that, “This is our family, this is our heritage”. He elaborated by saying, “If I look at these 
guys…they are more…driven than perhaps the average person might be, for success” 
(Interviewee #Y6). Family members in business can be problematic if everybody is not 
playing their part, but in Yogurt (Pty) Ltd this is not the case because “they are not lazy”, 
and they all have an “inherent passion” for the business (Interviewee #Y6).  
 
The family interviewee (Interviewee #Y3) expanded on his earlier view regarding the 
passion of family members, by commenting on the fact that the nature of the role in the 
organisation is an important factor to keep in mind when determining whether a family 
or professional manager should fill a certain position. He argued this point by stating 
that marketing is the heart of the business and it carries the organisation’s brand. Since 
family members are passionate about the brand, it is important for the organisation to 
appoint a family manager to that position. According to him, there is no need to appoint 
a family member as the head of finance because it is about “debit” and “credit”, thus it is 
“more black and white” (Interviewee #Y3). Therefore, passion is, according to him, not 
that important in a financial role (Interviewee #Y3), but it is important in marketing. 
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However, he did mention that, if an organisation were to appoint a suitably qualified and 
professional family member as the head of finance, that would be ideal. “You then hit 
the jackpot” (Interviewee #Y3). This viewpoint partly supports the appointment of an 
independent chief financial officer in the family organisation, but because of reasons 
other than what might be found in the current literature. The current literature mainly 
supports the appointment of an independent chief financial officer because of, for 
example, their technical expertise and leadership skills (IFAC 2014:4), and their ability 
to act objectively (Hiebl 2014:487). This alternative reasoning might need to be 
considered in future research when determining the potential roles and contributions of 
professional management within a family organisation. 
 
Personal interest and a common goal 
As mentioned before, family members in a family organisation are driven to perform well 
because they have a personal interest in the performance of the organisation. A 
possible reason for this is that they have a common goal, namely to grow the 
organisation to such a point where it can be successfully transferred to the next 
generation. According to a family interviewee, the appointment of non-family, 
professional managers, instead of family managers, would not have had a positive 
effect on the financial performance of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd. He believes that the siblings do a 
great job because they have a personal interest in the performance of the company. He 
said that they also have a common goal, namely to make the business work since the 
next generation depends on it (Interviewee #Y4). Another family member stated that 
they all work well together since they think in the same way (Interviewee #Y5). This 
illustrates the fact that the family members currently involved in Yogurt (Pty) Ltd act like 
stewards and, according to the interviewees, their actions contribute positively to the 
organisational value with respect to the current and future generations. This supports 
the comment by Holt et al. (2016:67) that a steward’s behaviour is “based on an intrinsic 
desire to serve the firm” and it can, therefore, be inferred that governance structures 
that are designed to promote stewardship behaviour, as is the case at Yogurt (Pty) Ltd, 
might result in increased organisational performance.  
 
Accountability 
The question was raised as to whether non-family managers were expected to answer 
more to the owners of the company than family managers. Three different types of 
opinions were obtained. 
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Firstly, it was stated by one interviewee (Interviewee #Y1) that the family managers are 
held more accountable than non-family managers. He clarified his view by explaining 
that family managers are held more accountable because of their respective positions in 
the organisation, and not, therefore, because of a distinction between family and non-
family management. Another interviewee (Interviewee #Y6) confirmed this view since 
he also said that some family managers are held more accountable because of their 
positions and not because of the fact that they are family members. He explained that 
specific deliverables are agreed upon during the one-on-one meetings and that those 
deliverables are then attended to by both family and non-family managers. Although not 
a regular occurrence, it becomes a bit more difficult in situations where the family 
managers do not co-operate; as Interviewee #Y6 stated, “He cannot treat them exactly 
the same as he would treat me, I am very clear on that, he doesn't.”  
 
This leads to the second train of thought, namely that family managers and non-family 
managers are held equally accountable (Interviewees #Y4, #Y8, and #Y11). An 
example was provided where the marketing executive, who was a family member, 
needed to answer just as much on the performance and running of his division as the 
chief operating officer and the chief financial officer who were non-family managers 
(Interviewee #Y11). A different approach to this question was given by another 
interviewee (Interviewee #Y8) since, according to him, it is not about being more 
accountable, but rather, it is more about the quality of the answer and the impact of that 
answer which differentiates these parties.  
 
This explanation leads to the last viewpoint which is that non-family managers are held 
more accountable than family members. Confirming the explanation as to the quality of 
the answers, another interviewee said that any answers that are to be given by non-
family members would need to be much more detailed and correct than those of the 
family members. Some of them will get away with a less detailed explanation and also 
with an answer that is not totally correct. One interviewee claimed that more is most 
definitely expected from the non-family managers than from the family managers. It is 
here where “the water and oil becomes a bit mixed, you know, blood is thicker than 
water” (Interviewee #Y7). Two interviewees felt very strongly about this third viewpoint. 
One stated that the non-family managers need to be a bit more “on their toes” 
(Interviewee #Y9), and another stated that non-family managers are “without a doubt” 
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held more accountable than family managers (Interviewee #Y3). It was explained by an 
interviewee that it is not correct, or even desirable, to distinguish between family and 
non-family managers, but because a first generation is currently responsible for the 
management of the family organisation, you need to have a slightly different approach 
to this (Interviewee #Y2).  
 
Independence 
The chief executive officer of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd is a family member and the main driver of 
corporate governance within the family organisation. He stated that the organisation is 
trying to find a balance between organisational needs and the best practice 
recommendations of King III (IoDSA 2009). Based on his answers, the chief executive 
officer is clearly very knowledgeable in matters of corporate governance and the 
recommendations of King III (IoDSA 2009). According to him, it is important to have 
corporate governance in order to avoid nepotism and self-interest, and also to ensure 
that you “take the person out of the business”, therefore ensuring an independent, non-
personal process. He stated that this is achieved where policies manage the process. 
He continued to motivate the implementation of corporate governance structures by 
explaining that there is a reason why companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange are structured and managed in such a way.  
 
Professionalisation 
In this section, the effect of appointing family management versus appointing 
professional management in the governance structures of a private family organisation 
was explored. An interviewee motivated the appointment of family management, as 
opposed to professional management, by stating that professional management comes 
at a cost which does not only relate to salaries and bonuses, but it also relates to the 
increased risk of incorrect decision-making (Interviewee #Y9). He continued to say that, 
because of the fact that these individuals might feel that they do not have sufficient 
long-term financial security in the company, they might feel the need to benefit 
financially as, and when, they can. Therefore, they will not necessarily act in the best 
interest of the company in the long-term. He describes this by saying that, should the 
current financial position of the company be taken into consideration, a professional 
chief executive officer might immediately cut costs, retrench people, and try to improve 
the net profit, but that might not be the correct decision in terms of the company’s long-
term sustainability. According to this interviewee, Yogurt (Pty) Ltd is well structured 
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because there are professional managers in key positions, but, they are on “tight social 
control” (Interviewee #Y9). This view confirms the increased risk of agency cost due to 
the appointment of professional managers, as is discussed in the literature (Madison 
2014:9). 
 
Continuing the discussion on family versus professional management, it was observed 
that Yogurt (Pty) Ltd has proper structures in place which, inter alia, include the 
autonomy of the non-family chief financial officer. An example was given that, if the 
chief financial officer stipulated that there were insufficient funds to purchase a specific 
item, it would not be bought. The interviewee stated that, "The most key position, 
besides the chief executive officer or managing director, is the chief financial officer" 
and the current chief financial officer is an independent individual who does not allow 
the chief executive officer to “bully” him (Interviewee #Y11). The position of the chief 
operational officer is, according to the interviewee, also key to the organisation. This 
position is filled by a non-family member. The interviewee continued to explain that the 
organisation is well-balanced since there are family executives and non-family 
executives in key positions, and it has non-executive members on its board 
(Interviewee #Y11). 
 
It appears as though the successful implementation of governance structures and 
processes in Yogurt (Pty) Ltd partly results from the independent chief financial officer’s 
contribution to this process. The chief financial officer, for instance, implemented a 
“chart of authority” that specifies the various levels of authority within the organisation. 
The “chart of authority” also enforces discipline in actions for both family and non-family 
members (Interviewee #Y7). The fact that the chief financial officer, as a non-family 
member, is responsible for driving some of the governance processes greatly assists 
the chief executive officer with the implementation of governance in the organisation. 
This is needed since the other siblings might not necessarily see the need for, and will 
also not be so easily convinced by the chief executive officer, of the need for, the 
implementation of governance structures, inter alia an authority framework. The reason 
for this is that there is a very thin line between being the chief executive officer and 
simply being ‘just’ one of the siblings (Interviewee #Y7). 
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Policies: The role of policies 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd has various policy documents in place. The chief executive officer 
originally obtained a very detailed list of all the policies that are generally applicable to 
companies. This list was explored and discussed within the organisation and they then 
identified the policies that were relevant to Yogurt (Pty) Ltd. These policies were 
developed and formally accepted in the organisation. The board and its sub-committees 
also have formal terms of references in place.  
 
According to a family interviewee (Interviewee #Y2), it is crucial to establish policies at 
present, during the reign of the first generation and before the second generation joins 
the company. He elaborated that, if the organisation has a vision of becoming a big 
corporate entity, it is important to implement these policies already at the beginning of 
the organisation’s life-cycle, since these policies avoid self-interest and nepotism. If they 
are not in place, next generations will be employed by the family organisation because 
of their family ties, and not because they are the right people for the job. As previously 
discussed, policy also ensures an independent, non-personal process. Other 
interviewees supported the implementation of policies by stating that policies create 
guidelines which, again, reduce conflict (Interviewee #Y5), remove politics from the 
family organisation (Interviewee #Y8), and protect the business (Interviewee #Y6). 
 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd is subjected to regulatory requirements for instance, with the 
establishment of an audit committee, but it also needs to be “open to external scrutiny, 
in terms of doing the right thing” (Interviewee #Y6). Various well-known international 
and national companies regularly perform audits at Yogurt (Pty) Ltd. This is done in 
terms of licence and/or distributor agreements with these companies. As part of their 
audit procedures, they evaluate Yogurt (Pty) Ltd’s governance structures, human 
resource policies and processes, as well as its financial position (Interviewee #Y3). 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd stands to lose these contracts should it not adhere to all the 
requirements as per the relevant licence and/or distribution agreements. Although not a 
legislative requirement, Yogurt (Pty) Ltd is therefore required, from an industry 
perspective, to implement relevant structures, policies, and procedures.  
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Policies: Performance management 
The company has formal performance management processes in place that are 
applicable to all levels of employees. It is a paper-based system that focuses on key 
performance areas (KPAs) which are then aligned with measurable key performance 
indicators (KPIs). The various divisions’ KPAs are aligned with the overall company 
strategy. The process also includes a personal development section which assists 
individuals with the planning and managing of their own careers. The company’s 
strategic objectives, as per its strategic plan, form the basis for the KPAs and these are 
then broken down into detailed, measurable KPIs per department and per individual 
employee. Approximately 60% of the managers actively use this system, but it is 
estimated that the number of active users will increase once the envisaged electronic 
performance management system is implemented. The information relating to the 
performance management system, as obtained through the interview process, is 
confirmed by the existence of a formal “Performance management policy and strategy” 
document and a “Performance management compliance” document. As per these policy 
documents, the company implemented “a meaningful fair performance management 
system” which has been in effect since February 2010.  
 
Although the process is officially applicable to all employees, it seems as though it is 
inconsistently implemented and executed on an executive level. From the interviews it 
became apparent that the non-family executives are managed, to a lesser degree, 
through the use of this formal system. Therefore, a more “watered-down version” 
(Interviewee #11) is used for their performance management. Family executives’ 
performances are not formally managed at all. The non-family shareholder’s 
performance is managed on a level somewhere between the management of the family 
executives and the management of the non-family, non-shareholder executives.  
 
The paper-based, policy-driven performance management system is therefore replaced, 
on the non-family executive level, by a more subtle performance management system, 
generally referred to in the company as “one-on-one” meetings. This is a weekly 
meeting between the chief executive officer and the individual executive managers. 
Record is kept of the discussions at these meetings and the focus is primarily on 
performance—i.e., “These were the tasks, they’re done or not done” (Interviewee #Y7). 
Likewise, family members’ performances are also managed, but this is done much more 
subtly (Interviewees #Y2 and #Y8). Some of them also have “one-on-ones” with the 
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chief executive officer, whereas others do not. As jokingly stated by one of the siblings, 
‘I manage myself and he can rate me, but if he doesn't give me full marks, it will be 
problematic for him’ (Interviewee #Y3). 
 
The performance management system on this level is therefore more a discussion 
forum, with an emphasis on teamwork, to ensure that all the relevant company 
objectives are met. They therefore support each other if one of them does not manage 
to meet some of his objectives. According to Interviewee #Y2, in the case of a non-
family executive, the view is more, “If you do not know how to do it, go and make sure 
as to how to do it” and, “Boy you better know what you have to know”. It is therefore 
clear that the non-family executives were appointed based on their perceived technical 
knowledge, expertise, and experience in their respective fields, and they are thus 
expected to perform on that level. If they do not perform well, the non-family 
executive/manager will be requested to leave the employment of the company more 
easily than would be the case with respect to the family executive. This observation is 
supported by the following statements: “I am definitely not going to tell him tomorrow to 
take his things and leave” (Interviewee #Y2) and, “One of the disadvantages is that, 
your hands are tied, actually all you can do… is to manage it” (Interviewee #Y1). 
Therefore, “There is a fine line, as you still need to keep to your objectives and 
strategies, but it is not worth hiring and firing on this level, as it will destabilise the 
company” (Interviewee #Y2). 
 
Interviewees felt that one weakness of the current “one-on-one” process, with respect to 
family executives, is that this process focuses very much on performance, but that it 
lacks the personal development element which would normally form part of the 
performance management process. Therefore, the opportunity to identify personal 
developmental needs and the formalising of developmental plans does not exist for 
family executives. The personal development of these executives is not managed 
because it is very difficult to manage within a family organisation context, and this might 
sometimes be to the detriment of the company. As explained by Interviewee #Y8, “It is 
not managed, since it is difficult to manage, and that difficult [sic], is sometimes to the 
detriment of the company”. 
 
 
 
Master’s Dissertation – R vd Westhuizen Page 129 
 
Stewardship, as discussed under the literature review (Chapter  2.3.1), was clearly 
portrayed by some of the family-executives. They explained that they are responsible 
for their own performance and that they manage their performance based on the 
company’s objectives. The following statements support this view, “You can make it 
formal if you want to make it formal, I am not convinced that it will make a major 
difference” (Interviewee #Y5) and, “Whether I am being performance managed or not 
performance managed, I know whether I perform or not” (Interviewee #Y5) and, 
“Nobody needs to manage me, I ensure that everything runs the way it should” 
(Interviewee #Y3). 
 
A non-family interviewee challenged the general perception of performance 
management as an essential element for the successful management of any business 
organisation. He stated that the whole idea of performance management in a family 
organisation is questionable because, “Is it the individuals that perform or is it the 
relationship between them that allows them to perform?” (Interviewee #Y9). He further 
explained this by saying that the strength in a family business with healthy family 
dynamics does not so much depend on the family members’ individual performances 
but that they, as a team, support each other’s performances (Interviewee #Y9). This 
view could provide a fruitful avenue for future research relating to the impact of healthy 
family dynamics, or “familiness”—as it is referred to in the literature (Eddleston, 
Kellermanns & Zellweger 2010)— on the financial performance of private family 
organisations. 
 
Nepotism as it relates to performance management 
Unbridled nepotism would make it almost impossible for family members to effectively 
manage non-performing family members employed at the family organisation (Dyer 
2010:270). As per Dyer (2010:270), family shareholders are frequently unwilling to 
discipline or to performance-manage family employees until the point at which the 
business is almost past its point of return. This theory is supported by the interviewees 
of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd, who indicated that a non-performing family manager will be given 
more time and opportunities than a non-family manager to rectify his performance 
levels. According to some of the interviewees, it might take a bit longer to make the 
decision to take action against a family manager than it would in the case of a non-
family manager, but the decision will be made in the end (Interviewees #Y5 and #Y8). 
According to Interviewees #Y5 and #Y8, the difference between the family manager and 
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the non-family manager is that the family manager will be redeployed and the non-
family manager will be asked to leave the company. This view is affirmed by another 
interviewee who stated, “You can fire him, but you will not fire him, you are going to try 
and [sic] fix him” (Interviewee #Y1).  
 
Summary: Managerial governance structure 
The board and executive management of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd actively strive to incorporate 
the recommendations as set out in King III (IoDSA 2009). However, as stated by the 
interviewees, they are attempting to find the optimum balance between establishing the 
structures where they are needed and where they can add value (Interviewee #Y2), 
without incurring unjustifiable costs and without spending unnecessary time on it 
(Interviewee #Y1). One of the most important principles is that the structures should not 
negatively impact upon the effectiveness of the organisation’s decision-making 
processes (Interviewee #Y7).  
 
An important observation made at this point is that a culture of good governance 
principles and structures has been instilled at the organisation, although for some family 
members this culture has been instilled subconsciously. This view is supported through 
a comment made by one of the family members who implied, through the majority of his 
comments, that he is not so much in favour of formally implemented governance 
structures. His comment related to the performance management principles that are 
applied, where applicable, to any non-performing family members, “If it does not work, 
the formal systems need to kick in. If you do not handle it formally, you are shirking your 
responsibility and then King will probably deal with you very aggressively” 
(Interviewee #Y1).  
 
4.6.2 CREAM (PTY) LTD: DETAIL DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The interview data of Cream (Pty) Ltd was coded (refer to Chapter  3.3.3 for more 
detail), and organised according to the a priori sub-categories and identified themes, as 
depicted in Figure 18 below.  
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Figure 18: A pathway to the data analysis of Cream (Pty) Ltd as it relates to 
research objective A.3. 
 
Sub-category Category 
 
Theme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted extract from Figure 7: Adapted codes-to-theory model 
 
This sub-section will discuss the various themes identified during the data analysis of 
Cream (Pty) Ltd. The themes will be presented under the relevant a priori categories.  
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4.6.2.1 FAMILY ORGANISATION 
 
Family organisations, as previously mentioned, are different from other organisational 
forms because they include three unique elements: the family, the 
management/employees, and the ownership (Davis and Tagiuri 1996:200). These 
elements ensure a complex environment from which researchers can obtain rich and 
interesting data. The discoveries, as they relate to the complex interactions between the 
family, management, and ownership in Cream (Pty) Ltd, will be elaborated on below. 
 
Independence 
The interviewees consider the implemented governance structures of Cream (Pty) Ltd 
to be effective. The practical implementation of these structures poses its challenges, 
but it provides the organisation (including its shareholders) and its employees with very 
good guidelines (Interviewee #C1). An important aspect highlighted by the interviewees 
was that, as soon as there were structures in place, opinions and perceptions were no 
longer relevant, and the facts on the table then mattered (Interviewee #C3). 
 
Dynamic process 
More than one respondent alluded to the fact that the implementation of structures in a 
family organisation is a dynamic process. Also important to remember is that, although 
the structures that are currently implemented are effective, they will not necessarily be 
sufficient in the future. Therefore, the effectiveness of the structures should be reviewed 
and reconsidered on a regular basis (Interviewees #C3, #C6, and #C7).  
 
4.6.2.2 SUPERVISORY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 
The supervisory governance structures of Cream (Pty) Ltd consist of a family advisory 
board and a company board of directors. 
 
Independent advisors: Family advisory board 
As previously discussed, the family advisory board consists of independent advisors, 
family non-executives, family executives, and non-family executives. The independent 
advisor’s role in Cream (Pty) Ltd is twofold. It is firstly, to act as an advisor to the 
executive members, and secondly, to assist the non-executive family members in 
assessing the performance, and determining the remuneration, of the family 
executives (Interviewee #C1).    
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Due to their experience, industry knowledge, and understanding of the economy, the 
independent advisors are able to contribute tremendously to the general direction, 
objectives, and long-term strategies of Cream (Pty) Ltd (Interviewee #C2 and #C4). 
They also challenge the executives and management to “think outside the box” 
(Interviewee #C7). In addition, the independent advisors assist the executives in 
reporting to themselves (Interviewee #C2). This is very important because the majority 
of the executive members are both family and shareholders, and the overlay of the 
family, ownership, and management spheres might, if not managed correctly, lead to 
complacency by family executives.  
 
The independent advisor’s performance assessment role is also very important as it is 
difficult for family members to assess each other’s performances. It is a challenge for 
parents to independently assess their children’s performances, especially if the 
assessment needs to be fair and aligned with that of non-family executives who have 
the same level of responsibility (Interviewee #C1). Dealing with performance and salary 
related matters in this forum prevents the discussion of family performance and 
remuneration at trustee (shareholder) meetings, and this therefore limits emotional 
decision-making and family conflict at the shareholder level. 
 
Role confusion, due to the overlay of family, management, and ownership, as discussed 
in the literature review (see Chapter  2.2), is a reality in Cream (Pty) Ltd’s contextual 
framework. The presence of independent advisors on the family advisory board assists 
in reducing this confusion. “Independent advisors help us to report to ourselves as it is 
difficult, since we are management and family shareholders, so we actually report to my 
father, mother and sister” (Interviewee #C2). 
 
The presence of an advisory board, with independent advisors, undoubtedly adds value 
to the organisation. As summarised by one of the non-family, non-executive managers,  
What I like about this family organisation, as opposed to the previous family 
organisation I worked for, is the external board (advisory board) to whom they 
need to report. There is somebody that can reprimand the board of directors as to 
their direction and performance. The external views help the organisation to stay 
focused. What I appreciate of [sic] this model is the fact that there is somebody 
that tells the boss, “Listen, here you are making a mistake, here you are doing 
well” (Interviewee #C7). 
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Independent advisor: Company board of directors 
 
The company board of directors consists of family executives, a non-family executive, 
and an independent advisor. This independent advisor does not serve in this capacity 
on the family advisory board; he only serves on the company board of directors. He is 
an experienced individual and a former chief executive officer of a well-known and 
respected dairy company. Although in the minority, and not a registered director 
(therefore he has no voting rights), his experience and approach bears weight at the 
meetings and he therefore exercises the necessary authority on the board of directors 
(Interviewee #C1). All the executive board members value the independent advisor’s 
contributions since he identifies gaps and he helps the executive directors to keep to 
their strategic plan (Interviewees #1C, #C2, and #C3). In addition to his strategic advice, 
he also contributes to certain high-level operational issues for instance, when major 
sales price adjustments need to be made. This confirms the view of Boshoff et al. 
(2010:50) that external professional advisors play an important role in the improved 
performance of family organisations because of their experience gained outside of the 
family organisation, their general and industry knowledge, and their qualifications and 
objectivity. 
 
Who determines the organisational strategy: the family, the family advisory 
board, the board of directors, or the chief executive officer? 
From the interviews, it was deduced that the board of directors determines the strategic 
direction of the business, whereas the independent directors give guidance on strategy 
and any other relevant issues. The majority of the interviewees (family and non-family 
members) indicated that the board of directors (as a team) determines the strategic 
direction of the organisation (Interviewees #C1, #C2, #C3, #C4, #C7, #C8, and #C9). 
Decision-making is mainly done by the three executive directors, on a consensus basis, 
after considering the views of the independent advisor. As indicated earlier, it is 
important to note that the executive directors greatly value the independent advisor’s 
input. From a process point of view, the board of directors makes the relevant decisions 
and/or determines the strategies, after which they are communicated to the family 
advisory board via the chief executive officer. One of the interviewees made the 
comment that the final decision by the advisory board is generally in line with that 
proposed by the company’s board of directors (Interviewee #C3). According to one of 
the interviewees, the shareholders like to understand why and how things were done, 
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but they do not instruct the board of directors as to what to do (Interviewee #C9). The 
board of directors therefore has the necessary decision-making power and they then 
subsequently report to the shareholders on the advisory board as to why certain 
decisions were taken (Interviewee #C9). 
 
Contrary to the majority view discussed above, two interviewees commented that the 
family, after taking into account advice from the advisory committee, determines the 
strategic direction of the organisation. The one interviewee stated, “I think, that at the 
end of the day, the family is running the board of directors” (Interviewee #C5); “The 
board of directors work for the family” (Interviewee #C5). This interviewee felt that it was 
appropriate for the family to determine the strategic direction because they finance the 
organisation’s activities. The words “it is not wrong” (Interviewee #C5) were repeated 
three times by the interviewee. In addition, and with specific reference to the family chief 
executive officer’s role, the following opinion was voiced: “It is the family that manages 
the place, over and done with” (Interviewee #C6).  
 
The latter comment was contradicted by another interviewee, who is one of the 
managers reporting directly to the non-family executive director. This interviewee 
(Interviewee #C8) argued that the chief financial officer is most definitely involved in the 
setting of the organisational objectives, strategies, and vision of the organisation. He 
also felt that the chief financial officer’s input added some independence to the strategic 
process. Since the chief financial officer is a member of the board of directors, it 
supports the majority of the interviewees’ views that the company board of directors 
determines the strategic direction of the organisation. 
 
Summary: Supervisory governance structure 
The supervisory governance structures within Cream (Pty) Ltd consist of a family 
advisory board and a company board of directors. These structures are effective 
because the combination of these two boards manages the family influence to not be 
completely dominating, but to still establishes sufficient family influence, in order to 
ensure that family objectives and values are not negated. Simultaneously, these 
implemented supervisory governance structures ensure that the external experience 
and knowledge, as contributed by the independent advisors, create balance between 
family direction, and organisational direction and performance.  
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4.6.2.3 MANAGERIAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 
Management’s role in Cream (Pty) Ltd is the execution of strategy as defined by the 
board of directors. The management structure consists of divisional supervisors who 
report to senior managers, who then again report to the executive management. The 
executive management consists of the chief executive officer, chief operations officer, 
and chief financial officer. The chief executive officer is a member of the owner family, 
and the chief financial officer is an independent, non-family member. The executive 
management structure is well defined and everybody knows where they fit in 
(Interviewee #C3). 
 
Various points were identified as they related to managerial governance structures, of 
which the main themes are described below. 
 
Professionalisation 
The effect of appointing family management versus professional management in the 
governance structures of Cream (Pty) Ltd was explored. The question was raised as to 
whether the interviewees believed that more professional management, thus fewer 
family managers in the governance structures of the organisation, would have made 
any difference to the performance of the organisation. Various opinions were obtained, 
of which the majority indicated that more professional managers, and less family 
management, would not have made a difference in the performance of the organisation. 
The reasons given were the following: 
- “We are still in the growth phase. If the business was established, it might have 
made a difference. The presence of the family at this point brings different 
perspectives, therefore not only a cold, black and white perspective. So it plays a 
strategic role.” (Interviewee #C2) 
- “The one thing that counts for the business is the fact that the family members who 
are currently involved have grown up in the industry. If the structures looked 
different, maybe it would have been different. It is a process.” (Interviewee #C3) 
- “Since the job descriptions and responsibilities were determined upfront, it does not 
matter whether the position is filled by a family or non-family member.” 
(Interviewee #C4) 
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- “No, I do not think it would have made any difference. The advisory board, as well 
as the independent person on the board of directors has a big enough effect on the 
family. And if you are family, you work for yourself; therefore, you are more inclined 
to go the extra mile than any external person.” (Interviewee #C7) 
- “The combination of both family and non-family is working well. The external 
advisors’ contributions are for instance, the identification of risks that the family has 
become complacent to. The external person brings a different perspective. The 
family, especially the directors are open to these contributions; I can honestly say 
that it is the combination that works.” (Interviewee #C8) 
- “Maybe it would, maybe not. An external person might have done the same as the 
current CEO, but then again, an external person might maybe not have the same 
passion for the cows and the farm as the current COO… so it depends on the 
person and their capabilities.” (Interviewee #C9) 
- “I think the company performs well as it is, since the majority are anyway external 
people. I do think that it will always be better if you could have external people, but 
then they need to be the right people.” (Interviewee #C6) 
 
The above opinions were summarised by Interviewee #C2: 
I am considering it from both sides. If it is "yes", it will be because we will then be 
able to appoint a better qualified team. If it is "no", it is because we will not have 
the commitment as is currently the case. The guys with the qualifications do not 
necessarily come with the commitment. If we could have better qualified people 
with the same commitment it would be a perfect world. 
 
From the above opinions, it is clear that the interviewees were comfortable with the 
current management structure, which includes a balanced combination of family and 
non-family managers. Family members on the executive team contribute institutional 
knowledge and passion to the organisation (Interviewees #C3 and #C9). These family 
executives have grown up in the business and therefore understand the detailed 
operations of the organisation. They are also perceived, by the interviewees, to be very 
passionate about Cream (Pty) Ltd, and as a result, very committed towards the success 
of this private family organisation. This is supported by Andrews (2010:30-33) who 
found that passion is one of the elements that fuel smart, effective decision-making in 
family organisations (2010:30), and drive the organisation to achieve new heights 
(2010:33). External management contributes new perspectives and independence to 
the family organisation.  
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King: best practice recommendations 
The chief executive officer, as the chairman of the board of directors, acts as the link 
between the executive, the board of directors, and the family advisory board. With 
reference to potential conflict of interest, as identified under agency theory, the 
Companies Act (see Chapter  2.3.3.1) requires both family and non-family managers to 
act in the best interest of the organisation as a separate legal entity. The fact that the 
chief executive officer is also the chairman of the board is inconsistent with the 
requirements of King III (IoDSA 2009:24). However, from the various discussions held 
with both family and non-family management, it can be assumed that the family 
executive members’ general approach is to act in the best interest of the organisation as 
a separate legal entity and, therefore, not to use the organisation as merely an 
extension of their personal and family undertakings.  
 
The organisational structure, although not intentionally focused on adhering to the best 
practice recommendations of King III, conforms to recommended practice 
number 2.18.5 (IoDSA 2009:26). This stipulates that the chief executive officer and the 
chief financial officer should serve on the company board of directors. King III (IoDSA 
2009:25) principle 2.16, however, stipulates that the chairman of the board should be an 
independent non-executive director. This is not the case at Cream (Pty) Ltd since the 
family chief executive officer also serves as the chairman of the board. Principle 2.17 
stipulates that the chief executive officer should be appointed by the company board of 
directors. Contradictory evidence was obtained on this matter. One interviewee 
indicated that the family advisory board appointed the chief executive officer. This 
demonstrates that Cream (Pty) Ltd adheres to the spirit of King III (IoDSA 2009) in the 
sense that the power of appointing the chief executive officer is removed from the 
management level because it is done by the family advisory board. A contradictory view 
was expressed by another interviewee, who indicated that the family board gave the 
executive members the choice to appoint the chief executive officer from their own 
ranks. Hence, the current chief executive officer was selected, as he was the 
“businessman” (Interviewee #2) and, therefore, the best fit for the position. No reference 
was made to the fact that he is also a member of the owner family and, therefore, 
nepotism in the appointment of the chief executive officer was not implied by the 
interviewees. 
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The role and the responsibilities of the chief executive officer are defined by the board 
of directors. The chief executive officer is required to drive the organisation forward, in 
line with the approved strategic plan. His performance is measured by the family 
advisory board in comparison with the set objectives of the strategic plan. This adheres 
to principle 2.17.4 of King III (IoDSA 2009:25). 
 
Independence and non-traditional solutions 
The chief financial officer, being independent and initially from a non-agricultural 
background, adds great value to the organisation. One of the reasons given was that he 
approaches issues from a different or non-traditional perspective—“He challenges one 
to think outside the box as he arrived here with no traditional solutions” (Interviewee 
#C4). The chief financial officer’s role includes being responsible for budgeting, 
implementing procedures, and ensuring people adhere to these procedures. As 
explained by Interviewee #C4, “If he implements a system, he wants a person to keep 
to it”. The role also includes the implementation of change. The problem experienced 
with this is that people are not necessarily in favour of change, as is suggested by the 
following statement: “People do not like change, but yes, sometimes if nothing changes, 
everything will remain” (Interviewee #C4). The non-family chief financial officer also 
brings independence to the strategic planning and execution processes 
(Interviewee #C8). 
 
Employee framework: Contribution to organisational value 
The organisation’s governance structures, including the visual depiction of this through 
the use of an organogram, create a framework within which to work effectively. 
According to the interviewees, it is especially valuable for new employees entering the 
organisation because it helps them to identify their reporting lines, as well as the core 
responsibilities of the various positions.  
 
Originally, the organisation did not have a formal organogram. This was implemented as 
part of the governance structure implementation process. As the organisation grew, the 
organogram became increasingly important (Interviewee #C8) because the employees 
needed to know where they fitted into the organisation and its operations (Interviewees 
#C2 and #C3). An additional advantage of the framework is that it saves time for senior 
or executive managers because ground level problems are resolved on the ground level 
(Interviewee #C7). An interviewee explained that the organogram, job descriptions, and 
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minimum job requirements were put in place to ensure the long-term sustainability of 
the business, whether or not the family members form part of the management team 
(Interviewee #C4).  
 
The existence of a framework simplifies business for both non-family employees and 
family employees because they can use it as a tool to manage their careers and any 
interpersonal working relationships. An example was given by one of the family 
interviewees who explained that, when he was initially appointed, his appointment was 
at a very low operational level. As time went by, his father increasingly gave him more 
responsibilities. This was done unofficially because there were no formal governance 
structures in place. In the end, it resulted in him having more responsibilities than his 
non-family manager. This situation was extremely challenging for the family member 
because he had to start instructing his manager, but he was never formally appointed 
on a level above the non-family manager. As quoted, “I became his boss, but I was 
never appointed as his boss.”; “It was difficult for me…as we did not have such a 
structure where you could climb the ladder. You climbed the ladder, but there was no 
ladder.” (Interviewee #C2). Because the structures are now in place, every new 
employee knows where he fits in, as well as the rules that are applicable to that specific 
position. Therefore, it can be deduced that organisational structures assist with 
removing emotions from “family interaction,” “business related interaction,” and “just in 
general” (Interviewees #C1 and #C2), therefore decreasing interpersonal conflict and 
potentially increasing organisational value. 
 
Accountability 
It was indicated by the majority of interviewees that family and non-family members, on 
equivalent responsibility levels within the organisation, are held accountable to the 
same degree. Hence, they are equally accountable based on their relative positions 
within the organisation and not because of their family statuses. The chief executive 
officer is, for example, more accountable than the chief operational officer, or 
alternatively, the chief financial officer is more accountable than the managers reporting 
to him. However, when probed a bit more, it became clear that this was not always the 
case. Family members are given more opportunities or chances to rectify their 
behaviour. “I believe that he will be spoken to twice and not only once, or threefold, and 
not twice” (Interviewee #C2). A family employee will, as far as possible, be performance 
managed and/or re-assigned within the organisation, but will not necessarily be 
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dismissed if he has underperformed. As stated by another interviewee,  
Family and non-family managers should not be governed differently. They should 
not, but the reality is, if a family executive fires a non-performing family member, the 
executive will have a problem (Interviewee #C1).  
 
Nepotism as it relates to recruitment and appointment 
In terms of recruitment and appointment, the interviewees were asked to comment on 
whether or not they believed that there was any favouritism towards family members 
when recruiting and appointing new staff members. The responses to these questions, 
combined with general comments made during the interviews, resulted in the following 
very informative conclusions. 
 
Historically, a number of family members used to work at the organisation because they 
were related to the owner family. Organisational structures were then implemented and 
this resulted in only a few family members remaining in the employment of the 
organisation.  Should any family members be appointed in the future, they will be paid a 
market-related salary, based on the pre-determined grading levels as per the employee 
framework.  
 
In addition, it was mentioned that the intended level of employment is an important 
consideration during the recruitment and appointment process. If the position applied for 
is at a senior or executive level, family members would not be given preference solely 
because they were members of the owning family. However, should the intended 
position be at a lower level within the organisation, family members might be given 
preference above non-family members (Interviewee #C2). This indicates that 
preferential treatment of family members is considered on the employment levels where 
the impact of any potential errors will be either low or immaterial. Thus, senior positions 
will be filled based on the prospective employee’s competency levels and not as a result 
of favouritism. It is important to note that, should the prospective family and non-family 
employees be equally qualified for a vacant position, the family member will receive 
preference.  
 
Two interviewees mentioned the importance of a person’s character. They indicated 
that the organisation places great value on a person’s character and upbringing or 
background. If they know the person, and if they have confidence in that person’s 
character and upbringing, he will have an advantage over unknown candidates 
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(Interviewees #C1 and #C2). Here, the interviewees were referring to both family and 
non-family candidates. When screening prospective employees, the organisation will 
firstly consider the candidate’s character traits and background; secondly, the 
organisation will consider the candidate’s business experience; and thirdly, the 
organisation will consider the candidate’s formal qualifications (Interviewee #C1). This 
supports Eijssen’s (2014:2) view that cultural fit and commitment towards the values, 
standards, and objectives of the family organisation are important factors to consider in 
the appointment of employees. 
 
Therefore, it is quite clear that the new structures that have been put in place are aimed 
at avoiding or limiting any future favouritism in the appointment and recruitment of family 
members. Family members appointed before the implementation of the current 
structures, were appointed as a result of their family ties, irrespective of experience and 
qualifications. In future, family appointments on senior levels will, however, be based on 
competency and capabilities, and not solely on family relationships (Interviewees #C1, 
#C2, and #C7). 
 
The risk of nepotism in performance management 
Formal performance management processes, which are applicable to all levels of 
employees, are in place. The organisation implemented a KPI system to assist the 
organisation in assessing employees’ performances based on facts and not on 
perceptions. This, therefore, removes subjectivity from the performance management 
process. The KPI system was implemented during the years 2010 and 2011.  
 
The executive directors are reviewed based on their performance against the strategic 
plan. Therefore, they are not on the same KPI system as the management levels below 
them. The chief financial officer and the chief operational officer report to the chief 
executive officer. All three executives, as a team, are then accountable to the family 
advisory board.  
 
Family members in management positions occasionally need to monitor the 
performance of other family members which has the potential to lead to family conflict. 
Where it is practical to implement, reporting lines are structured so that family members 
report to non-family managers, instead of to family managers. KPIs are set up front and 
are very specific. This reduces the ambiguity of the personal performance measurement 
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process. This also removes some of the emotions associated with performance 
management. Consequently, the family members’ performances are managed 
professionally as is the case with non-family employees. Performance management is 
based on financial figures and no sentimentality is involved. This process of 
independent management and review is perceived to be effective and value-adding.  
 
Sometimes it is not possible to implement independent reporting lines. Family members 
then need to report to other family members. In theory, this process should still work 
well since KPIs or strategic objectives are predetermined and performance should 
therefore be objectively measured against these. Where family members are capable of 
performing their duties, the non-executive interviewees indicated, with conviction that no 
nepotism exists in terms of the performance management of family members. However, 
when the question referred specifically to certain underperforming family members who 
are currently in the organisation’s employ, the responses were either quite negative or 
the interviewees preferred to refrain from discussing the matter.  
 
In addition to the above, it was mentioned that the performance management process, 
with respect to family members, is, although stringent, to be approached in a different, 
more subtle way. One of the interviewees alluded to the following:  
I think...yes, it is a difficult situation, as yes, blood is thicker than water...we can fight 
with our family today...tomorrow we are family and...yes, it is a difficult situation 
(Interviewee #C6).  
 
When asked whether family and non-family executives undergo performance reviews 
with the same rigour and frequency, an executive made the following comment:  
I think when it comes to family members, it is currently a bit softer. I believe that it 
all depends on your focus. If you want a professional business where family or 
non-family is not important, but the results are, then it has to be the same. In order 
to have a better business, it should be the same (Interviewee #C1). 
 
This comment was partly contradicted by another executive. He did agree with the 
former executive on the point that the family and non-family executives do not undergo 
performance reviews with the same rigour and frequency. However, he felt that this 
distinction was to be expected in a family organisation, and that it is important for the 
sustainability of the family business (Interviewee #C3). His reasoning for this 
observation was that the family executives would still be involved in the organisation in 
the long-term, whereas non-family members might leave the employment of the 
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organisation because they do not have the same long-term commitment to the family 
organisation.  
 
Interestingly, all the non-executive managers (except for one who indicated that he did 
not know) believe that the family and non-family executive directors undergo 
performance reviews with the same amount of rigour and frequency. From this 
observation, and when compared to the evident situation as illustrated by the 
executives, it is deduced that the executive directors are successful in portraying a 
sense of unity, and that they do not engage in special treatment and they do not make a 
distinction between family and non-family in the rest of the organisation.  
 
The family trust factor and internal controls 
Since the extended family members were no longer actively involved in the daily 
operations of the family organisation, management had to start relying and trusting 
outsiders with respect to core financial functions for example, the management of 
debtors and creditors. Management initially saw this as a big disadvantage of the new 
structures. The removal of people they perceived to be competent and trustworthy 
because of their family ties necessitated the implementation of systems, processes, and 
controls. Interviewee #C2 stated, “When they left we had to trust strangers,” and “we 
had to put systems in place and perform re-checks”. 
 
Despite initial misgivings, the development of these systems, processes, and controls 
assisted the business to become more professional, and is in accordance with the 
recommendation made by PwC in its Family Business Survey (PwC 2014b:3). It is 
important that these processes and procedures be implemented since they “form the 
backbone of the business operations and provide it with the context and structure it 
needs to grow and adapt” (PwC 2014b:3). 
 
Policies: Human resources 
One of the motivations given for the implementation of governance structures was that 
they are used as a tool to manage the organisation’s succession process 
(Interviewee #C1). As per Cream (Pty) Ltd’s new human resource and succession 
policies, family members need to be qualified, and they should have the necessary and 
relevant experience in order to be appointed at a senior management or executive level. 
One interviewee specifically stated that he believes that the next generation will consist 
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of professional people who will make a positive contribution to the organisation based 
on their skill set, and not as a result of their family ties. He also believes that the next 
chief executive officer will be an independent non-family member. This confirms Van 
den Heuvel et al.’s (2007:143) view that independent people can be used to assist the 
organisation during its generational succession processes. The interviewee feels that 
the change in the governance approach was necessary and inevitable, especially for 
when the next generation enters the family organisation. This is evident from the 
following quote: “What we have, brought us this far. I do not think it will be enough to 
take us forward” (Interviewee #C1). 
 
Policies: Additional policies and procedures 
As the family organisation grows and expands its business, it will become more 
exposed to industry specific regulations and requirements, as well as general 
regulations and statutory requirements. These requirements are enforced from both a 
regulatory and a client perspective. For instance, premium brand retailers require their 
suppliers to be Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) compliant. The 
requirements for HACCP food safety approval include the development and 
implementation of certain health and safety policies, as well as the presence of a 
HACCP sub-committee (Interviewee #C8). These types of requirements, although not 
required in terms of the Companies Act or King III’s (IoDSA 2009) best practice 
recommendations, compel Cream (Pty) Ltd to implement certain sub-committees, 
policies, and procedures. Therefore, the absence of these policies will negatively affect 
the organisation’s opportunities for expansion, and will indirectly result in a decrease in 
financial value. 
 
Recommended practice number 2.17.3 of King III (IoDSA 2009:25) states that the board 
of directors should approve a delegation of authority framework within which the 
business should operate. A delegation of authority framework is an internal control tool 
that allocates different authority levels to specific positions within the organisation. 
Cream (Pty) Ltd does not have an approved delegation of authority framework or policy. 
 
General 
In addition to the common themes identified and discussed above, some isolated but 
interesting discoveries are highlighted in the remainder of this section.   
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Tenure at the family organisation and the sequence of appointments 
Nepotism, as it relates to recruitment, appointment, and performance management has 
been discussed in detail. An equally noteworthy matter, which has not yet been raised 
in either the within-case analysis or during the literature review discussion, is the 
importance of the sequence of appointments. Stated differently, it is important to 
determine whether the current non-family manager was responsible for the appointment 
of a specific family employee, or whether the specific family employee was employed 
before the non-family manager was appointed at the family organisation.  
 
This concept was illustrated by one of the executive members. In the event that a non-
family manager appoints a family member, it would be clear to the family member that 
he would report to the non-family manager, and that he would be treated similarly to any 
other employee on that level of employment. However, if the particular family member 
was appointed long before the non-family manager started working at the organisation, 
unofficially, the non-family manager would not have the same level of authority as he 
would have had if the non-family manager had made the appointment. Therefore, the 
non-family manager would be more reluctant to manage the family employee with the 
same amount of rigour as he would have managed a non-family employee on the same 
level. This would therefore result in nepotism in terms of performance management. 
Tenure at the family organisation and the sequence of appointments therefore plays 
and important role in these interpersonal dynamics (Interviewee #C2) and could be 
considered in future research.  
 
Management succession planning 
As part of the succession planning, and in line with the shareholders’ transgenerational 
vision, two interesting matters were observed.  
 
The next generation of family children is still very young and, therefore, the possibility 
exists that the current chief executive officer might retire before the next generation is 
able to take over the management of the organisation. Thus, a non-family chief 
executive officer will potentially be appointed as an interim measure (Interviewee #C1). 
 
In order to identify and groom the next generation leaders, the chairman of the board of 
trustees indicated that he would instruct the future, “to-be-appointed”, non-family chief 
executive director, and a suitable external party, to analyse the potential of the family 
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members’ children. This analysis will be done by considering their qualifications, 
experience, interests, and leadership qualities. The purpose of this analysis will be to 
select the family children with the potential to lead the organisation. Once the potential 
future leaders have been identified, these individuals will receive silent seats on the 
board of directors in order to gain experience and an understanding of the 
organisation’s business activities. 
 
Organisational structures as a potential barrier to communication 
A disadvantage of organisational growth, as well as the resulting new structures, is that 
it removes the “familiness” which previously existed between family and non-family 
employees. Interviewee #C4 stated that the organisation “is not as close as it used to 
be”. It is therefore important for the organisational structures to not be so rigid that they 
limit communication and interaction between different departments, and therefore 
restrict horizontal integration and information flow. One of the distinct advantages of a 
family organisation is that, despite formal structures, there are still opportunities for 
interpersonal communication for example, at family social events. This type of 
communication might assist the various departments within a family organisation to 
share relevant information and to not exist in silo. It is important for the individual 
departments to understand the impact of their strategies and actions on the rest of the 
organisation (Interviewee #C8), as non-communication can negatively impact upon the 
financial performance of the organisation, and therefore the value of an organisation. It 
is thus important that family organisations do not lose their competitive advantage 
(effective communication) against non-family organisations as a result of the 
implementation of formal governance structures. 
 
Organisational structures as a tool to delineate family versus business roles 
Initially, during the establishment and early years of a family organisation, it was quite a 
challenge for the family members to distinguish between family and business related 
matters. However, the longer these governance structures are in place, e.g. dividend 
policy, the easier it becomes for the family members to separate their roles as family 
members from their roles as business leaders (Interviewee #C2). 
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SECTION C 
 
4.7 IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTED ORGANISATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURES ON ORGANISATIONAL VALUE 
 
This sub-section is in response to research objective A.4., which is the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to explore the value of governance structures in private 
family organisations. Thus, it is important to understand the impact of implemented 
governance structures on the value of the featured cases, both from a financial and 
non-financial perspective.  
 
The goals of an organisation will influence its financial performance and, ultimately, its 
organisational value. This is even more relevant in the case of family organisations 
since the family influence might impact upon behaviour, which could lead to a more 
socio-emotional orientated organisational strategy. Therefore, a distinguishing 
characteristic of family organisations, when compared to non-family organisations, is 
that the family organisations’ non-financial goals might be prioritised above their 
financial goals (Chrisman & Patel 2012:992).  
 
The theory of a family organisation’s potential orientation towards non-financial goals 
was explored by requesting the chief executive officers of the respective cases to 
indicate the top ten most important indicators of success for their respective family 
organisations. A list of 18 pre-populated indicators of success, based on the literature, 
was presented to the chief executive officers (see Annexure D: Company goals and 
success measures). Additional blank spaces were also supplied in order to allow for the 
chief executive officers to include any supplementary indicators that might be relevant to 
the specific organisation. The list was specifically designed to incorporate both financial 
and non-financial indicators. The indicators were displayed in a random order. 
Therefore, the financial and non-financial indicators were not clustered into distinct 
sections, but rather spread out over the list. This was purposely done in order to identify 
whether the organisational strategy leans more towards financial or to non-financial 
goals.   
To determine, through a multiple-case study analysis, whether or not the 
implementation of governance structures in the selected private family organisations 
added any value to the respective organisations. 
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In addition to determining the respective organisations’ goal orientations, the financial 
orientated indicators, as selected by the chief executive officers, were used to evaluate 
the organisations’ financial performances since 2010. The financial orientated success 
indicators, as selected by the chief executive officers, were compared between the two 
private family organisations. The corresponding success indicators, as selected by both 
chief executive officers, were used to evaluate the organisations’ relative performances. 
From the literature, return on assets (ROA) has been indicated as the most frequently 
used method of measuring performance (Brabec et al. 2013:6; Mazzi 2011:175). 
Notwithstanding this, only one of the featured organisations listed it as one of its short-
term goals. It was also not listed as one of the top ten indicators of success by either of 
the organisations and therefore ROA will not be used as one of the performance 
measurements in this study.   
 
Basis of analysis 
The corresponding financial indicators of success, as indicated by the respective chief 
executive officers, were “increased return on invested capital” (based on carrying 
values) and “growth in net profit (after tax)”. Since, actual performance amounts (incl.  
profit figures) were deemed somewhat sensitive, but percentages (such as returns) 
much less so, all amounts were either indexed or not disclosed as part of the analysis 
below. This was also in-line with the ethical clearance requirements.  
 
The return on invested capital and net profit after tax were indexed, with the 2012 
financial year being the first year of reference. The 2012 financial year served as the 
indexing reference year (2012=1,00) because it served as neutral starting point where 
both organisations were in a profit-making situation (one of the organisations made 
losses in the years prior to 2012). The indexing was further done to improve 
comparability between the different years, the financial indicators, and the two cases 
under review. 
 
These financial figures, in conjunction with the personal views of the executive and 
senior managers, were used to illustrate the perceived value, from a financial 
perspective, of the governance structures in a private family organisation. Love et al. 
(2002:617), as well as Eddleston and Kellermanns (2007:1052), stated that personal 
views on organisational performance highly correlate with independent performance 
information, and that these personal views have the benefit of indirectly controlling 
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industry movements. The individual executive and senior managers’ subjective views, 
on the perceived impact of the implementation of governance structures on the 
performance of the respected organisations, were therefore also explored.  
 
4.7.1 YOGURT (PTY) LTD: IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTED ORGANISATIONAL 
STRUCTURES ON ORGANISATIONAL VALUE 
 
The interview data of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd was coded (refer to Chapter  3.3.3 for more detail) 
and organised according to a priori sub-categories and subsequently identified themes, 
as depicted in Figure 19 below. Where relevant, the interview data was compared to 
supporting documentation, for instance the annual financial statements, in order to 
ensure the credibility and dependability of the findings.  
 
Figure 19: A pathway to the data analysis of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd as it relates to 
research objective A.4. 
 
Sub-category Category 
 
Theme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted extract from Figure 7: Adapted codes-to-theory model 
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This sub-section will discuss the themes identified during this section of the data 
analysis of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd. Before exploring the governance structures’ contributions to 
organisational value, it is important to first understand the organisational goals of 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd (Section  4.7.1.1) as well as Yogurt (Pty) Ltd’s relative financial 
performance for the period under review (Section  4.7.1.2).  
 
4.7.1.1 ORGANISATIONAL GOALS 
 
After considering the suggested list of “indicators of success for the family business” 
(see Annexure D: Company goals and success measures) and ranking the indicators in 
descending order of importance (from priority number one to ten), the chief executive 
officer of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd selected “increased return on invested capital” as his main 
indicator of success in the family organisation. Bearing in mind that family organisations’ 
might prioritise socio-emotional objectives above financial objectives, the main indicator 
of success—as selected—goes against initial expectations. Based on the chief 
executive’s selection, one can deduce that the organisation prioritises financial 
objectives above non-financial objectives. However, further evidence was required 
before reaching a conclusion. The study therefore sought a greater understanding of the 
reasons for selecting this financial objective as the top priority. In addition to this, it was 
also important to consider the other items that were listed by the chief executive officer 
as they could have potential to contribute to gaining a better understanding of the 
success factors that drive this family organisation.  
 
The following indicators were ranked as priority numbers two to five:  
- Growth in net profit,  
- Customer service and satisfaction,  
- Quality products in so far they would affect the reputation of the company, and  
- Increased market share.  
 
The goal orientation of the family organisation as illustrated by the top five indicators of 
success is depicted in Figure 20. 
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(Interviewee #Y1), long-term financial stability (Interviewee #3), job creation—there are 
more than 800 employees (Interviewee #Y5), a sustainable way of doing business 
(Interviewee #Y8), and a reduced impact on the environment (Interviewee #Y11) as 
core performance goals. From the interview data, and in support of the success 
indicators that were listed, it became clear that Yogurt (Pty) Ltd has prioritised financial 
objectives partly because of the fact that a non-performing organisation will not be able 
to sustainably support socio-economic priorities like training, people development, and 
job creation (Interviewees #Y1 and #Y5). A non-performing organisation will also be to 
the detriment of a wider range of stakeholders for instance, to the detriment of suppliers 
and clients (Interviewee #Y3). It is therefore clear that, although Yogurt (Pty) Ltd 
prioritises financial objectives above non-financial objectives, its motive for the focus on 
financial performance is not solely to ensure the enrichment of the shareholders, but 
also to ensure the enrichment of all of their stakeholders. As summarised by one family 
interviewee, “It’s all about building something that you can be proud off” 
(Interviewee #Y5).    
 
When asked whether the financial wealth of the organisation or the financial wealth of 
the family was more important for the family shareholders, the answers mainly 
supported the findings that were discussed above. It was stated that the financial wealth 
of the organisation is more important because the success of the business is 
inextricably linked to the success of the family (Interviewee #Y1, #Y3, #Y4, #Y5, #Y7, 
and #Y11). This opinion was refined by one interviewee who stated that success needs 
to be measured in more than financial wealth.  
Real success lies in the difference that you make, and the difference that your 
business makes in the bigger picture, outside of your business. I believe that is 
ultimately what you will use to measure your success. In order for me to make that 
difference, it is essential for the business to be successful (Interviewee #Y2). 
 
4.7.1.2 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
The relative financial performance of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd was measured by using “net profit 
after tax” and “return on invested capital”, as previously discussed. This was done over 
a six year period, namely the financial year end of each year from 2010 until 2015. The 
analysis used the 2010 financial year as the starting point for various reasons, which 
included the following: Yogurt (Pty) Ltd started implementing its governance structures 
during approximately 2009/2010 (Interviewee #Y9); the financial information for the 
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periods prior to 2010 were, as per the chief financial officer, not suited for analysis 
purposes (Interviewee #Y7); the period 2010 to 2015 provided adequate data to allow 
the exploration of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd’s financial trends; and, since the 2010 financial 
statements were also used as the starting point for the analysis of Cream (Pty) Ltd’s 
financial information, it provided a comparable base for the cross-case analysis. The 
relative performance of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd over this period has been depicted in Figure 21. 
 
As explained earlier, the year 2012 was used as the reference year for the indexing 
process. Note that indexing provides an indicator of e.g., net profit after tax (NPAT) 
levels relative to the reference year (2012=1.00), but cannot be plotted for loss-making 
years (the indexing-scale sub-minimum is zero). The indexed profit-figures are therefore 
only shown for the profit-making years. 
 
Figure 21: Relative performance of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd 
 
*NPAT = Loss 
Source: Own observation (Data as per the Yogurt (Pty) Ltd Annual Financial 
Statements) 
 
Except for the 2014 financial year, the performance of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd, as depicted in 
Figure 21, displays a general positive growth in the relative net profit (after tax) (NPAT), 
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Ltd, a negative movement was identified in the 2014 financial year. This might have 
been partly a result of the fact that the “Dairy industry growth”, as it relates to domestic 
production volumes, had shown a negative rate of 1.04% during the five quarters, which 
ended in December 2014 (Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries 2015:9). 
Overall, inflationary cost pressures might be another reason for the decline in net profit 
(Clover 2014:3). A decrease in performance was also experienced by Cream (Pty) Ltd 
(see Figure 25) and Clover (see Figure 32) during the same period.  
 
It should be noted that the 2015 financial year’s figures of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd were 
adjusted for analysis purposes because the figures as per the annual financial 
statements included a non-recurring event which inflated the profit for the 2015 financial 
year. Therefore, the inflated profit was eliminated and, as can be seen from Figure 22, it 
is still clear that the organisation’s performance increased steadily over the last few 
years.  
 
As part of the above analysis, it was also important to explore whether there was any 
growth in equity value attributed to shareholders. This trend is depicted in Figure 22, but 
the actual rand amounts are not disclosed for confidentiality reasons. 
 
Figure 22: Equity value attributable to shareholders 
 
Source: Own observation (Data as per the Yogurt (Pty) Ltd Annual Financial 
Statements)  
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The equity value attributable to shareholders of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd was negative at the end 
of the 2010 financial year. Negative equity value is the result of the organisation’s 
liability levels exceeding the value of its assets. The risk of negative equity value is that, 
should the assets of the organisation be sold, it would not be sufficient to redeem all the 
company’s liabilities. The family members, being both shareholders and prescribed 
officers of the organisation, might then be liable for any outstanding debt. This might 
also trigger the liability clause as listed under section 77 of the Companies Act. The 
negative equity value decreased steadily over the period under observation and 
became positive during the 2015 financial year. This positive 2015 equity value, as 
depicted above, was obtained by Yogurt (Pty) Ltd even after the removal of some of the 
non-recurring profit that was made during the 2015 financial year. This positive trend 
suggests that the equity value attributable to the shareholders of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd 
progressed significantly since the 2010 financial year.  
 
The positive trend was confirmed by some of the interviewees, who, when asked 
whether the current organisational structure had any effect on the organisation’s 
financial performance, stated that, 
The organisation transformed, over the last 5 years, from a huge loss-making 
business to a business with the potential of profit-making. This was done through 
continuous development and continuous improvement (Interviewee #5), and  
There has been a total turnaround in the company's financial position over the last 
few years (Interviewee #2). 
 
4.7.1.3 THE VALUE OF IMPLEMENTED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
 
Although it is not possible to assert any direct relationship between the implemented 
governance structures and the increase in financial performance, it is clear that the 
organisational value improved over this period and that the implementation of 
governance structures did not result in a decline in organisational performance and 
value. One of the interviewees explained the following: 
You cannot measure the effectiveness of governance structures in [sic] the 
positive results that come from it. The value of having structures in place is that 
the likelihood [sic] of breaking down value…becomes less (Interviewee #Y9). 
 
The executive and senior managers’ subjective views on the perceived impact of the 
implementation of governance structures on the financial performance of 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd are discussed below. 
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Socio-emotional wealth: Reputation  
All the interviewees, with the exception of one, commented favourably on the perceived 
contribution of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd’s governance structures as they relate to its financial 
performance. The opposing interviewee (Interviewee #Y3) stated that there was no 
direct financial benefit. However, he did continue to say that these structures need to be 
in place, albeit a bit less formal. According to him, the structures create a good 
impression on workers, clients, and suppliers. Therefore, this can be classified as 
something that contributes to the organisation’s socio-emotional wealth, and more 
specifically, to Yogurt (Pty) Ltd’s reputation, which might then also indirectly contribute 
to its financial performance. As previously discussed, these positive impressions are 
essential to sustain various contracts with local retailers and international licence 
holders. Should these contracts or licenses be retracted, it could have a direct negative 
impact on the organisation’s financial performance. 
 
Dynamic process which ultimately leads to behavioural change 
The implementation of governance structures is a dynamic and lengthy process 
(Interviewee #Y5). As alluded to by a non-family executive member, the implementation 
of governance structures cannot be achieved overnight, but needs to be done 
systematically (Interviewee #Y7). When the business started, nobody really understood 
the difference between being a shareholder and a director, as they saw it as "our 
business" (Interviewee #Y2). It is therefore important to systematically implement these 
structures and to ensure the “buy-in” of all relevant stakeholders before implementation 
(Interviewee #Y7). The dynamic and lengthy process, as well as the contribution of 
these structures to the improved behaviour within Yogurt (Pty) Ltd, was described by 
two executives: 
When I look at the company's level of maturity compared to ten, even five years 
ago, it is evident that these governance structures are effective. There have been 
radical changes in the way things are done, even on family level. People are 
starting to understand that you need structures, systems, procedures and policies 
in place to manage the organisation as it prevents politics to[sic] take over; 
(Interviewee #Y8) and 
I believe the decision-making process is effective. It's not perfect yet, but it has 
changed dramatically over the past few years (Interviewee #Y7). 
 
As described by one interviewee, the effectiveness of the governance structures is 
currently “mixed” because the same people are shareholders, trustees, directors, and 
senior management (Interviewee #Y2). Role confusion, as described by Hall (2012:32), 
seems to be a reality within Yogurt (Pty) Ltd. The interviewee’s explanation of the mixed 
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effectiveness is quite illuminating. He feels that the mixed effectiveness in these 
first/second generations is mainly because of role confusion. He theorises that the 
longer these governance structures are implemented, the more effective they will 
become. It is anticipated that during the reign of the next generation these structures will 
be more effective because family members will probably join the organisation on a 
senior management level, and not as directors, and their roles will therefore be more 
established (Interviewee #Y2). 
 
Stability, order, and information 
An organisation needs to ensure balance between people and systems 
(Interviewee #Y1). According to Interviewee #Y1, it is important to spend time with 
employees on their respective levels, in order to gauge their efficiency and 
effectiveness, instead of simply relying on reports. This view was challenged by an 
interviewee who highly values the contribution of the governance structures and related 
information technology systems. This interviewee stated that the implemented 
governance structures “set the table [sic] for the future”, since it brings stability, order, 
and information (Interviewee #Y2).  
 
Interviewee #Y2 felt that, in addition to the governance structures as defined and 
discussed during the literature review of this study, information technology is also a very 
important part of any organisation’s governance structure. According to him, information 
technology provides information in a very structured manner. Notwithstanding this 
positive contribution, he did caution as to the cost implications of these information 
systems because the full benefit is only visible over time. He stated, “It doesn't come 
quick [sic], it doesn't come cheap [sic]...and it takes a long time to reward” 
(Interviewee #Y2).  
 
Associated cost 
The two interviewees (Interviewees #Y1 and #Y3) who seemed a bit more sceptical as 
to the contribution of governance structures mainly motivated their scepticism by 
alluding to the fact that the implementation of these structures has certain cost 
implications, of which the financial benefits are not immediately recognised 
(Interviewees #Y1 and #Y3). Although the direct financial benefit of the governance 
structures is not immediately recognised, family organisations have a long-term vision of 
transgenerational wealth (Marchisio et al. 2013:50) and this could potentially motivate 
the implementation of these structures. Therefore, they do not necessarily implement 
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them for the short-term financial benefit, but rather to facilitate the sustainability of the 
relevant family organisation for generations to come.  
 
Decision-making and strategy 
Governance structures in Yogurt (Pty) Ltd add value to the organisation as they give 
structure to decision-making which results in more responsible and less risky decisions 
being taken (Interviewee #Y2). A non-family interviewee commented on the fact that the 
structures which were put in place, added increasing value, because they supported a 
decrease in the negative risks of a family business. This, according to him, is important 
since the biggest risk for the organisation is to take a high impact incorrect decision 
(Interviewee #Y9).  
 
Another non-family interviewee (Interviewee #Y7) supported this view by stating that he 
believes that the implemented structures improve financial performance. He gave an 
example of a situation where an important strategic or business decision had to be 
made and the advice of the most recently joined member of the board, a non-executive 
independent director, was followed in the end.  
 
The view of Interviewee #Y7 was challenged by another non-family interviewee who 
made the comment that the non-executive directors do not seem to have sufficient 
influence on decision-making. He stated, “There isn't, in my view, in the non-executive 
directorship, enough power to override the critical mass of the executive directors, 
which is 80% family” (Interviewee #Y6). It can be deduced from this that the 
implementation of governance structures is a dynamic process, of which the effect is 
sometimes directly visible, as can be seen by the above example on decision-making. 
Sometimes, it takes a bit longer to yield the required results, e.g. family executives 
embracing the experience, knowledge, and potential contribution of the non-executive 
independent directors. 
 
Governance structures also assist with the positioning of the company and the laying of 
the foundations on which to build the organisation for the future (Interviewee #Y2). One 
of the non-family interviewees (Interviewee #Y8) expressed his view on the contribution 
of governance structures by saying that he believes that the structures and committees 
that were put in place helped the organisational strategies come into play. It also took 
the individual out of the process. According to him, an individual should be in the 
process, but he should not be the process. He stated that the structures have, without a 
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doubt, put the company on the right financial path (Interviewee #Y8).  
 
4.7.2 CREAM (PTY) LTD: IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTED ORGANISATIONAL 
STRUCTURES ON ORGANISATIONAL VALUE 
 
The interview data of Cream (Pty) Ltd was coded (refer to Chapter  3.3.3 for more detail) 
and organised according to a priori sub-categories and subsequently identified themes, 
as depicted in Figure 23 below. The interview data was, where relevant, compared to 
the supporting documentation, for instance the annual financial statements, in order to 
ensure the credibility and dependability of the findings. 
  
Figure 23: A pathway to the data analysis of Cream (Pty) Ltd as it relates to 
research objective A.4. 
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This sub-section will discuss the themes identified during this section of the data 
analysis of Cream (Pty) Ltd. Before exploring the governance structures’ contributions 
to organisational value (Section  4.7.2.3), it is important to first understand the 
organisational goals (Section  4.7.2.1), as well as Cream (Pty) Ltd’s relative financial 
performance for the period under review (Section  4.7.2.2). 
 
4.7.2.1 ORGANISATIONAL GOALS 
 
After considering the suggested list of “indicators of success for the family business” 
(see Annexure D: Company goals and success measures) and ranking the indicators in 
descending order of importance (priority number one to ten), the chief executive officer 
of Cream (Pty) Ltd indicated “sustainability of income for current shareholders and 
future generations,” or alternatively stated, “sustaining a family business across 
generations,” as the most important indicator of success. This again confirms that 
Cream (Pty) Ltd meets part three of the definition of a family organisation (see 
Section  4.4.2), namely the current owner’s multi-generational vision.  
 
The selection of “sustainability of income for current shareholders and future 
generations” also indicates that transgenerational wealth, as discussed in the literature 
review under “Organisational value from a non-financial viewpoint” (see Chapter  2.4.2), 
is a major priority for Cream (Pty) Ltd. This confirms that socio-emotional wealth is an 
important factor to consider when determining the value of this family organisation.  
 
Important to note in the analysis of socio-emotional wealth is that the non-financial 
indicator, “keeping control of the business,” was not even selected as one of the top ten 
indicators of success by the chief executive officer of Cream (Pty) Ltd. This is an 
important point to reflect on since some researchers (Abdellatif et al. 2010:109) 
consider the preservation of family control to be one of the main priorities of a family 
organisation. When one considers that fact that “sustainability of income for current 
shareholders and future generations” was selected as the number one priority, and the 
fact that “keeping control of the business” was not even selected, one might conclude 
that, although the financial wellbeing of the family is a priority for the chief executive 
officer, Cream (Pty) Ltd might not necessarily be the only investment vehicle that is 
used by the family to achieve this goal. This conclusion is supported by a family 
member, who mentioned that,  
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Initial observations suggest that Cream (Pty) Ltd prioritises financial objectives over 
non-financial goals (see Figure 24). This therefore challenges the findings of some 
researchers who imply that non-financial goals supersede financial goals in a family 
organisation (Barnett et al. 2012:268). A potential reason for the financial orientation 
that is depicted in Figure 24 might be, as deduced from the interviews, that the financial 
welfare of the organisation is essential to the financial well-being of the family, as well 
as to the financial well-being of the non-family stakeholders, e.g. the direct community. 
This therefore explains the organisation’s considerable focus on financial objectives. As 
explained by Interviewees #C2 and #C8,  
If the company is not performing well, it will not be well with the family; and the 
financial wellbeing of the family will not materialise if the company doesn't meet its 
performance goals. 
 
This is supported by the chief executive officer’s number one success indicator which is 
“ensuring sustainability of income for current and future generations”. This was also 
confirmed by an interviewee who stated that the family relies on the performance of the 
company for their own well-being (Interviewee #C2). 
 
It was also stated that the organisation plays an important role in job creation in the 
local community which, therefore, indirectly improves the socio-economic circumstances 
of the community. Therefore, the organisation needs to be financially successful in order 
to fulfil its role in the community (Interviewee #C5). As explained by Interviewee #C5, “If 
the company does not exist, they will not have…it is their bread and butter”.  
 
4.7.2.2 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
The relative financial performance of Cream (Pty) Ltd was measured by using “Net profit 
after tax” and “Return on invested capital” (based on carrying values). In this case these 
two financial measures were selected for the following reasons: firstly, these were 
included in the list of top five priorities for Cream (Pty) Ltd; secondly, other mentioned 
financial measures are more subjective and therefore difficult to quantify objectively; 
and finally, to facilitate comparison with the other entity. This was done over a seven 
year period from the financial years ending 2010 until 2016. The analysis used the 2010 
financial year as a starting point for various reasons which included firstly, the fact that 
the new governance structures were implemented during 2010/2011; secondly, as per 
the chief financial officer, it was the first year that the organisation existed as a private 
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company (in its current form); thirdly, the period 2010 to 2016 provides adequate data to 
allow the exploration of Cream (Pty) Ltd’s financial trends; and lastly, the 2010 financial 
statements were also used as a starting point for the analysis of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd’s 
financial information.  
 
Figure 25 indicates the relative performance of Cream (Pty) Ltd which was measured by 
using “Net profit after tax” and “Return on invested capital”.  
 
Figure 25: Relative performance of Cream (Pty) Ltd 
 
Source: Own observation (Data as per Cream (Pty) Ltd Annual Financial Statements) 
 
The net profit (after tax) was indexed and the 2012 financial year was used as the first 
year of reference. Yogurt (Pty) Ltd, the other organisation, was in a loss-making position 
before the 2012 financial year; therefore, for comparison it made more sense to use the 
2012 financial year as the reference year for Cream (Pty) Ltd as well.  
 
Figure 25 displays a fluctuating, but largely correlating, trend in both net profit after tax 
(NPAT) and return on invested capital (ROICcv). The profit figures and returns however 
remained positive over the analysis-window, but displayed two significant dips, one in 
2011 and one in 2014. There was growth in net profit after tax in the years 2012, 2013, 
2015 and 2016. The 2011 and 2014 years included dividend payments to shareholders 
which were not declared during the other financial years under review. (Dividend 
payments would not directly affect net profit after tax, as this figure excludes the impact 
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of any dividends declared, but may impact the returns on invested capital to some 
extent, based on a possible impact on the formula's denominator.) It is also important to 
note that the steep increase in net profit after tax, and return on invested capital during 
the 2013 financial year, was partly due to an above average positive fair value 
adjustment. If the fair value adjustment for this particular year were to be averaged, the 
trend would still be positive and, therefore, it would not have a material impact on this 
study’s findings. A decrease in the 2014 net profit has been identified. This is 
comparable to the decrease in the 2014 performance of both Yogurt (Pty) Ltd (see 
Figure 21) and Clover (see Figure 32). As discussed under Yogurt (Pty) Ltd, the 
reasons for this decrease in performance might be the negative growth rate of 1.04% in 
domestic production volumes, which was experienced during the five quarters ending 
December 2014 (Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries 2015:9), as well as 
overall inflationary cost pressures (Clover 2014:3). 
 
As part of the above analysis, it was also important to explore whether there was any 
growth in equity value attributed to the shareholders of Cream (Pty) Ltd. This movement 
in equity value is depicted in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26: Equity value attributable to shareholders 
 
Source: Own observation (data as per Cream (Pty) Ltd Annual Financial Statements) 
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From the above graph it is clear that the equity value attributable to shareholders had 
increased consistently during the period under review. The trend is depicted, but the 
actual rand amounts have not been disclosed for confidentiality reasons. 
 
The chief financial officer indicated that the implementation of the organisational 
structures definitely had a positive effect on the financial performance of 
Cream (Pty) Ltd. He supported this statement with an indication of the considerable 
growth in turnover experienced by Cream (Pty) Ltd since the implementation of the new 
organisational structures. This view was supported by other interviewees who stated, “If 
I look at the company growth, it had to be positive” (Interviewee #C5), “It is not a 
coincidence” (Interviewee #C5), and “Definitely a positive effect. I see the numbers” 
(Interviewee #C7). This information was verified by assessing the revenue figures as 
disclosed in the audited annual financial statements. 
 
The revenue figures were indexed with 2012 being used as the year of reference (as 
explained earlier) and depicted in Figure 27. The indexing was done in order to show 
the relative revenue growth and to avoid disclosing the actual revenue rand values (for 
confidentiality reasons).  
 
Figure 27: Growth in revenue 
 
Source: Own observation (Data as per Cream (Pty) Ltd Annual Financial Statements) 
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The professionalisation of the organisation, through the implementation of governance 
structures, as well as a renewed focus on sales, contributed to a material increase in 
turnover (Interviewee #C3). The growth in revenue, as disclosed in the annual financial 
statements and depicted in Figure 27, supports the view of the interviewees who 
motivated the organisational structures’ positive contributions towards the increase in 
revenue and organisational value from a financial perspective. 
 
4.7.2.3 THE VALUE OF IMPLEMENTED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
 
From the above figures (Figure 25, Figure 26, and Figure 27), and from the subsequent 
discussions, it can be derived that, holistically, the implementation of governance 
structures did not negatively affect the value of Cream (Pty) Ltd.  
 
The purpose of this study is not to prove a direct relationship between the 
implementation of governance structures and financial performance or equity value. The 
study recognises that many internal and external factors could influence the financial 
performance and the value of a family organisation. However, the above financial 
performance discussion did set out to achieve an illustration that Cream (Pty) Ltd did 
experience growth in organisational value since the implementation of their governance 
structures.  
 
The executive and senior managers’ subjective views on the perceived impact of the 
implementation of governance structures on the financial performance of 
Cream (Pty) Ltd were explored; the findings are revealed below. 
 
Associated cost 
With the exception of one interviewee who started working at the organisation only after 
the implementation of the new structures, all the interviewees indicated that the 
implementation of the current organisational structure had a positive impact on the 
financial performance of the organisation. Notwithstanding this, it was mentioned by one 
interviewee that the initial financial impact was negative because the implementation of 
the structures was quite costly (Interviewee #C2). However, he continued to say that, 
subsequent to the initial implementation costs, it had a positive impact because 
everybody now knows what their respective roles and responsibilities are, and where 
they fit into the business.  
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Discipline and measurement 
A second interviewee (Interviewee #C6) posited that the current structures had 
definitely contributed positively because the organisation now has predetermined goals, 
direction, and structure. He feels that it is important to have discipline with respect to the 
way things are done because discipline prevents chaos and confusion. He stated that, 
following the implementation of the new structures, discipline and measurement had 
been brought in. When he started his career at the organisation, nothing was measured. 
He motivated the need for measurement by stating, “If you do not measure, I am telling 
you today, then we can rather leave it, since we will not be able to manage” 
(Interviewee #C6). 
 
Strategic direction 
Another interviewee focused on the positive contribution of the external advisors of both 
the family advisory board and the board of directors. He reiterated that these advisors 
possess industry knowledge and experience which they apply at Cream (Pty) Ltd in an 
advisory capacity. The independent advisors have a long-term view, which, in 
conjunction with their industry knowledge and experience, assist the organisation in 
defining its long-term strategy. For instance, they will advise, “Do not invest so much in 
your milk parlour, since we foresee that the milk prices in the country will probably 
decrease. You're going to be able to buy milk cheaper from other guys, than to feed 
your own cattle” (Interviewee #C4) and, “We predict packaging to move in a certain 
direction, so we think that you should start investing in a new type of packaging 
machinery. Do not buy new tractors, rather invest in a new machine, and these are the 
reasons for it…” (Interviewee #C4). This long-term orientation and industry view is 
perceived to contribute positively to the organisational value of Cream (Pty) Ltd.  
 
Socio-emotional wealth 
From the literature review (see Chapter  2.4.2) it was concluded that the following factors 
contribute to organisational value from a non-financial or socio-emotional viewpoint: 
family control, transgenerational wealth, social identity, and organisational reputation. 
Notwithstanding this, the chief executive officer did not rate “keeping control of the 
business” as one of the indicators of success for Cream (Pty) Ltd. However, information 
that was obtained during the interview process implied that family control might be a 
fundamental socio-emotional goal, albeit subconsciously, for the owner family.  
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One of the executive members stated that the power of control lies with the board of 
directors as a collective and not with the executive management. He continued to say 
that, should the chief executive officer be a non-family member and should the 
chairman of the board of directors be a family member—with the majority of members 
on the board also being family members—the family could still convince the board to 
dismiss the chief executive officer. It is therefore clear that the interviewee was not 
concerned with losing family control (a very important socio-emotional value) because 
of the potential appointment of a non-family chief executive officer.  
 
When considering the current organisational structure, and the potential impact of the 
chief executive officer’s roles as both chairman of the board of directors and chairman 
of the board of trustees (i.e. shareholding), it is clear that the family has family control 
over the organisation. It can also be deduced that the family, although it was not 
specifically stated, intuitively sees family control as one of its socio-emotional goals. 
This confirms Cennamo et al.’s (2013:1343) view that family organisations strategically 
appoint family chief executive officers to preserve and enhance socio-emotional wealth. 
Simultaneously, it also challenges Cennamo et al.’s (2013:1343) view by showing that 
there are alternative ways—i.e. not solely through the use of a family chief executive 
officer—in  which a family can keep control of the family organisation. Thus, the position 
of chairman of the board might be a strategic position in the quest for family contol. This 
could be considered in further research. 
 
Family employees 
The new structures that were implemented by Cream (Pty) Ltd meant that the spouses 
of the current family employees could no longer be employed by the organisation. Both 
family and non-family managers experienced this change positively. The presence of 
spouses in the organisation created conflict. Company vehicles would, for instance, be 
needed for business purposes, but instead they would be used by the spouses for 
personal reasons (Interviewee #C4). Spouses would be allowed to run personal errands 
during working hours but this was not allowed for non-family personnel 
(Interviewee #C9). It was noted by the interviewees that since the new structures were 
implemented, these types of frustrations were no longer experienced (Interviewee #4). 
 
The fact that the family spouses no longer work in the organisation, and the 
implementation of the new governance structures (inter alia, the advisory board, the 
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company board of directors, and the organogram), seems to have had a positive 
contribution to the well-being of both the organisation and to the family life. The reasons 
given include the facts that there is less emotional decision-making in the organisation 
and there is less office politics in the home (Interviewees #C2 and #C4). The structures 
eliminate the emotional component with respect to the interactions within the family 
sphere, the interactions within the business sphere, as well as the family versus 
business interactions (Interviewee #C1). This again leads to easier and less complex 
decision-making processes, it creates boundaries, and it ensures discipline in actions 
(Interviewee #C4). The structures clarify the role allocations within the organisation for 
example, the board of directors is responsible for strategic direction, and management 
is responsible for the daily execution of the strategic direction (Interviewee #C4). As 
stated by one interviewee, “There is discipline in this whole thing, it’s not just a number 
of things thrown into a hat” (Interviewee #C4). 
 
Potential threats to organisational value 
Currently, the family’s money is being used to fund the activities of the organisation 
because, as it was stated, “It is the family’s money” (Interviewee #C5). One interviewee 
postulated that the family would continue to be the controlling shareholder up to the 
point where the organisational growth is restricted by insufficient financial capital. At that 
point, the organisation would require external capital investment to support further 
growth (Interviewee #C7). External investors, through equity holding, can likely lead to a 
loss of family control. According to Vancauteren and Vandemaele (2015:168), giving up 
family control is a critical socio-emotional loss which, from a family business 
perspective, could potentially negatively affect the organisational value. 
 
Supporting the potential need for external capital, another interviewee noted that the 
current capital expansion projects might require some external funding in the future. 
This, according to him would not have a positive effect on the organisation. He stated, 
“It will, according to me, derail the apple cart” (Interviewee #C5). The reason given for 
this is that any external, non-family shareholder would require a return on his 
investment. To achieve this over the short-term might require measures that are not 
closely aligned with family values. “That shareholder requires his money back. He 
comes with different ideas and will not uphold the family values” (Interviewee #C5).  
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4.8 SUMMARY OF STRUCTURES 
 
Taking into account the vast level of information already discussed, it is important to 
visually represent a summary of the organisational structures of the featured cases. 
 
4.8.1 YOGURT (PTY) LTD: SUMMARY 
 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd is an organisation that conforms to the definition of a family 
organisation. Its structures are depicted in Figure 28. These include both family 
governance structures and organisational governance structures. The main features of 
the family governance structures are the establishment of trusts, and the establishment 
of a board of trustees that will be responsible for the effective management of these 
trusts. The organisational governance structures include the holding company’s board 
of directors and the company’s board of directors and non-executive management 
structures.   
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Figure 28: Yogurt (Pty) Ltd – Governance structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: 
 Legal entity 
 Governance structure 
 Governance structure composition 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the fieldwork) 
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Based on the above schematic presentation, the information obtained during the 
interview process, and the additional supporting documentation, it can be stated that the 
case under review has a well-balanced governance structure. Traditionally, the 
organisation could have been classified as an owner-managed organisation because of 
the majority of family members on the executive management team. However, the 
organisation has enough essential professional elements for example, non-executive 
directors, board sub-committees, an independent chief financial officer, an independent 
risk manager and an independent human resources manager, a non-family chief 
operating officer and formal policies, in order to classify it as a very effective hybrid 
governance system.   
 
4.8.2 CREAM (PTY) LTD: SUMMARY 
 
Cream (Pty) Ltd is an organisation that conforms to the definition of a family 
organisation. The organisation also has both family governance structures and 
organisational governance structures. The family governance structures include inter 
alia, a board of trustees, a dividend policy, and a shareholders agreement. The 
organisational governance structures, as defined in this study and as depicted in Figure 
29, are comprised of supervisory governance structures (i.e. the family advisory board 
and the company board of directors), as well as managerial governance structures (i.e. 
executive and senior management, and relevant policies and procedures). Both the 
family advisory board and the company board of directors consist of family members 
and independent advisors. With specific reference to the presence of family members 
on these boards, the family advisory board is comprised of executive and non-executive 
family members, whereas the company board of directors does not have any non-
executive family members.  
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Figure 29: Cream (Pty) Ltd – Governance structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend:  
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Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the fieldwork) 
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The organisational structures in place are perceived, by senior and executive 
management, to support value-creation in the organisation. The involvement of non-
family advisors, as well as the involvement of non-family executive members in these 
governance structures contributes towards independence, industry knowledge and 
experience, improved strategic planning, and a long-term vision. Their presence, as well 
as the fact that the family in-laws are no longer operationally involved in the 
organisation, decreases the amount of family conflict both at home and at the office. 
The executive family members’ integration within these governance structures is also 
very important because they are passionate about the organisation and they are 
motivated to ensure its success. This might result from their stewardship mentality, 
family values and character, as well as their vested interest in the financial success of 
the organisation. These family executives also act as intermediaries between the 
organisation and non-executive family shareholders. 
 
 
SECTION D 
 
4.9 A CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS: YOGURT (PTY) LTD AND CREAM (PTY) LTD 
 
A multiple case study was performed in order to gain insight into the similarities and 
differences between the two featured cases because, as suggested by De Massis and 
Kotlar (2014:18), this provides a “stronger base for theory building or explanation”. 
Before performing a cross-case analysis, it is important to understand the context within 
which these cases are situated, as stressed by Baxter & Jack (2008:556).  
 
Both Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd are family organisations, as defined in this 
study. Yogurt (Pty) Ltd is, in terms of turnover and based on the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) cut-off points as adjusted by Statistics South Africa for Quarterly 
Financial Statistics  purposes (Statistics South Africa 2015:30), classified as a large size 
entity; and Cream (Pty) Ltd is classified as a medium size entity. These two 
organisations are also situated in different provinces within South Africa. Yogurt (Pty) 
Ltd is in a more traditional milk region, and Cream (Pty) Ltd in a less traditional milk 
region. Although the organisations differ in size and location, they are comparable 
entities because they are both producers and distributors of inter alia, fresh milk, 
flavoured milk, yogurt, cream, and fruit juice. Thus, they are active in the same industry. 
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They supply dairy products to premium brand and independent retailers; they are both 
seen as leaders in the dairy manufacturing industry; the generations in control, with 
regard to the respective organisations’ shareholding and management, are comparable; 
and they implemented their governance structures during approximately the same time 
periods.  
 
Although a vast set of information and interesting findings have been identified and 
discussed in this chapter, it is important not to be distracted from the research 
objectives described in Chapter  1.4. De Massis and Kotlar (2014:24) warn case study 
researchers not to fall into this “typical pitfall” in the presentation of results. The cross-
case analysis will therefore focus on how the organisations are currently structured, 
why they are structured as such, and whether the current governance structures of 
these organisations add value to the organisations. Corresponding information and any 
discrepancies across these cases have been compared with each other in order to 
understand whether the findings are replicated in both cases, or whether they are 
isolated.  
 
4.9.1 THE “HOW” AND “WHY” OF THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
The current governance structures of both cases are, for ease of comparison, 
summarised in tabular form and can be seen in Table 5.  
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Table 5: A cross-case analysis of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd 
 Examples of applicable: 
 Theory / Legal requirements / 
Best practice 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd Cream (Pty) Ltd 
1. Organizational size - DTI cut-off points 
(Statistics SA 2015:30) 
- Large entity - Medium entity 
2. Ownership - De Massis, Huges, Kotlar, 
Scholes & Wright (2016:10)  
 
- Ownership in trust 
- Family and non-family 
shareholding 
- Ownership in trust 
- Only family shareholding 
3. Supervisory structures 
3.1  Type of structure 
 
 
 
- Companies Act, No 71 of 
2008 
 
- Professional board of 
directors (Holding) 
- Operational board of 
directors (Company) 
 
- Family advisory board 
 
- Company board of directors 
 
3.2  Members 
 
 
- King III 
- De Massis, Huges, Kotlar, 
Scholes & Wright (2016:9) 
 
 
- Professional board: 
 30% Non-family, non-
executive 
 50% Family executive 
 20% Non-family executive 
 
 
 
- Family advisory board: 
 25% Non-family, non-
executive 
 25% Family executive 
 12.5% Non-family 
executive 
 37.5% Family, non-
executive 
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 Examples of applicable: 
Theory / Legal requirements / 
Best practice 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd Cream (Pty) Ltd 
3. Supervisory structures 
(continued) 
3.2 Members (continued) 
 
  
 
- Operational board: 
 60% Family executive 
 40% Non-family executive 
 
 
- Company board: 
 50% Family executive 
 25% Non-family executive 
 25% Non-family, non-
executive 
4. Managerial structures 
4.1 CEO 
 
- King III 
 
- Family CEO 
 
- Family CEO 
4.2 CFO - King III  - Non-family CFO - Non-family CFO 
4.3 Other senior       
management 
 - Family and non-family 
managers 
- Family and non-family 
managers 
4.4 Policies - King III 
 
- Many policies, including 
delegation of authority, 
finance, HR, IT, logistics, 
procurement, risk 
management, sales, and 
marketing 
- Not that focused on 
policies; mainly HR policies 
in place. 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the study) 
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With reference to the governance structures, as per Table 5, the following discussion 
will expand on how and why these structures were put in place across both private 
family organisations.  
 
Ownership 
Both organisations have opted for the establishment of trusts as ownership vehicles. 
This is done for various reasons which include estate planning and the ease of 
management with regard to future generations and their involvement in the decision-
making processes of these organisations. The establishment of these trusts supports 
De Massis et al.’s (2016:10) view that the establishment of a trust is an important aspect 
of governance. It is Interesting to note that Yogurt (Pty) Ltd has a non-family 
shareholder, and Cream (Pty) Ltd is one hundred percent family-owned. However, both 
of these organisations are under the ownership control of the respective families as the 
families have, by far, the majority of the shareholding. 
 
Supervisory structures 
From an initial glance, it might seem as if Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd have 
totally different supervisory governance structures. The Yogurt Group has two boards, 
namely the board of directors of the holding company which, for ease of reference, will 
be referred to as the professional board, and the board of directors of the subsidiary 
company, Yogurt (Pty) Ltd, which will be referred to as the operational board. Cream 
(Pty) Ltd has a family advisory board and a company board of directors.  
 
It is important to understand the composition and the purpose of these structures in 
order to reach any meaningful conclusions. When considering the composite effect of 
the two boards at each respective organisation, they have, albeit in different 
proportions, a membership composition which includes family executives, non-family 
executives, and non-executive, non-family members. One variation is the presence of 
non-executive family members on Cream (Pty) Ltd’s family advisory board, which is not 
the case within Yogurt (Pty) Ltd’s supervisory governance structures. Non-executive 
family members play no part in the official governance structures of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd.  
 
The main difference between these two organisations’ supervisory governance 
structures is more from a regulatory point of view than from a practical one. The 
executive and independent directors of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Yogurt Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
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are formally registered directors at the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission. Contrary to this, the family advisory board of Cream (Pty) Ltd is not a 
formal board of directors and therefore none of the family advisory board’s “directors” 
are registered at the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission. In terms of the 
company’s board of directors, only the executive directors (both family and non-family) 
are formally registered at the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission. The 
non-family, non-executives of Cream (Pty) Ltd are therefore, as described by the 
interviewees, not formal directors and are therefore referred to as “independent 
advisors”. The purpose of this discussion is not to explore the difference in 
accountability in terms of statutory regulations, but it is, therefore, simply noted that 
there may or may not be a difference in legal interpretation as to the accountability of 
the registered versus non-registered members of the board. The Companies Act refers, 
in section 76, to the roles and responsibilities of prescribed officers, and it can therefore 
be debated whether the informal “directors” or advisors fall within the ambit of this 
section. Further studies could test this as part of a cross-discipline research project.  
 
Practically, the roles fulfilled and the contributions made by these independent directors, 
or advisors, are reasonably aligned between the two private family organisations. The 
contributions of these independent board members, as established during the interview 
process, are depicted in Figure 30 below.  
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Figure 30: The role of independent directors or advisors: a cross-case analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the study) 
 
From the above figure, it is clear that the main role of independent external 
directors/advisors, in both of these organisations, is to improve the quality of strategic 
planning and execution. Their contribution to this process is done through making use of 
critical independent thinking, making use of their industry knowledge, as well as making 
use of their experience outside of the respective companies. Both organisations made 
the comment that they greatly value the contribution of these independent directors or 
advisors.   
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS / ADVISORS 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd 
 
Cream (Pty) Ltd 
 
 Strategy  
(in common) 
- They are not able to 
officially change the 
strategic direction of the 
company 
- Their critical thinking and 
questioning adds value 
to strategy, thus 
contributes to the 
general direction, 
objectives, & long-term 
strategy of the company 
- They ask “out-of-the-
box” questions; they 
therefore challenge 
executives to think 
“outside the box” 
 
Independence 
 
- They assist in keeping 
matters as objective as 
possible 
- They play a “balancing” 
role—not mediation—
but  provide a reference 
point for family 
executives to work from 
 
 
Decision-making 
- They bring discipline 
into decision-making 
- They try to ensure that 
decisions are made in 
the best interest of the 
company instead of the 
family 
Independence 
 
- They independently 
assess family executive 
members’ performances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accountability 
- They help family 
executives to report to 
themselves, thus they 
reduce role confusion 
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In addition to the above, the interviewees of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd felt that the independent 
directors contributed objectivity and balance to the family organisation. They also bring 
discipline to the decision-making processes within the organisation. Their role, as 
independent individuals, is therefore to ensure that decisions are made in the best 
interest of the company as a separate legal entity. 
 
Although not specifically stated by any interviewees of Cream (Pty) Ltd, it can logically 
be assumed that the roles as identified by the interviewees of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd might 
also be relevant to Cream (Pty) Ltd. In addition to these roles, the independent advisors 
on the family advisory board of Cream (Pty) Ltd assist the board members, as part of 
the strategic planning process, to set individual goals. Therefore, they are also 
responsible to evaluate the family executives’ performances against the set objectives 
on an annual basis. The performance assessment is done on behalf of the rest of the 
family shareholders. This is quite a unique function that is not implemented at 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd. 
 
The cross-case analysis on the role of independent directors or advisors, as part of the 
supervisory governance structures, supports the current body of knowledge with regard 
to the contribution of these independent structures (Boshoff et al 2010:50; De Massis et 
al. 2016:9). From the above analysis, it can be concluded that, from a practical, non-
legislative point of view, there is a very limited distinction between the role of 
independent directors and “permanent” independent advisors as part of the supervisory 
governance structures of the featured cases. 
 
Managerial structures 
In terms of managerial governance structures, it is very interesting to note that both 
organisations have appointed family members in the position of chief executive officer, 
but that the organisations have appointed non-family members in the position of chief 
financial officer. In Cream (Pty) Ltd, the chief executive officer also occupies the position 
of chairman of the company board of directors, whereas at Yogurt Holdings (Pty) Ltd, 
this position is occupied by an independent director.  
 
The chief executive officer, as the link between the organisation and the board of 
directors, plays a very important role in both the establishment of the organisation’s 
strategic direction, and in the execution of this established strategy. From the interview 
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data, it was concluded that the family chief executive officers, in both cases, are highly 
motivated to ensure the long-term sustainable success of the family organisation. These 
individuals also have a passion and drive for the organisation that will, according to the 
interviewees, not necessarily be found in a non-family chief executive officer.  
 
The non-family chief financial officers contribute positively to the governance of the 
respective family organisations. These chief financial officers are both experienced 
individuals, who in addition to strategic financial planning, are responsible for the 
implementation of procedures, systems, and internal controls within the organisation. 
No major differences could be identified within the two cases under review with respect 
to the roles of these individuals. 
 
The combination of a family chief executive officer and a non-family chief financial 
officer seems to work effectively within the context of both Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and 
Cream (Pty) Ltd. This structure is supported by the findings of Caselli and Di Giuli 
(2010:381) and Gordini (2016:1) who found that a non-family chief financial officer 
contributes positively to the performance of a family organisation, and that the “best 
performance is achieved when the chief executive officer (CEO) is a family member and 
the chief financial officer is an outsider (non-family)” (Caselli & Di Giuli 2010:381). 
 
An interesting theme, although not directly relevant to the research objectives, is that 
the executive team of Cream (Pty) Ltd is, although on the same level with respect to 
experience, less academically qualified than the executive team of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd. No 
evidence could be obtained in the comparison between the two organisations that the 
lower level of academic qualifications had any negative impact on the value of the 
organisation. 
 
With regard to the remainder of the managerial structures, the senior management 
teams of both family organisations consist of a combination of family and non-family 
members. Officially, both the non-family and family members are held accountable and 
responsible for the performance of their respective departments without any prejudice 
as to their respective family ties. A very strong theme that came to the forefront was 
that, although family and non-family managers are officially held equally accountable 
and responsible, family managers are performance managed to a lesser degree, or in a 
more subtle manner, than their non-family counterparts. This phenomenon was evident 
in both cases.  
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Both organisations have policies and procedures in place, but it seems as if 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd has a much more structured and focused approach towards the 
development and implementation of policies than Cream (Pty) Ltd. Yogurt (Pty) Ltd has 
a vast array of policies in place which include finance, human resource, information 
management, risk management, and sales policies. The policies within Cream (Pty) Ltd 
focus more on human resource related policies.   
 
General 
From the discussions with the various interviewees across both cases, it became 
apparent that Yogurt (Pty) Ltd has a much more focused and a somewhat more formal 
approach towards the implementation of good corporate governance structures 
compared to Cream (Pty) Ltd. The governance structures implemented within 
Yogurt (Pty) Ltd were mainly influenced by the best practice recommendations of 
King III, whereas no specific reference was made to King when the structures of 
Cream (Pty) Ltd were discussed. Cream (Pty) Ltd’s structure was rather based on 
interpersonal relationship issues between family members, and the need to bring order 
to the unstructured way of doing things, that were the driving forces behind the 
implementation of Cream (Pty) Ltd’s governance structures.  
 
4.9.2 THE VALUE OF THE IMPLEMENTED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
 
The title of this study refers to the value of governance structures in private family 
organisations. Considering the title and the research objective and sub-objectives, as 
discussed under Chapter  1.4, the value of governance structures will be discussed. This 
will be done by looking at the organisational objectives, financial performance, and total 
value-add of these structures within both organisations. 
 
Organisational objectives 
From the comparative figure below (Figure 31), it can be seen that Yogurt (Pty) Ltd has 
a slightly more balanced approach in terms of their non-financial and financial 
objectives. Cream (Pty) Ltd, on the other hand, focuses more on financial objectives 
than on non-financial objectives. 
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Financial performance 
The common financial orientated success indicators, as discussed above, were used to 
evaluate Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd’s relative performances against each 
other. In addition, these organisations’ performances were compared to the relative 
financial performance of Clover over the same time period, as depicted in Figure 32. 
Clover is a well-known national brand within the dairy industry. Due to its size, and 
diversity of products and activities, it is not entirely comparable to the featured private 
family organisations, but it is still a very good benchmark with regard to the relative 
performance of the market. Additional information obtained from Milk South Africa’s 
LactoData Statistics (2015:6,24) has also been used to gain a better understanding of 
the relative movements within the industry.  
 
The data used were for the periods 2011 to 2015 because Yogurt (Pty) Ltd’s 2016 
financial data was not yet available at the time of the review. Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and 
Cream (Pty) Ltd’s financial year-ends differ by four months. Clover’s year-end is aligned 
with one of the two featured organisations. The difference in their year-end cut-off dates 
might have an immaterial influence on the comparability of the figures. 
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Figure 32: Relative performance of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd: a cross-case analysis 
  
*Yogurt NPAT = Loss 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the fieldwork) 
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In Figure 32, the relative growth in net profit (after tax) (NPAT) and the return on 
invested capital (based on carrying values) (ROICcv) were used to compare the relative 
financial performance of Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd, with the results of Clover 
shown as an additional industry benchmark. The financial figures of Clover were 
calculated based on information obtained from the summarised financial results as 
published on its website (Clover 2015). A proxy indicator of the South African milk 
market size was calculated by using the annual raw milk purchases (Milk South Africa 
2015:24) multiplied by the international free-on-board (FOB) dairy product prices (Milk 
South Africa 2015:6) for the period under review. The net profit (after tax) and the SA 
milk market size were indexed, with the 2012 year once again being used as the 
reference year. 
 
From the above figure, it can be seen that both Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd’s 
growth in financial performance, as measured in net profit (after tax) and return on 
invested capital, showed a fluctuating movement for the period under review. The 
following general observations can be made. Within the fluctuations, post 2010/2011, 
both cases display a general upward trend in performance over time. For both cases a 
notable peak in performance occur in 2013, with a prominent decline in 2014 (reasons 
discussed elsewhere), and with a recovery in 2015. These trends roughly correlate with 
that of the overall proxy milk market-size, and the results of the industry benchmark–at 
least from 2012 onward. The featured cases did not underperform in general against the 
market, as calculated. 
 
The contribution of governance structures to the value of private family 
organisations 
Private family organisations are well represented—both in the South African community 
and in the international business community. Since it is estimated that family 
organisations comprise approximately 80% of all South African businesses (Diederichs 
& Maas 2007:4), it can be assumed that they contribute materially to economic 
development, growth, and higher employment levels in South Africa. In order to 
maximise their contribution to the economy, their performance needs to be optimised.  
 
The inherent nature of family businesses results in some value destroyers that can limit 
its much needed performance optimisation. These value destroyers, as identified 
through the literature review, the within-case analyses, and the cross-case analysis of 
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Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd include a lack of strategic planning and direction; 
unsuccessful strategy execution due to a lack of pre-determined goals, direction and 
strategy; unstructured and inefficient decision-making processes; limited resources due 
to the impact of possible nepotism and fear of relinquishing family control; negative 
family dynamics due to the family’s inability to objectively measure each other’s 
performances; lack of accountability, especially with respect to non-performing family 
members; and family conflict. This study identified certain essential governance 
structures to be put into place in order to address and eliminate some of these value 
destroyers. The value of governance structures in private family organisations, as 
evidenced from the findings in the featured cases, is summarised in Table 6 below. 
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Table 6: The value of governance structures in private family organisations 
Value destroyer in a family 
organisation 
Governance structure addressing 
value destroyer 
Detailed value contribution 
- Lack of strategic planning and 
direction. 
- Supervisory structures with a balanced 
composition of independent non-
executives, family executives, and 
non-family executives. 
 
- The presence of a balanced supervisory structure imposes 
discipline into the strategic planning process and ensures 
that the organisation’s strategy remains focused. 
- Executives are challenged to improve their strategic, “out-
of-the-box” thinking. 
- Independent directors / advisors contribute industry 
knowledge and external experience to strategy 
development and direction. 
- Independent directors / advisors’ prior experiences in 
strategy development assist with the identification of “gaps” 
within the current strategy. 
- Family executives contribute institutional knowledge and 
long-term sustainability views. 
- Unsuccessful strategy 
execution due to a lack of pre-
determined goals, direction, and 
strategy. 
 
- Supervisory structures with a balanced 
composition of independent non-
executives, family executives, and 
non-family executives. 
 
- As a result of strategic planning and direction, as discussed 
above, pre-determined goals and direction will now be 
established which can be used as a base for better strategy 
execution. 
- The presence of independent directors/advisors helps family 
executives to “report to themselves”. This is needed since 
they are both shareholders and management. This also 
forces discipline into ensuring that strategic objectives are 
met. 
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Value destroyer in a family 
organisation 
Governance structure addressing 
value destroyer 
Detail value contribution 
- Unsuccessful strategy 
execution due to a lack of pre-
determined goals, direction, and 
strategy (cont.). 
- Pre-determined reporting framework. - Predetermined goals of which the progress is reported 
within a pre-determined reporting framework, e.g. pre-
determined timeframes and levels of reporting, from ground 
level up to supervisory governance level.  
- Unstructured and inefficient 
decision-making processes. 
 
- Supervisory structures with a balanced 
composition of independent non-
executives, family executives, and 
non-family, and 
- Non-family / professional executives 
and/or senior management. 
- Improves the effectiveness of the decision-making process 
and forces discipline into decision-making. 
- Brings balance into decision-making, ensuring the interest 
of the company is prioritised above that of the family. 
- Ensures discipline in actions. 
 - Policies on approval processes - Independence on supervisory, executive, and senior 
management level. 
- Implemented policies remove the family-element and 
therefore lead to an easier and less complex decision-
making process. 
 - Information technology and related 
information flow structures. 
- Decision-making is only effective if the information used is 
accurate, complete, and timeous. 
Limited resources due to the 
impact of possible nepotism, and 
fear of relinquishing family 
control. 
- Policies on recruitment and 
appointment, especially as they relate 
to family members. 
 
- Only family members with the necessary qualifications, 
skills, and experience will be appointed; therefore, 
appointment is based on the potential contribution to the 
organisation and not because of family ties. 
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Value destroyer in a family 
organisation 
Governance structure addressing 
value destroyer 
Detail value contribution 
Limited resources due to the 
impact of possible nepotism, and 
fear of relinquishing family control 
(cont.) 
- Appointment of non-family executives 
and senior management in crucial 
roles. 
- Non-family executives contribute independence and prior, 
external experience to the management process. This can 
be done without relinquishing family control. 
 - General policies and frameworks, 
within which to operate on a daily 
basis, being applied fairly and 
consistently. 
- Makes it easier for a non-family managers and non-family 
employees to be part of the family organisation. 
 - Organogram and job descriptions. - It provides a framework for employees within which to work. 
It assists the organisation since the roles are pre-defined 
and clear; it allocates responsibilities and therefore ensures 
accountability, irrespective of family status; it helps 
employees to develop a career-path, which is especially 
relevant to non-family employees within the family 
organisation; and it indicates a reporting line, therefore 
improves communication, and saves time for executives 
because they will not have to deal with minor issues. 
Negative family dynamics 
- Family’s inability to 
objectively measure each 
other’s performance. 
 
- Non-family, non-executives within the 
supervisory structures. 
 
- Independent members assess executives’, especially family 
executives’, performances. 
- Lack of accountability, 
specifically as it relates to 
non-performing family 
members. 
- Policies defining performance 
management processes, as well as 
specifying the applicability of these to 
both family and non-family. 
- Performance management being applied fairly and 
equitably across the organisation. 
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Value destroyer in a family 
organisation 
Governance structure addressing 
value destroyer 
Detail value contribution 
Negative family dynamics (cont.) 
- Family conflict. 
 
- Supervisory structures with 
independent non-executives, as well 
as managerial structures with non-
family executives and/or senior 
management. 
 
- It improves maturity levels within the organisation. 
- It balances the family interest against that of the 
organisation as a separate legal entity. 
- Independent members contribute “objectivity”, which then 
assists in reducing family conflict. 
 - Policy on the involvement or non-
involvement of spouses. 
- Improves family life because it results in less office politics 
at home, and family politics within the business 
environment is also limited. 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the study) 
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4.10 CONCLUSION 
 
In order for governance structures to be effective in their attempt to eliminate the value 
destroyers as identified in Table 6, the organisation needs to take cognisance of the 
following aspects, as identified during the individual and cross-case data analysis 
processes, when implementing their governance structures. 
 
Private family organisations need to identify a governance champion to drive the 
process. In both cases, this role was played by the family chief executive officer. 
Governance structures need to be implemented systematically and the implementation 
champion will need to ensure that he obtains the family members’ buy-in. The family 
members referred to include shareholders, executives, and senior management. 
 
Any policies need to be implemented equitably and fairly with respect to both family and 
non-family members. If not, it could have a detrimental effect in the long-term success 
of the private family organisation. The policy implementations, especially as they relate 
to family members, need to be done in a sensitive manner because conflict at top 
management level will destabilise the organisation. 
 
Non-family professional managers, especially the chief financial officer, should be 
strong-willed, knowledgeable individuals who do not allow the family chief executive 
officer or other executive family members to coerce them. The supervisory structures 
should also have the necessary autonomy and should, therefore, not be instructed by 
individual family members as to the roles and responsibilities the structures should fulfil. 
If the family needs to become involved from a shareholder perspective, the decision 
should, as per Hiebl’s (2013:49) research, be taken at a family meeting level and then 
communicated to the relevant structures as one clear family voice. Management should 
be able to act with authority, and family members should not override decisions made 
by non-family managers simply because of their family ties. It is also important to 
structure the organisation, as far as possible, in such a way that family-on-family 
reporting lines are minimised. 
 
These are, by far, not an encompassing series of factors to take into account when 
implementing governance structures in a private family organisation, but they do 
highlight a few themes that emerged from the data. It is very important to remember that 
the structuring and resultant implementation of governance is a dynamic and lengthy 
process which will never be completed. 
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With reference to the conceptual framework (see Chapter  1.4), within which the 
research objectives of this study were explored, it emerged that both featured cases do 
in fact have supervisory and managerial governance structures in place.  
 
The supervisory governance structures consist of various types of boards, but with an 
underlying balanced representation of family executives, non-family executives, and 
non-family non-executives who are thus independent members. These independent 
members are either registered or not registered at the Companies and Intellectual 
Property Commission. Although structured differently in Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream 
(Pty) Ltd, these supervisory governance structures generally perform similar functions 
within the respective cases.  
 
Family members and non-family members are represented on the executive 
management teams. In both private family organisations, the chief executive officer is a 
family member and the chief financial officer is a non-family member. Both 
organisations have policies in place, with Yogurt (Pty) Ltd being more pro-active in 
terms of the formalisation and implementation of a variety of policies.  
 
Both of these companies seem to be successful in terms of market share, sales 
volumes, job creation, and growth. They survived through the difficult times in the 
industry where even listed companies were struggling. Therefore, one would be able to 
infer, based on the discoveries made in these two cases, that the optimal combination 
of family and non-family executives (for example, a family chief executive officer and a 
non-family chief financial officer) within management structures, as well the presence of 
strong, influential, non-family, independent, non-executives within supervisory structures 
is essential.  
 
It emerged from this study that the involvement of external, independent board 
members or advisors assists the family business executives to refocus from detailed 
day-to-day operational tasks to a wider, and more strategic vision. It was also noted that 
the presence of non-family executive directors/managers improves the professional 
behaviour of family members on an executive level and forces the executives into a new 
level of efficiency and accountability.   
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CHAPTER 5 – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1. FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study provides additional insight into the behaviour of private family organisations, 
and therefore contributes to the current body of knowledge. It also acknowledges the 
limitations to the generalisability of its findings, since these findings can be influenced 
by many individual and situational factors that relate to the respective private family 
organisations under review.  
 
The purpose of this study was to determine how the governance of the selected private 
family organisations is structured, why it is structured as such, and whether these 
implemented structures added any value to the organisations. By following a structured 
research approach, this study is able to generalise its findings to theory, and therefore 
contribute to the current body of knowledge with regard to family organisations and 
governance structures. These findings, as they relate to the research sub-objectives, 
are summarised in Table 7 below. 
 
Table 7: Research sub-objectives and findings 
No Sub-objective Framework / Findings 
A.1. To determine a theoretical 
framework, though a detailed 
literature review, of proposed 
governance structures within private 
family organisations. The literature 
review includes the minimum legal 
requirements for the composition of 
a board of directors, the make-up of 
executive management teams, as 
well as the policies (if there are any) 
that govern private family 
organisations. 
- Definition of a family organisation; 
- Three elements: family, ownership, and 
management; 
- Predominant theories are agency & 
stewardship theory; 
- Legislative requirements (Companies 
Act) and best practice recommendations 
(King III); 
- Generation in control and organisational 
life-cycle are important; 
- Role and characteristics of supervisory 
structures, independent advisors, 
executive managers, CEOs & CFOs; and
- Organisational value: financial & non-
financial (socio-emotional value) 
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No Sub-objective Framework / Findings 
A.2. To identify, through a multiple-case 
study analysis, the format and levels 
of governance structures in the 
selected private family 
organisations. 
Supervisory structures consist of boards of 
directors and/or family advisory boards. 
These are comprised of family and non-
family executives, as well as independent 
non-executive advisors or directors. 
 
Management structure is formalised and 
consists of family and non-family 
members. CEOs are family members & 
CFOs are non-family members. 
A.3. To gain an in-depth understanding, 
through a multiple-case study 
analysis, as to why the relevant 
governance structures were 
implemented in the respective 
private family organisations. 
The structures were implemented mainly 
in order to support effective and balanced 
strategy development & execution, to bring 
discipline into decision-making, to uphold 
interpersonal relationships, to limit 
nepotism and related inequalities, and to 
facilitate accountability.   
A.4. To determine, through a multiple-
case study analysis, whether or not 
the implementation of governance 
structures in the selected private 
family organisations added any 
value to the respective 
organisations. 
It can be deduced, based on the data of 
both Yogurt (Pty) Ltd and Cream (Pty) Ltd, 
that the implemented governance 
structures added value to the respective 
private family organisations. A summary of 
this can be found in Chapter  4.9.2. 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the study) 
 
It is important for family organisations to identify their strengths, e.g. company specific 
knowledge and long-term orientation, in order to capitalise on them, while at the same 
time minimising their weaknesses, e.g. family conflict, role confusion, nepotism, and 
confined views, by appointing the right people in the right places at the right times. It is, 
therefore, not so much the implementation of formal governance structures—just for the 
sake of implementing structures—which is generally accepted and/or legally required 
throughout the business world, but it is more a process of professionalising the private 
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family organisation. As per PwC’s Family Business Survey 2014, professionalising the 
family organisation is about “giving structure and discipline to that vision and energy, so 
that family businesses will be able to innovate better, diversify more effectively, export 
more and grow faster. In short, it is about achieving their twin goals of ensuring the 
company’s long-term future and improving profitability” (PwC 2014b:13). 
 
The description of “one size fits all” does not seem to be relevant in terms of the 
governance structures of a private family organisation. As per the literature review, and 
the discoveries of this study, it is clear that there is no universal governance structure 
that would be suitable and value-adding to all private family organisations (Brenes et al. 
2011:284; Jaggi, Leung & Richardson 2014:18). That being said, certain key elements 
—or “invisible assets”, as Itami (1991:2) refers to them—are recommended and should 
be present in the governance structures of a private family organisation in order to 
ensure, or at least support, the value creation within these organisations. These 
elements, as identified through the study, include, but are not limited to, independence 
(with respect to people, processes, and relationships), external and internal knowledge 
and experience, structure in decision-making and behaviour, equality or fairness in 
terms of operational activities, and family passion and drive. From Figure 33 it can be 
seen that these elements are not rated in terms of relative importance since they all 
more of less contribute to the success of a private family organisation. 
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Figure 33: Key elements to be present in a private family organisation’s 
governance structure 
 
Source: Own observation (based on information obtained during the study) 
 
Independence, as depicted in Figure 33, is all-encompassing because it speaks to the 
independence of both non-executive members involved in the supervisory structures 
and executive members involved in the managerial functions of the private family 
organisation. However, the independence is not only limited to the positions as depicted 
on the respective organisational organograms, but it also reaches much further into 
independent thinking, independent decision-making, and independent performance 
management— and therefore independent processes—to name but a few.  
 
Knowledge, as well as experience, refers to the external knowledge and industry 
experience that non-executive independent directors, non-family executives, and non-
family senior managers contribute to the strategic development and execution 
processes within a private family organisation. In addition to external knowledge and 
experience, the organisation also depends on the institutional knowledge and 
experience contributed by family members.  
 
Value‐adding 
Governance 
Structures
Family passion 
and drive
Knowledge 
and 
experience
Structure
Equality / 
fairness
Independence
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Structure is important, as it assists both family and non-family members in knowing 
where they fit into the organisation, and what their relative roles and responsibilities are. 
It also makes it possible for non-family members to feel as though they are part of the 
family organisation. Since structure clarifies roles, it limits the role confusion 
experienced by family shareholders who need to also act as members of the board of 
directors and executive management. 
 
Structure facilitates equality or fairness in the treatment of all the main stakeholders 
within the private family organisation. It limits nepotism and, therefore, creates more 
equal opportunities and fair treatment for both family and non-family managers and 
employees. 
 
From the findings in this study, it was deduced that the passion and drive of family 
members are also key elements in the success of the featured family organisations. 
Family members have a vision for the organisation (i.e., they “can see the way forward” 
(Interviewee #5)) and work hard to ensure the success of the private family 
organisation. As stated by Interviewee #6, “They are more driven than, perhaps, the 
average person might be, for success”. 
 
In conclusion, a family organisation needs external members in their governance 
structures who are either official board members or “contracted-in” industry and/or 
strategy specialists to act in an advisory capacity. Based on the research performed in 
this study, and supported by the findings of Van den Heuvel et al. (2007:152), the 
suggestion to policy-makers is therefore, as is currently the case in South Africa, not to 
enforce any specific governance structures through legislation onto private 
organisations, but rather to educate these organisations as to the added value of formal 
governance structures—for example, the role that external independent directors can 
play in the various stages of a private family organisation, and the discipline that can be 
obtained from having formal policies in place, for example, a delegation of authority 
framework.  
 
The findings, as supported by the literature, suggest that governance structures do 
indeed add value to private family organisations. A few concluding comments by the 
interviewees on the value-add of governance structures in a private family organisation 
include the following:  
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By having corporate governance in place, you are limiting the risks specific to a 
family business (Interviewee #Y9);  
 
The company changed dramatically from a company with very little structure, to 
almost over structured. It is like day and night, but it is for the good. The company 
now has a much better chance of being sustainable, by having a structured 
environment that is not so dependent on individuals (Interviewee #Y6); and  
 
A family business is all about the vision of the family. A family needs to decide 
whether their vision is to build a world-class family organisation or whether they 
would just like to have an organisation that “keeps them alive”. The family’s vision 
for the organisation is the main driver for the type of structure to be implemented. 
They have to ask themselves the question as to whether their vision is to create 
wealth. I can tell you that ours was to create wealth, therefore the implementation 
of this model (Interviewee #C1). 
 
5.2. CONTRIBUTIONS, SUGGESTIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
The limitations of this study have been discussed under Chapter  1.6 and Chapter  3.4. 
These limitations should be considered when generalising the discoveries of this study 
to theoretical propositions. Despite the impact of these limitations on generalisation, the 
study also provides direction for future research.  
 
Drawing on this study’s research about managerial governance structures, future 
research in the area of fair and equal performance management systems within a 
private family organisational context, would be valuable. Non-performing family 
members, although they are performance managed in accordance with the 
organisation’s KPI processes, will most likely not be dismissed, but only be redeployed. 
A reason given for this is that the dismissal of family members will negatively affect 
family relationships. It was however stated that if the relevant non-performing family 
members were appointed after the implementation of the new governance structures, 
matters might have been handled differently. For any future research on the 
performance of family management/employees compared to that of non-family 
members, it will thus be important to consider the timeframes of the appointment of the 
relevant employees, compared to timeframes of the implementation of the governance 
structures which manage these processes. 
 
In addition to this, it is important to determine whether the family employee was 
appointed at the organisation before his supervisor’s appointment date. If the supervisor 
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is responsible for the appointment of the family employee, his level of authority will 
immediately increase and will consequently reduce the risk of nepotism with regard to 
the performance management of family employees. This will potentially facilitate 
improved employee performance and, indirectly, it will potentially facilitate improved 
value of the family organisation. Management’s tenure at the family organisation and 
the sequence of appointments therefore warrants further investigation. 
 
The role of trust relationships in a family organisation is an important aspect of 
governance literature that cannot be ignored. As highlighted in the study, family 
members rely on mutual trust as a substitute for formal internal controls and procedures 
to manage certain risk elements. Although the purpose of this study was not to 
investigate these trust relationships, it did illuminate the importance of trust for family 
members within a family organisational context. This contributes to Chrisman et al.’s 
(2010:1044) call to no longer “neglect” trust in the governance literature as it can make 
an important contribution to management theories.  
 
Family organisations might, for various reasons which include socio-emotional wealth 
(family control), contemplate the appointment or non-appointment of family versus non-
family managers in certain key positions within the organisation. Family shareholders 
may, for instance, feel that the finances of the private family organisation are of a 
confidential nature and that they would, therefore, prefer not to have a non-family 
member heading the finance division. Contrary to this reasoning, an interviewee stated 
that the role and the responsibilities of the chief financial officer are of a more analytical 
nature, and that, therefore, the presence of a family member might not be necessary in 
that position. In addition to this, some of the interviewees indicated that family members 
are very passionate about their organisations and might, therefore, be the ideal people 
to fill positions in marketing. This alternative reasoning might need to be considered in 
future research when determining the potential roles and contributions of professional 
management within a family organisation. 
 
Further research should also consider performing a cross-discipline study between legal 
and accounting/management disciplines, focusing on the accountability of non-
registered advisors of the board of directors versus registered independent directors. 
This can be done with reference to the requirements of, and the potential liabilities listed 
in, the Companies Act and other relevant statutory documents.   
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ANNEXURE A: INSTITUTIONAL CONSENT 
Request for permission to conduct research at  
XXX (PTY) LTD 
 
The effect of the governance structure of a private family organisation on its 
financial performance 
 
xx xxxx 2014 
 
XX XXX 
CEO XXX 
XXXXXX 
 
Dear XXX, 
 
I, Rolandi van der Westhuizen, am doing research towards a master’s degree 
(MPhil Accounting Sciences), at the University of South Africa (UNISA). My supervisor 
is Mr. Albert de Graaf, the acting Director of the School of Applied Accountancy, in the 
College of Accounting Sciences. 
 
We are inviting you to participate in a study entitled: “The effect of the governance 
structure of a private family organisation on its financial performance”. [The 
original title, which was updated at a later stage] 
 
The aim of the study is to obtain an in-depth understanding of the governance 
structures (board of directors, executive management, operational management, 
policies & procedures) in your family organisation, as well as to determine whether 
these structures have any effect on the financial performance of the organisation. 
 
It is envisaged that your organisation will benefit from this study, as the results might 
provide insight to you in identifying an optimal governance structure to facilitate better 
financial performance in your organisation. The output from this study will be a 
dissertation for master’s degree purposes, as well as an article / articles to be published 
in accredited academic journals. 
 
Master’s Dissertation – R vd Westhuizen Page 221 
 
 
Your company has been selected as part of the study, for the following reasons: 
 
Firstly, we have identified the manufacturing of dairy products as one of the industries in 
which limited (if any) family business research have been done, specifically as it relates 
to the governance structures and relevant financial performance. You were identified as 
a major role player in this industry.  
 
Secondly, it is believed that your company qualifies in terms of our definition of a private 
family organisation, namely that:  
1. “The majority of decision-making rights are in the possession of the natural 
person(s) who established the firm, or in the possession of the natural person(s) 
who has/have acquired the share capital of the firm, and/or in the possession of 
their spouses, parents, child or children’s direct heirs; 
2. The majority of decision-making rights are indirect or direct; 
3. At least one representative of the family or kin is formally involved in the 
governance (strategic and/or operational level) of the organisation; and 
4. The organisation’s vision is to ensure the transfer of ownership and where 
applicable, management of the organisation to next generations.” 
 
The study will entail a detailed case-study, which will include: 
- One-to-one interviews with family shareholders, members of the board, executive- 
and operational management (family and non-family); 
- A review of the company’s policies and procedures as it relates to the recruitment, 
appointment, performance management, etc. of people employed in the 
governance structures, as listed above; and 
- A review of other relevant current and historical financial and non-financial company 
information, e.g. financial statements, shareholder agreements etc.  
 
The information obtained from this in-depth case-study will at all times be treated as 
confidential. The organisations and individuals participating in the study will not be 
named in the report and will merely be referred to as company A, B or C or Interviewee 
no 1, Interviewee no 2, etc. The information obtained from the case-study will be used 
for academic research purposes only and the data obtained will be securely stored by 
me as primary researcher for at least five years, where after it will be destroyed.  
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Your organisation’s participation in this study is very important and will be appreciated. I 
do not foresee that your organisation or any individual participating in this study will 
suffer any harm from participating in this study, however, you may choose not to 
participate and you may also stop participating at any time without any adverse 
consequences. 
 
The findings of the case-study will be discussed with the CEO or his/her representative 
to test the factual accuracy of the findings before finalisation of the report. Should you 
require any further information or feedback from the research results, please do not 
hesitate to inform me accordingly. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Rolandi van der Westhuizen 
Senior Lecturer – Department of Financial Governance 
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ANNEXURE B: INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION SHEET 
 
The effect of the governance structure of a private family organisation on its 
financial performance [The original title, which was updated at a later stage] 
 
Dear Prospective Interviewee 
 
My name is Rolandi van der Westhuizen and I am doing research with Albert de Graaf, 
the acting Director of the School of Applied Accountancy, in the College of Accounting 
Sciences towards a master’s degree (MPhil Accounting Sciences) at the University of 
South Africa. We are inviting you to participate in a study entitled: “The effect of the 
governance structure of a private family organisation on its financial performance: 
 
The aim of the study is to obtain an in-depth understanding of the governance 
structures (board of directors, executive management, operational management, 
policies & procedures) in your family organisation, as well as to determine whether 
these structures have any effect on the financial performance of the organisation. 
 
Your company has been selected as part of the study as it was identified as a major role 
player in this industry and it qualifies in terms of our definition of a private family 
organisation. Being a stakeholder in the company, you are being invited to participate in 
this study. 
 
Interviews will be held with individuals qualifying in terms of one or more of the following 
categories as it relates to your company: shareholders, board of directors, executive 
management and operational management.  
 
Your contact details have been obtained from the office of the chief executive officer. 
The study includes interviews with all the Interviewees identified as described above 
and will entail a discussion of approximately 60 minutes per individual regarding the 
company’s formal governance structures, succession, recruitment and appointment 
processes, performance management, accountability, privileged information and 
company performance.     
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The interview will be audio taped to ensure the factual accuracy and completeness of 
data captured for purposes of this study. The interview will be semi-structured in order 
to facilitate our discussion of the various topics. Questions will for instance be:  
- Does the company have formal governance structures in place, and if so, what are 
they?  
- Are these structures, in your opinion, effective or not? Please motivate. 
 
It is envisaged that your organisation will benefit from this study, as the results might 
provide insight in identifying an optimal governance structure to facilitate better financial 
performance in your organisation. The output from this study will be a dissertation for 
master’s degree purposes, as well as an article / articles to be published in accredited 
academic journals. 
 
The information from individual interviewees will at all times be treated as confidential. 
Your name will not be linked to your individual contributions to this study by 
allocating a respondent number to your responses. The information obtained from the 
interview will be used for academic research purposes only and the data obtained will 
be held under lock and key by me as primary researcher for at least five years where 
after it will be destroyed (hard copies will be shredded and electronic information will be 
permanently deleted from the hard drive of the relevant personal computer). A 
professional transcriber will also have access to the audio recordings of the interviews, 
but only after signing a confidentiality agreement. 
 
Your participation in this study is very important and will be appreciated. Because of the 
non-sensitive and non-personal nature of the study, I do not foresee that you will suffer 
any harm from participating in this study, however, you may choose not to participate 
and you may also stop participating at any time without any adverse consequences. I 
kindly request you to please complete the consent form below before participating in the 
interview. 
 
The interview should take approximately 60 minutes of your time and will be conducted 
as per our appointment at a time and place of your convenience. Please keep in mind 
that you will not receive any financial compensation for participating in this study. 
 
This study has received written approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the 
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College of Accounting Sciences, Unisa. A copy of the approval letter can be obtained 
from the researcher if you so wish. 
 
Should you require any further information or feedback from the research results, 
please do not hesitate to contact me at: 
Telephone: 012 – 429 8225 
E-mail: vdwesr@unisa.ac.za    
 
Should you have concerns about the way in which the research has been conducted, 
you may contact my supervisor, Albert de Graaf at:  
Telephone: 012 – 429 4529  
E-mail: Dgraaa@unisa.ac.za  
 
Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet and for participating in this 
study. 
 
Kind regards. 
Rolandi vd Westhuizen 
 
LETTER OF CONSENT: 
 Please tick 
I understand that the information I provide will only be used for 
the purposes of this research project and that I will remain 
anonymous. I confirm having participated under informed 
consent. 
Yes No 
Consent: I give my permission for the use of information I 
provide to be used for research purposes (which will not in any 
way be to my disadvantage or detriment) 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Consent: I give my permission for the audio recording of the 
interview 
Yes No 
I confirm that I am aware that I may at any point during the 
interview cease to participate without being adversely affected. 
 
Yes 
 
No 
  
Signed on   .................................... (date) at ...................................................(location) 
Dr/Prof/Mr/Me ...........................................................  
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ANNEXURE C: FACTUAL ORGANISATIONAL INFORMATION 
 
PART A – PRIVATE FAMILY ORGANISATION (does it meet the definition?) 
 % 
1. Majority of decision making rights  
1.1 Share ownership of holding company  
1.1.1 % Directly held by family¹ members  
 1.1.2 % Directly held by non-family members  
 1.1.3 % Indirectly held by family company/trust etc. Please  
  specify as to the: 
  a) legal structure of the investment vehicle,  
  b) % family ownership of the investment vehicle; and 
  c) % non-family ownership of the investment vehicle. 
 
 
 Yes / No 
1.2 Contractual agreements that specify voting rights in 
shareholders’ meeting, if not aligned with share ownership. 
Please give details as to the voting rights arrangement: 
 
1.2.1 Votes based on share ownership %.  
1.2.2 One vote per shareholder present in shareholders’  
 meeting (not aligned with % shares held). 
 
1.2.3 Alternative method, please specify: 
 
 
1.3 Contractual agreements that specify voting rights in directors’ 
meeting. Please give details as to the voting rights 
arrangement: 
 
1.3.1 Votes based on share ownership %.  
1.3.2 One vote per director present in directors’ meeting.  
1.3.3 Alternative method, please specify: 
 
 
1.4 Is there a minimum percentage or number of votes required 
before a decision can be adopted / implemented in a 
shareholder’s meeting? If so, please specify the 
percentage/number of votes, as well as the type of decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5 Is there a minimum percentage or number of votes required 
 before a decision can be adopted / implemented in a 
directors’  meeting? If so, please specify the 
percentage/number of votes,  as well as the type of 
decisions. 
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 Number of 
individuals 
2. Involvement in the governance of the organisation  
2.1 How many representatives of the family are formally involved 
in: 
 
 2.1.1 Non-executive management (on the board, but not 
  operationally involved). 
 
 2.1.1 Executive management (on the board and  
  operationally involved). 
 
 2.1.2 Operational management (not on the board).  
  
2.2 What is the total number of individuals (family as well as 
non-family) formally involved in: 
 
 2.2.1 Non-executive management (on the board, but not 
  operationally involved). 
 
 2.2.1 Executive management (on the board and  
  operationally involved). 
 
 2.2.2 Operational management (not on the board).  
 Indicate 
2.3 Who determines the strategic direction of the company:  
 2.3.1 Family members  
 2.3.2 Chairman of the board of directors  
 2.3.2 Non-executive management (on the board, but not 
  operationally involved). 
 
 2.3.3 Executive management (on the board and  
  operationally involved). 
 
 
3. Transfer of ownership:  
3.1 Is the intention of the current family shareholders to transfer 
their company ownership to the next generation family 
members? 
 
3.2 Are there formal succession plans in place with regards to 
ownership? 
 
3.3 Are there formal succession plans in place with regards to 
management? 
 
3.4 Which generation is currently managing the company?  
 
PART B – COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
1. The chairperson of the board of directors  
1.1 Is the chairperson of the board a member of the family?  
1.2 In the event that the chairperson is not a family member, 
does he form part of the company’s professional external 
support structure, i.e. auditor, legal representative, banker, 
etc.? If so, please specify. 
 
1.3 In the event that 1.1 and 1.2 in not applicable, please indicate 
as to the relationship between the chairperson and the 
company, i.e. totally independent advisor, long-time friend of 
the family, etc. 
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1.4 Is the chairperson of the board also the CEO/MD of the 
company? 
 
1.5  Date of the chairperson’s appointment: 
- To the board? 
- As chairperson? 
 
 
 
2. Members of the board of directors 
Please indicate the members of the board of directors, their relationship to the family, 
responsibility on the board and their qualifications.  
 
# Member ² Family/advisor/ 
not related 
Responsibility 
(CEO/CFO, 
non-executive 
etc.) 
Qualifications Date of 
appointment 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9      
10      
11      
12      
 
 
PART C – COMPOSITION OF THE MANAGEMENT TEAM 
1. Members of the executive management team 
Please indicate the members of the executive management team, their relationship to 
the family, their responsibility in the organisation, their qualifications and date of 
appointment. 
 
# Member ² Family/not 
related 
Responsibility 
(CEO/CFO/ 
marketing/production)
Qualifications Date of 
appointment
1   Chief executive officer   
2   Chief operations officer   
3   Chief financial officer   
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9      
10      
 
 
 
Master’s Dissertation – R vd Westhuizen Page 229 
 
2. Members of the operational management team (not on the board) 
Please indicate the members of the operational management team (not on the board of 
directors), their relationship to the family, their responsibility in the organisation and their 
qualifications.  
 
# Member ² Family/not 
related 
Responsibility Qualifications Date of 
appointment 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9      
10      
 
PART D – POLICIES 
 
1. Human Resource Policies 
1.1 Does the company have formal human resource policies?  
1.2 In general, are these policies applicable to all employees in 
the organisation, or is it limited to non-family members? 
 
 
1.3 Please indicate if the following human resource policies are relevant to the 
company and whether they are applicable to both family and/or non-family 
members on an executive and/or operational management level: 
 
# Policy Relevant Executive 
management 
Operational 
management 
  Y/N Family Non-
family 
Family Non-
family 
   Y/N Y/N Y/N Y/N 
1 Recruitment       
2 Selection and 
appointment 
     
3 Performance 
management 
     
4 Disciplinary action      
5 Grievances      
6 Remuneration      
7 Leave      
8 Training and 
bursaries 
     
9 Career development      
10 Ethical and 
professional conduct 
     
 
 
 
Master’s Dissertation – R vd Westhuizen Page 230 
 
 Other, please 
specify: 
     
11       
12       
 
2. General Policies 
Please indicate if the following financial policies are relevant to the company and 
whether they are applicable to both family and/or non-family members on an executive 
and/or operational management level. 
 
# Policy Relevant Executive 
management 
Operational 
management 
  Y/N Family Non-
family 
Family Non-
family 
   Y/N Y/N Y/N Y/N 
1 Delegation of 
authority ³ 
     
2 Procurement      
3 Credit card      
4 Travel      
       
 Other, please specify:      
5       
6       
7       
8       
 
3. Dividend Policy 
3.1 Does the company have a formal dividend policy?  
3.2 If no, what method is used to determine profit distribution or 
alternatively capital retention? 
 
 
 
 
PART E – GENERAL 
1. Family council/board 
1.1 Does the family have a formal family council/board?  
1.2 If applicable, who chairs the family council/board?  
1.3 Who are the members of the family council/board?  
1.4 What are the responsibilities and functions of the family 
council/board? 
 
- Responsibilities: 
- Functions: 
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Notes: 
 
¹ Definition of family members: 
Natural person(s) who established the firm or initially acquired the share capital of the 
firm, and/or their spouses, parents, children or children’s direct heirs.  
 
 
² Important: 
The information obtained from this in-depth case-study will at all times be treated as 
confidential. The organisations and individuals participating in the study will not be 
named in the report and will merely be referred to as company A, B or C or Interviewee 
no 1, Interviewee no 2, etc. The information obtained from the case-study will be used 
for academic research purposes only. 
 
³ Delegation of authority: 
A policy indicating the individuals/positions in the company, who have the right to take 
certain short term/long term/strategic decisions. It also specifies as to who can authorise 
payments (expenses and of capital nature) up to predetermined rand value levels, etc.  
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ANNEXURE D: COMPANY GOALS AND SUCCESS MEASURES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“It is imperative that the researcher understands the vision, goals and motivations of the 
family organisation before trying to determine the effectiveness of its organisational 
structure in terms of financial performance.” 
 
 
THE COMPANY CANNOT BE MEASURED ON SOMETHING THAT IT DID NOT AIM 
AT!! 
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COMPANY GOALS AND SUCCESS 
 
PART A: GOALS OF THE FAMILY BUSINESS 
1. Please describe the long-term and short-term goals of this family business  
 
 
No Long-term goals 
1 
 
 
 
 
2  
 
 
3  
 
 
4  
 
 
5  
 
 
 
No Short-term goals 
1  
 
 
2  
 
 
3  
 
 
4  
 
 
5  
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PART B: COMPANY SUCCESS 
2. What are the top 10 most important indicators of success for the family 
business? (Please rate them in order of importance, 1 being the most important) 
 
No Important indicators of success Rating 
1 Growth in net asset value 
 
 
2 To be an environmentally responsible business 
 
 
3 Increased return on invested capital 
 
 
4 Customer service and satisfaction 
 
 
5 Growth in revenue 
 
 
6 Contributing to the socio-economic circumstances of the local 
community, e.g. job creation, education, mentoring, sponsorships 
etc. 
 
 
7 Decrease in operating expenses 
 
 
8 Employee satisfaction 
 
 
9 Increase in gross profit 
 
 
10 Quality of products in so far as it would affect the reputation of the 
company 
 
 
11 Growth in net profit (after tax) 
 
 
12 Sustainability of income for current shareholders and future 
generations / sustaining a family business across generations 
 
 
13 Being able to declare substantial dividends on a regular basis 
 
 
14 Job-creation for direct and indirect family members 
   
 
15 Availability of cash for planned and unexpected occurrences / being 
“cash flush” 
 
 
16 Keeping family control of the business 
 
 
17 Increased market share 
 
 
18 Preservation of family relationships and unity 
 
 
19 Other, please specify 
 
 
20 Other, please specify 
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3. How do you MEASURE the above rated items?  
(Please indicate it in the order of the ratings) 
 
Rating Measurement 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
10 
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4. For the items rated 1 to 10 under question 2, what PROCESSES do you have in 
place to ensure that the company focus on and achieve the individual success 
factors? Also, if available, please indicate in which financial year these 
processes were IMPLEMENTED. 
 
Rating Process Fin year 
Implemented 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
  
4 
 
 
  
5 
 
 
  
6 
 
 
  
7 
 
 
  
8 
 
 
  
9 
 
 
  
10 
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PART C: COMPARABILITY 
5. Are there any listed companies that you would consider comparable to your 
company, in terms of industry, products and financial performance? Please 
name them and the reasons as to why you believe they are comparable.  
(Please rate them in order of relevance, 1 being the most comparative) 
 
No Company Name Reasons as to why comparable 
1   
2   
3   
 
6. Do you ever compare your company’s financial performance to that of the 
listed companies identified above? If yes, what indicators do you consider/use 
to perform the comparison? (Please rate them in order of importance, 1 being the 
most important) 
 
Yes / No: 
 
No 
 
Indicators 
1  
 
2  
 
3  
 
4  
 
5  
 
 
PART D: OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION 
7. Please indicate any other information (financial and non-financial), not 
referred to in Parts A – C, which you would consider important/relevant to this 
study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU 
    Interviewee #___ 
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ANNEXURE E: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE – EXECUTIVES AND MANAGEMENT 
 
 
Dear Interviewee, 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
As described in the information sheet, the information obtained from the individual 
interviewees will at all times be treated as confidential. Your name will not be linked to 
your individual contributions to this study by allocating a respondent number to your 
responses. Please be reminded that you may choose not to participate and you may 
also stop participating at any time without any adverse consequences. Should there be 
any questions that you are not comfortable in answering, you are welcome to indicate it 
as such. 
 
Kind regards 
 
Rolandi vd Westhuizen 
  
Master’s Dissertation – R vd Westhuizen Page 239 
 
PART A 
1. Personal information: 
a) Are you a family member or non-family member? Please explain the relationship, 
i.e. father, brother, sister-in-law etc. 
b) If you are a family member, which generation of family management do you 
represent (1st, 2nd 3rd generation)? 
c) Are you a shareholder in the company and if so, what is your % shareholding? 
d) When did you start working at the company and what was your position at that 
time? 
e) Why are you working in the family business? 
 
PART B 
2. Formal governance structures: 
a) Does the company have formal governance structures in place, and if so, what are 
they according to you?  
b) Why do you think it is important or not important to have formal governance 
structures in place? 
c) Please discuss whether these company structures are, in your opinion, effective or 
not. 
d) Who is determining the strategic direction of the business, the family or the 
directors? If the directors, is it the family directors or the board as a whole? 
 
3. Succession: 
a) Please explain whether or not you believe that the current owners have the intention 
to transfer the company to the next generation and why would you think so?  
 
4. Recruitment and appointment: 
a) Is there, in your opinion, biasness and/or favouritism towards family members when 
recruiting and appointing new staff members? Why would you say so and if it is the 
case, to what extend? 
b) Please discuss whether you believe that all executives/managers in this company 
are: 
i) Qualified in terms of formal qualifications and experience/expertise for their 
various positions and; 
ii) Are competently performing their duties in their respective positions? 
 
5. Individual performance management: 
a) Does the organisation have formal performance management procedures in place 
and what are they? 
b) Family members in management positions sometimes need to monitor the 
performance of other family members. Would you describe them as being effective 
in monitoring the performance of other family-members and why?  
c) How often do you personally undergo formal performance reviews? 
d) Please motivate whether you believe that family and non-family 
executives/managers undergo performance reviews with the same rigor and 
frequency? 
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6. Accountability (not responsibility): 
a) Would you say that the non-family executive/manager is expected to answer more 
to the owners of the company than the family executive/manager regarding their 
actions, and why would you say so? 
b) In the event that all executive members (family and non-family) are held equally 
accountable for their actions, what do you believe will be the impact on the 
performance of the company as a whole and more specifically on the financial 
performance of the company? 
c) Who are you accountable to and is it on a formal or informal basis? Please explain. 
i) Shareholders (any specific one, if more than one shareholder)? 
ii) Board of directors? 
iii) Direct line manager? 
iv) Specific family member? 
v) Other 
 
7. Privileged information: 
a) Is there, in your opinion, important company information (relevant to the 
performance of the company) that is shared only with family executives/managers 
that should have been shared with the entire management team? 
b) If so,  
i) what type of information was privileged?; 
ii) and what do you believe would the impact have been on the overall 
performance and financial performance of the company if the entire 
management team had access to the information? 
 
8. Company Performance: 
a) What do you understand as your company’s performance goals? 
b) What do you understand as your company’s financial performance goals? / What 
are your company’s financial performance goals? 
c) What are the company’s non-financial goals?  
d) What is more important to you (or if non-family, what do you think?): The financial 
wealth of the company or the financial wealth of the family? And why? 
 
9. General: 
a) Do you think that family managers should be governed/managed differently from 
non-family managers?  
i) why?; and 
ii) if so, how? 
b) In your opinion, what impact does the current structure of the organisation’s board 
of directors, executive and operational management has on its financial 
performance?  
c) In the event that the organisation had less family members involved in the 
governance structures and more professional managers (based on role specific 
qualifications and experience), what do you believe would have been the effect on 
the financial performance of the organisation? (Will it increase/decrease/stay the 
same and why?) 
 
10. Conclusion: 
a) Is there anything else that you would like to discuss or add before we conclude? 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this research project!! 
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ANNEXURE F: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE – NON-EXECUTIVES 
 
 
Dear Interviewee, 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
As described in the information sheet, the information obtained from the individual 
interviewees will at all times be treated as confidential. Your name will not be linked to 
your individual contributions to this study by allocating a respondent number to your 
responses. Please be reminded that you may choose not to participate and you may 
also stop participating at any time without any adverse consequences. Should there be 
any questions that you are not comfortable in answering, you are welcome to indicate it 
as such. 
 
Kind regards 
 
Rolandi vd Westhuizen 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE – NON-EXECUTIVES 
 
PART A 
1. Personal information: 
a) Are you a family member or non-family member? Please explain the relationship, 
i.e. father, brother, sister-in-law etc. 
b) If you are a family member, which generation of family management do you 
represent (1st, 2nd 3rd generation)? 
c) Are you a shareholder in the company and if so, what is your % shareholding? 
d) When were you appointed on the board of directors and what are your specific 
responsibilities? 
e) If not a family member, do you form part of the company’s professional external 
support structure, i.e. auditor, legal representative, banker etc.? 
f) Why are you involved in this family business? 
 
PART B 
2. Formal governance structures: 
e) Does the company have formal governance structures in place, and if so, what are 
they according to you?  
f) Please discuss whether these structures are, in your opinion, effective or not. 
g) Who is determining the strategic direction of the business, the family or the 
directors? 
 
3. Succession: 
b) Please explain whether or not you believe that the current owners have the intention 
to transfer the company to the next generation and why would you think so?  
 
4. Recruitment and appointment: 
c) Is there, in your opinion, biasness and/or favouritism towards family members when 
recruiting and appointing new staff members? Why would you say so and if it is the 
case, to what extend? 
d) Please discuss whether you believe that all executives/managers in this company 
are: 
i) Qualified in terms of formal qualifications and experience/expertise for their 
various positions and; 
ii) Are competently performing their duties in their respective positions? 
 
5. Individual performance management: 
e) Does the organisation have formal performance management procedures in place 
and what are they? 
f) Family members in management positions sometimes need to monitor the 
performance of other family members. Would you describe them as being effective 
in monitoring the performance of other family-members and why?  
g) Please motivate whether you believe that family and non-family 
executives/managers undergo performance reviews with the same rigor and 
frequency? 
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6. Accountability (not responsibility): 
d) Would you say that the non-family executive/manager is expected to answer more 
to the owners of the company than the family executive/manager regarding their 
actions, and why would you say so? 
e) In the event that all executive members (family and non-family) are held equally 
accountable for their actions, what do you believe will be the impact on the 
performance of the company as a whole and more specifically on the financial 
performance of the company? 
f) Who are you accountable to and is it on a formal or informal basis? Please explain. 
i) Shareholders (any specific one, if more than one shareholder)? 
ii) Board of directors? 
iii) Direct line manager? 
iv) Specific family member? 
v) Other 
 
7. Privileged information: 
c) Is there, in your opinion, important company information (relevant to the 
performance of the company) that is shared only with family executives/managers 
that should have been shared with the entire management team? 
d) If so,  
a. what type of information was privileged?; 
b. and what do you believe would the impact have been on the overall 
performance and financial performance of the company if the entire 
management team had access to the information? 
 
8. Company Performance: 
e) What do you understand as your company’s performance goals? 
f) What do you understand as your company’s financial performance goals? / What 
are your company’s financial performance goals? 
g) What are the company’s non-financial goals?  
h) What is more important to you (or if non-family, what do you think?): The financial 
wealth of the company or the financial wealth of the family? And why? 
 
9. General: 
d) Do you think that family managers should be governed/managed differently from 
non-family managers?  
i) why?; and 
ii) if so, how? 
e) In your opinion, what impact does the current structure of the organisation’s board 
of directors, executive and operational management has on its financial 
performance?  
f) In the event that the organisation had less family members involved in the 
governance structures and more professional managers (based on role specific 
qualifications and experience), what do you believe would have been the effect on 
the financial performance of the organisation? (Will it increase/decrease/stay the 
same and why?) 
 
10. Conclusion: 
b) Is there anything else that you would like to discuss or add before we conclude? 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this research project!!
Master’s
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ANNEXURE H: CODE BOOK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Categories 
1. Family governance 
2. Organisational governance 
 
Sub-categories 
1. Family organisation 
2. Supervisory governance 
3. Managerial governance 
4. Financial value 
5. Non-financial value 
 
Codes 
1. Accountability 
2. Advisory role 
3. Autonomy 
4. Agency 
5. Agency cost 
6. Balance 
7. BBBEE 
8. Behaviour 
9. Best practice 
10. Biographical data 
11. Board of directors 
12. Board sub-committees 
13. Business management 
14. Business objectives 
15. CEO 
16. CFO 
17. COO 
18. Chairman of the board 
19. Commitment 
20. Communication 
21. Conflict 
22. Conflict of interest 
23. Control 
24. Culture 
Legend: 
Black: Obtained from literature review 
Blue: Obtained from literature review & used in data analysis 
Green: Not obtained from literature review. Used in data analysis, thus additional 
codes 
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25. Data analysis 
26. Decision making 
27. Definition - Family Organisation 
28. Developed vs Developing economies 
29. Dynamic 
30. Discipline 
31. Dividends 
32. Equality 
33. Executive directors 
34. Exit strategy 
35. Experience 
36. Familiness 
37. Family 
38. Family board / council 
39. Family business significance 
40. Family influence 
41. Family objectives / vision 
42. Family organisation characteristics 
43. Family vs non-family 
44. Family vs performance 
45. Financial goals 
46. Financial performance 
47. Financial performance - Measurement 
48. Financing 
49. Founder 
50. Generation 
51. Governance - Negative 
52. Governance - Positive 
53. Governance structures 
54. Human resource: Training & Development 
55. Independence 
56. Independent directors 
57. Industry requirementss 
58. Information 
59. Integrity 
60. Leadership 
61. Legislation 
62. Life-cycle stage 
63. Limitations 
64. Long term view / Sustainability 
65. Management 
66. Nepotism 
67. Non-family 
68. Non-family executive directors 
69. Non-financial objectives 
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70. Ownership/Shareholding 
71. Passion 
72. Patient Capital 
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